PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

JULY
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YOUTH IN THE USSR

SPECIAL BOOK SECTION

Khrushchev on Agriculture

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Are Russia and the US "Converging"?

THE SOVIET CONSUMER: A DISCUSSION

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Generations in Conflict

EDITORS' NOTE: That "fathers and sons" do not always see eye to eye and are in fact often on opposite sides of the fence is one of those facts of life which transcend the boundaries of time and geography. In no contemporary society, however, are the differences between generations so acute and so infused with political overtones as in the Soviet Union. In the two articles below, these differences and conflicts are examined, first, in the sphere of belles-lettres*—always a sensitive indicator of social and political trends in Russia—and, next, as they were observed by an American who spent two years at a Soviet university. A forthcoming article will deal with the problems of Soviet education in general.*

The Literary Arena

By Michael Rywkin

"We are thankful to Comrade Stalin for our happy youth" were words that stared down from the walls of every Soviet school while "The Leader" was still alive. They were more than words. Although adults encountered privations and injustice, the youth were given special attention and preferential treatment. Millions of adults vegetated in Solzhenitsyn-style concentration camps, while youngsters enjoyed the privileges of pioneer camps in the Crimea. And while the youth joined with their families in the struggle to survive on meager incomes in wretchedly crowded housing, they could at least spend their leisure hours in "Palaces of Pioneers," count on free tuition in

Mr. Rywkin, whose "Central Asia and the Price of Sovietization" appeared in the January-February 1964 issue of this journal, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the College of the City of New York. This article is based on a longer study now in progress.

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the schools and enjoy other encouragements from the government. Children indoctrinated from the nursery on could seldom shake off the combined influence of schools, youth organizations (Pioneers, Komsomol) and the pleasant feeling of holding a privileged position in their society. The Communist leadership therefore regarded the young people as far more reliable and "controllable" than their elders, especially those among the latter who could remember a different way of life under capitalism.

However, a profound change has taken place since 1956, when under the initial impact of revelations about Stalin, Soviet youth began to have doubts about the values and conceptions they had theretofore accepted blindly. By 1963 the "most reliable" group in Soviet society had evolved into the most unorthodox, the least conformist. This transformation has been due in no small part to the impact of a group of young Soviet writers who have captured the imagination of many youths, greatly weakening the influence of party, Komsomol, and school. The names of these young writers are now well known abroad: poets Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Andrei Voznesenski, Naum Korzhavin, Bella Akhmadulina, Yevgeni Vinokurov, Robert Rozhdestvenski, Boris Slutski; writers Victor Aksionov and Yuri Kazakov; and the balladeer Bulat Okudzhava.[1] They have gotten support from a number of middle-aged liberal writers who since 1956 have been increasingly active on the Soviet literary scene (Alexander Yashin, Victor Nekrasov, Yuri Nagibin, Leonid Martynov, Yaroslav Smeliakov, Victor Rozov, Nikolai Zhdanov, Yuri Bondarev and others), and from two older intellectuals, whose outstanding liberal influence on post-1956 events cannot be exaggerated: Ilia Ehrenburg, Konstantin Paustovski and Kornei Chukovski.

The young writers, as well as their liberal elders have not (and could have not) opposed the basic theoretical tenets of the existing system. They have not questioned the justice of Communist ideals nor the basic economic realities of the socialist state. They have accepted the existing ideology, demanding only that Soviet society live up to its promises. From the start what they mainly wanted to depict was the existing gap between theoretical ideals and everyday reality. This provoked the first important politico-literary issue: the right to portray life as it is, without lies or embellishment.

Soviet Reality

> ***Among the painters***
> ***I have often met people of the sort***
> ***Who never paint life "en face,"***
> ***But always "in profile."***
>
> —S. Mikhalkov ("Three Portraits")

The primary wish of the Soviet writers was to have the right to describe "life as it is." They had long been limited by the socialist-realist command to show only the side of reality which promoted the triumph of the accepted ideology, and they had been compelled to spend much energy and resourcefulness in circumventing that obstacle.

When the events of 1956 opened the floodgates of public debate, "honesty" of description in literature became a dominant demand. Yevgeni Yevtushenko (then little known) wondered "where is straightforwardness in discussion?" and squarely put the blame on the society as a whole:

. . . We all feel guilty
for the empty poems, the endless quotations,
for the same accustomed endings of speeches.[2]

Semion Kirsanov, an older poet, claimed:

We want boldness
of thought
of sound
of color . . .
finally, open
conversation everywhere
without whispering
"Something may happen." [3]

The existing state of affairs, asserted the old poetess Margarita Aliger, deformed Soviet man and made "a villain out of a hero and a scoundrel out of a giant." [4] A good illustration of the Soviet citizen's feeling of fear was provided by Yuri Nagibin's short story of 1956, "Khazar Ornament." [5] The author (born 1920) described the typical product of Soviet society, who refused to look at what was going on around him, as he was convinced that the only thing he could accomplish by protest would be getting himself into trouble. Many writers were not less careful than Nagibin's hero—the writers who "never paint life *en face*, but always in

* The author would like to express appreciation to the Russian Research Center of Harvard University for support of his research in 1963-64 (of which this article is one result), and to Priscilla Johnson, Colette Shulman and Peter Reddaway for their help.

[1] Slutski and Korzhavin are older in years, but part of the young generation in all else.

[2] "Stantsiia zima," *Oktiabr*, No. 11, 1956.

[3] "Sem dnei nedeli," *Novyi mir*, No. 9, 1956.

[4] "Samoe glavnoe," *Oktiabr*, No. 11, 1956.

[5] Published in *Literaturnaia Moskva*, ed. by M. I. Aliger *et al*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1956.

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profile," as it was aptly put by Sergei Mikhalkov, the coauthor of the Soviet national anthem.

In the period since 1956 there have been recurrent pleas concerning the urgent need for truthfulness in literary works. Writing in 1958, Ilia Ehrenburg, for example, quoted Chekhov's notable dictum:

One can lie in love, in politics, in medicine, one can lie to men and even to God Almighty—there have been such instances—but in art one cannot lie.[6]

Implicitly comparing the Soviet habit of distorting reality with the freedom of expression in France, Ehrenburg declared that "in the French disposition there is . . . no compulsory enthusiasm and no obsequious whisper."[7] Ehrenburg is also said to have quoted Alexander Fadeiev as the author of a definition of the origin of distortions in Soviet literature:

The difference between socialist realism and critical realism is that the first depicts man as he should be, *while the second* [*depicts man*] as he is.[8]

The need to depict life "as it is" had another strong advocate in Konstantin Paustovski, who defended the right of writers to picture "shortcomings" without counterbalancing them by immediate descriptions of real or imaginary "achievements."[9]

The dull, conformist descriptions of life "as it should be" have been derided by both the liberals and the middle-of-the-roaders. Such writing has been called "philistine language" by Paustovski, "Church-Slavonic" by the politically influential poet Alexander Tvardovski, and "ersatz literature" by the more outspoken Ehrenburg. The liberal writers have entertained no illusion that men seeking truth could gain the favor of those in power. Andrei Voznesenski, tracing the phenomenon of official hostility against artistic criticism to the times of the medieval inquisition, wrote:

You [*artists*] *were immured in walls,*
Burned on stakes,
Monks, like ants,
Danced on [*your*] *bones.*

Yet:

Art has always been reborn
From execution and torture
And has been sparked anew. . . .[10]

Appeals for truthfulness of description and freshness of thought have permeated much of Yevtushenko's early and later poetry. Straight to the point are his lines:

One should not lie to children,
One should not keep convincing them of lies.[11]

And:

Comrades,
You have to give words back
Their original meanings.[12]

In one poem he describes a contemporary of Galileo who knew quite well "that the earth was turning, . . . but [since he] had a family," was forced to lie to protect it.[13] In another poem Yevtushenko appeals passionately for:

Freshness
Freshness
We want snow-whiteness
And
Freshness of muscles
Brains
and brush strokes
Freshness of music
And speech.[14]

Alexander Yashin, echoing the same line, demands:

Let us be truthful
From now on
In everything.
Till the end
In the name of our future
Let us not try to embellish.[15]

Thus, the long accepted idea that a writer must adhere to the prudent rules of socialist realism by picturing Soviet life "in profile" has been clearly challenged. Many writers have gone beyond the demand for freshness and truthfulness. The young short-story writer

[6] *Frantsuzskie tetradi. Zametki i perevody,* Moscow, 1958, p. 152.
[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 55-56.
[8] As reported by D. Starikov in "Neobkhodimye utochneniie," *Literaturnaia gazeta,* April 10, 1958.
[9] Speech at the Third Writers' Congress, as reported in *Soviet Highlights,* Vol. I, No. 1, 1959.
[10] *Mozaika,* Vladimir, 1960, p. 60.
[11] *Tretii sneg,* Moscow, 1956.
[12] *Shosse entuziastov,* Moscow, 1956, p. 18.
[13] "Novye stikhi," *Oktiabr,* No. 9, 1959.
[14] *Yabloko,* Moscow, 1960, p. 13.
[15] *Sovest. Liricheskie zapiski,* Moscow, 1961, p. 8.

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Yuri Kazakov (born 1927) insists that a writer must be absolutely moral, otherwise one feels "sad" and "ashamed" to read his books.[16] "Who has the right to establish what the writer or artist should see and what he shouldn't?" questions Paustovski's friend, the old country teacher F. Vigdorova, in support of her young literary colleagues.[17]

The Problem of Contradictions

Kingpins of local importance
Rose there to power and slid to oblivion,
Speedily churches were dismantled,
Slowly stalls were built.

—Y. Akim ("Galich")

As a consequence of the growing concern to picture "life as it is" without "embellishments," problems involving class contradictions and disparities within Soviet society have become a common subject in literature. In one story a middle-class *baryshnia* (young lady) is taken to task by her mother for having a working-class boyfriend:

I see nothing special in him—a plain worker. What do you have in common with him? [18]

In another story, a factory girl is aware of the low social status of the workingmen and complains about her boyfriend:

To hell with him! He said he is an engineer, while in reality he is just a truck driver.[19]

A powerful factory official is described as follows:

The director walked by, leaving a smell of after-shave lotion. He looked straight in front of him, without greeting anyone present. The chauffeurs jumped from their seats and stood at attention.[20]

Later, an office worker bitterly addresses the director:

You are barin (*master*) *and a general. I must tell you this. . . . Couldn't you treat us simple mortals less stiffly?* [21]

Usually less outspoken, the "simple mortals" are shown to be both impressed and afraid of important people:

"My hands and feet are shaking"—[whispers one of them]. . . . *"I can't help it. They're members of the Central Committee . . . "* [22]

There is not much respect for the working people on the part of the bosses:

In the garage girls worked at greasing and lubrication. Shapeless, in clumsy worn-out overalls, with oily hair and stained faces, they all looked alike, seemed to be of the same age. It was not necessary to remember their names. They would all respond to the call: "Girlie, hey you, come here." [23]

A young lady of some station also speaks of the workers with disdain:

I've never met such people, real workers. I know the workers who come to repair door locks or to paint rooms. They're all terrible drunkards and cheats.[24]

Such social contradictions in Soviet life are increasingly stressed by writers of all possible shades of opinion, conservatives included. However, their existence is still not admitted by the party, being contrary to the basic Communist conception of *beskonfliktnost* ("conflictlessness") in Soviet life.

Yevgeni Yevtushenko has been one of the foremost opponents of this official fiction. As early as 1956 he attacked it when he counterposed

. . . a snub-nosed, short fellow covered with dust; he was hungry, he was young and barefoot. . . .

to the

. . . solid citizen . . . with a briefcase—a symbol of business who . . . sat in a car as if in a Presidium.[25]

[16] "Molodye o sebe," *Literatura i zhizn*, No. 9, 1962, p. 137.
[17] "Glaza pustye i glaza volshebnye," *Tarusskie stranitsy. Literaturno-khudozhestvennyi sbornik*, ed. K. Paustovski *et al*, Kaluga, 1961, p. 158.
[18] V. Tevekelian, "Za moskvoi-rekoi," *Moskva*, No. 5, 1959, p. 55.
[19] Gladkov and Otten, "Bumazhnye tsvety," *Tarusskie stranitsy*, p. 171.
[20] Nataliia Davidova, *Liubov inzhinera Izotova*, Moscow, 1962, p. 138.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 325-26.
[22] Vsevolod Kochetov, *Sekretar obkoma*, Moscow, 1962, p. 427.
[23] Kochetov, *Bratia Yershovy*, Moscow, 1960, p. 275.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 296.
[25] "Stantsiia zima," *loc. cit.*

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The new focus on social contradictions in Soviet life has reflected the traditional preference of Russian writers for the poor and meek as against the strong and mighty. There has been a re-emphasis on the old Russian literary preoccupation with the average man, his life and feelings, a tradition epitomized by Gogol's famous "Overcoat." This approach is most often noted in the works of the younger Soviet writers.

The Return to Gogol's "Overcoat"

When they kick us,
They kick the dome of heaven.
Under your boots
The universe is screaming!

—*A. Voznesenski* ("Negroes are singing")

In line with the "common man" tradition, Yevtushenko's heroes are not *stakhanovites*, commissars or directors, but people "shaken in crowded trolleys," students unloading melons at the Moscow freight station, women standing in line for food, hard-working railroadmen from the poet's native Winter Junction. This trend is even more pronounced in the writings of Yuri Kazakov, whose leading characters are exclusively simple people leading modest, uneventful lives. They are not concerned with "great ideas" or universal happiness or world problems, but are just trying to live the best they can, maintaining their human dignity against difficult odds. Kazakov's heroes are neither positive nor negative. His rejected lovers, deceived country girls, rugged individualists, and quintessentially Russian peasants are deeply modest and human.

On the other hand, conservative writers like Kochetov are preoccupied with portraying the "best people," those with a vested interest in the existing society: *udarniks*, party workers, directors. Such writers shudder at the thought of dealing with "simple people . . . who ride trolley-busses, stand in lines before bath houses and wash floors." [26]

The issue of whether to concentrate on the depiction of important and heroic deeds, or simple people and their everyday struggle for existence, is clearly being resolved in favor of the latter. Even Kochetov admits that "important people" are now out of favor in literature. Other writers stress that "heroics" are also passé:

Nobody wears medals anymore.
Ribbons are worn only by eccentrics,
And they will, probably, soon drop the habit,
Thus sparing their jackets.[27]

The spread of such feeling was openly acknowledged by Sergei Mikhalkov at a 1961 party forum.[28] The popular guitar-playing folk-singer and writer, Bulat Okudzhava, has carried the theme even farther. His description of the adventures of a Soviet draftee during World War II—a youth who was not the least interested in heroism and was mainly concerned with just staying alive [29]—brought about a tempest of outcries from the conformist writers.

The tendency towards disillusionment with "heroics" is directly connected with a reshuffling of values and the spread of so-called "nihilist" attitudes among Russia's young writers and among Soviet youth in general.

The New Nihilism

One must think, and not smile,
Read difficult books.
One must verify—get bumps,
Not worship opinions too much.

—*B. Slutski* (*Pages from Tarussa*)

The collapse of the awe-inspiring yet familiarly paternal image of Joseph Stalin, the subsequent unveiling of the reality of Soviet everyday life by the proponents of the "life as it is" approach, and finally, the shift of literary emphasis toward simple people in their daily struggle, helped to create an atmosphere of doubt and disbelief. Under its impact Soviet youth's acceptance of propaganda-instilled values was soon shattered. Since Stalin was no longer sacred, there was no reason why one should believe anybody else. Since the quasi-religious heroics of "building socialism" were no longer considered an adequate excuse for the drabness of everyday life, how could one maintain the old idealistic belief in the perfection of the Soviet road towards the Communist future? Under Stalin everything seemed much simpler:

The important things were decided without me
I knew I would get some answers
To all the "who," "what" and "why."

[26] Kochetov, *Sekretar obkoma*, p. 9.

[27] Boris Slutski, "Za noshenie ordenov," *Tarusskie Stranitsy*, p. 211.

[28] "Novye zadachi—novye trebovaniia," in *XXII sezd KPSS i voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty*, Moscow, 1962, p. 217.

[29] "Bud zdorov shkoliar," *Tarusskie stranitsy, op. cit.*

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But in the new situation . . .

It suddenly appears necessary
To answer everything by yourself.[30]

The message of these lines is reminiscent of Turgenev's Bazarov and his revolt against the accepted Russian values of the 1860's in *Fathers and Sons* (1862). Yevtushenko's appeal to his readers to do their own thinking instead of accepting "ready-made" answers reflects a similar disillusionment with contemporary values that spread quickly among the Russian youth from 1956 on.

The right to doubt has been defended by some very popular prose writers, as well as by Yevtushenko,[31] in the successful monthly youth journal, *Yunost*. One such writer is Victor Rozov, a man in his forties known for his several movie scenarios (including the famous "Cranes are Flying"), who wrote a play for *Yunost* entitled *ABVGD* (ABCDE).[32] The hero of the play, a young Soviet high school graduate, shows no respect for the established authorities or what he calls their "relative" values. He is tired of all the "basic truths" instilled in him from childhood. Instead of devoting his thoughts to the building of communism, he sometimes feels the desire to "blow up the whole world to hell . . . and to start from the beginning." (This sentence was attributed by some Soviet critics to the "unhealthy influence" of Salinger's Holden Colfield.)[33] Despite his obvious lack of belief in the goals of his society, the young nihilist shows courage in difficulty, tenacity in work, a capacity for love, and above all a more genuine purity of soul than many "believers," who often turn out to be mere conformists willing "to obey orders" and "do whatever they are told."

The writers propounding such themes—as well as their youthful followers—have been branded "nihilists," "skeptics," "cynics," "blackeners," "anarchists," *"stiliagi."* They have been attacked and criticized by scores of political, literary and politico-literary officials, including the party theoretician Suslov ("one cannot allow skepticism and grumbling"), and Khrushchev himself.[34] The party has been mainly concerned about

Поэт Саморекламов Рисунок К. НЕВЛЕРА

CARICATURE OF A YOUNG POET

Caption below: Poet Samoreklamov (Self-Advertiser) Stickers read: "I myself," "I about myself," "Myself Abroad."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), Feb. 20, 1963.

. . . the penetration into the ranks of youth of the decaying bourgeois morality which manifests itself in the works of the young writers.[35]

Such "bourgeois morality," it is feared, has poisoned young minds and deeply affected the attitudes of Soviet youth. As a "conservative" writer put it:

The secret virus has so stricken youth that the latter protests against everything, disagrees with the reality of the 1960's, is trivially ironic concerning the "vulgarly materialistic actions of the party," scoffs at the "boring standardization" of our newspapers and at the fictitious indifference of our way of life.[36]

One of the most gifted among the young Russian poets, Andrei Vozenesenski, has explained the current groping of Soviet youth as follows:

[30] Yevtushenko, "Stantsiia zima," *loc. cit.*
[31] *E.g.*, his "Nihilist," *Yunost*, No. 12, 1960.
[32] *Yunost*, No. 9, 1961.
[33] See, *e.g.*, Georgii Radov, "Pravdokha i modern," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Nov. 16, 1961.
[34] See Suslov in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 19, 1960; see also N. M. Gribachev, speech at the 22nd Party Congress, *ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1961; and "Krushenie nihilista," *Komsomolskaia pravda*, July 25, 1962.
[35] *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1961.
[36] Leonid Sobolev, "O glavnom," *Literatura i zhizn*, Dec. 24, 1961.

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The Russian people have always felt a deep need for spiritual life. At one time it was filled by religion. Then, in a more specific manner, by the cult of personality. Is it bad that it is [now] being filled by poetry? [37]

Unfortunately, the point of view of the young writers is not shared by Nikita Khrushchev, who has made his position clear:

The person who tries, under the banner of the struggle against the cult of personality, to take a stand against the established foundations, against authority. . ., that person willingly or unwillingly moves away from Marxist-Leninist positions and assumes a bourgeois position. . . . We are for authorities. The working class, the people building communism must have respected authorities [and] leaders.[38]

The loss of confidence on the part of the youth is closely connected with a growing lack of understanding between different generations of Soviet society.

Fathers vs. Sons

Professor,
I will rob and defame you,
Your wife, I might leave you—
I leave you your wife, but bear in mind
I will take away your son from you.

—Yevtushenko ("Professor, I don't like you . . . ")

Conflicts between generations are a natural and recurrent condition of history. Due to specific circumstances, however, the clash between certain generations of a given society is greater than between others. This occurs when one generation has gone through an especially difficult period or is subjected to extreme pressures which shape its mentality in an unusual way. The succeeding generation, not experiencing similar pressures, cannot possibly understand the problems that have conditioned its elders. Age difference itself plays an important role, since younger people are generally more idealistic, more apt to take action and more prompt to react against injustice than their seniors.

In the case of contemporary Soviet society, one can distinguish four generations, each formed under different conditions and molded into a group with specific attitudes toward life. The first group, people over 65, are the last survivors of the revolutionary era. They took part in (or at least saw) the revolution and the civil war, lived through war communism, the NEP, collectivization, the first Five-Year Plans, the purges and World War II. They were conditioned to conform during the Stalinist terror. Most of them show no desire for a change, for liberalization of the Soviet way of life. They are resigned to the existing order of things. Nevertheless, some still remember the early revolutionary enthusiasm or even their pre-1917 youth, and sympathize with the aspirations of the younger generation. People like Paustovski or Ehrenburg or Chukovski, whose years are measured and who have seen much harder times, are no longer so afraid of the authorities and are now willing to take risks.

The most conservative generation is the group in their mid-forties to mid-sixties. Both the old Russia and revolutionary Russia are alien to them. They are the most typical products of Stalinist conformity—the opportunistic bureaucrats *par excellence*. Poorly-educated products of the speedy schooling that prevailed in the 1920's and early 1930's, their only background is Stalin's Russia, and their sons' aspirations for change are alien to them. It is these people who occupy the large majority of managerial and party positions in the Soviet structure. Radical changes can hardly be expected in the USSR until this group passes from the Soviet scene.

A third group is composed of people in their mid-thirties and mid-forties. Not a very large one, it includes all those who reached adulthood during World War II, who suffered most in defending Russia against the Hitlerite menace, but who were too young to witness the purges of the 1930's. Divided among the old and the young in spirit, these people play no role of their own in the conflict between generations but, depending on inclinations, join either the youth or the "fathers."

The final generation, for the purposes of this discussion, embraces adults up to age thirty-five—those who were too young to take part in World War II and also too young to suffer any lasting influence from Stalinist oppression. The Revolution, the Civil War, the first Five-Year plans, are for them symbols of the distant past. At the heart of the conflict between generations is a revolt of a large segment of this "fourth generation" against the conformist majority of the Stalin-molded middle-aged bureaucrats. As the writer Aksionov put it:

What is peculiar to Soviet youth is that it re-

[37] Interview in *Polityka* (Warsaw), March 2, 1963.
[38] Speech in *Pravda*, April 26, 1963.

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jects the traditions and the way of life of the period of the cult of the individual. It rejects it as a whole, and in every detail, and this worries some members of the other [middle-aged] *generation.*[39]

Articulated by the young writers, the revolt against conformity has focussed in the first instance on cultural reform:

In literature, art, stage and screen, the youth sees signs of innovation (i.e., *of progress*) *primarily in a decisive change from the forms of artistic expression which have developed within the framework of socialist realism.*[40]

In the arts, socialist realism has epitomized the ideological rigidity which the liberals despise: in the words of Yevtushenko, socialist-realist art is "cart-like and doomed in the age of rockets," while for Voznesenski its proponents look like "toothless grandmothers."

Yet the "conflict between generations" obviously goes beyond the issue of artistic expression: "modern" Soviet youth has increasingly shown its interest in a more individualistic way of life, in Western civilization, in fresh new theories. According to the complaint of one of the older conservatives, a portion of the youth also

. . . in effect opposes itself to what in its view is the boring reality of our country's [preoccupation with] *corn and metallurgy. They, these young people, consider themselves courageous. And where is that courage? In the fact that they proclaim the American-European concept of "individual freedom"?* [41]

Not all of the younger generation, certainly, have joined actively in the liberals' cause. There is in fact a vocal conservative element among the young people eager to gain a comfortable place in the society by smoothly and uncritically adjusting to existing conditions. While for the young liberals old Communist slogans taste of mothballs, the young conservatives see them as passwords to a successful personal career along a well-established path.

Most of the younger people are, however, neither conservative nor liberal. They tend to shun political discussion, which they view as not only superfluous and boring but also foolish to the extent that it is still potentially dangerous.

They are inclined to regard talks about communism or socialism as sort of abstract religious sermons unconnected with any real life situation. "You never think about communism because for you and Ina it is like a prayer: 'Hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come,' " remarks an older man to a member of the "fourth generation." [42] Yet if the younger generation is often politically indifferent, it has exhibited a restlessness, a tendency to break out of the established molds, that both reflects and feeds upon the themes expounded by the young liberal writers. In this sense large numbers of the young are in affinity with the liberals and are implicitly involved in the "conflict between generations."

The regime and its supporters have reacted with vehemence on the issue of this conflict. A few years back the reaction was one of anger:

. . . nobody will succeed in tearing down the link between the generations. Nobody will succeed in throwing out everything we have accomplished while covering such actions with references to the tragic facts and circumstances created by the cult of Stalin's personality.[43]

Since March 1963, however, the predominant emphasis of the official line has been to deny flatly that any serious conflict exists. The Party Secretary for Propaganda, Ilichev, took the lead in debunking

. . . stories about "the revolt" of . . . the youth against their "fathers," who had allegedly "tarnished themselves" during the era of the cult of personality. . . .[44]

Almost simultaneously Khrushchev himself took pains to assert publicly that "the youth follow the party" and that the majority of young people are not listening to the liberal writers.[45] Since then, refuting the existence of a conflict between fathers and sons has become a common pastime among the conservatives. An interesting sample is a poem by the young conservative Vladimir Firtsov, reassuring the "fathers" that the worthwhile "boys," at least, are immune to the disease of liberalism:

I spat at the crooked smiles
of the thirty-year-old "boys."
I stood without waiting a minute
Under the holy banner of the fathers.[46]

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[39] *Polityka*, March 2, 1963.
[40] *XXII sezd KPSS i voprosy . . .*, p. 101.
[41] Anatoli Sofronov, "Sviaz vremen," *Literatura i zhizn*, May 13, 1962.
[42] Nikolai Pogodin, "Yantarnoe ozherele," *Yunost*, No. 1, 1960, p. 35.
[43] Sobolev, *loc. cit.*
[44] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 9, 1963.
[45] *Izvestia*, March 10, 1963.
[46] "Kliatva vernosti," *Pravda*, March 24, 1963.

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Yet even while denying the existence of conflict, the regime and the conservatives continue to reveal their apprehension over some of the new attitudes prevalent among youth—not the least of which is the widespread interest in everything Western.

The Young Westerners

> ***He wore narrow trousers,***
> ***Read Hemingway.***
> ***"Your tastes are non-Russian, lad"***
> ***The father, gloomily, was reprimanding.***
>
> —Ye. Yevtushenko ("Nihilist")

The interest in everything Western is widespread among the young Soviet generation. Much of this concentration is on the most superficial aspects of Western culture: American or European clothing, modern dances, foreign movies, jazz, some English expressions. The young people of a more serious bent read contemporary foreign literature (what is available) and are interested in modern art. Quite a few find it fashionable to become "impressed" by half-digested non-Communist philosophies (of non-political character—existentialism, for example). Finally, some become genuinely influenced by Western values and by Europe as such, as they grow more and more aware of the class disparities existing within Soviet society and of the contradictions inherent in Soviet life. Since the society to which they belong is highly resistive to the changes they feel are necessary, the youthful Westerners enter into a direct conflict with that society, accusing their middle-aged parents of being afraid of anything fresh or new.

The poems of Yevtushenko and Voznesenski bear the strong impact of Westernism. Yevtushenko depicts members of a Soviet delegation in Paris, who, "forgetting about *bditelnost* [vigilance]," gaze at Parisian girls[47]; his famous "nihilist" wears Western-style narrow-bottom slacks and reads Hemingway, while Voznesenski speaks about Polish "abstract chef-d'oeuvres."[48]

The most prominent Westerner is, however, the young playwright Vasili Aksionov, whose works depict the growing Western influence over the way of life and the minds of Soviet youth. In his *Ticket to the Stars*,[49] his youthful heroes listen to German jazz, read Polish journals (the closest thing to the Western press one can get in the USSR), books by Hemingway, Böll, Jonesco. They give each other anglicized names, dress in jeans, play poker and ping-pong, dance "rock and roll" and even "the Charleston." For them a car is a Pontiac, a Ford, a Mercedes, never a ZIL; a pretty girl—Brigitte Bardot, mademoiselle, miss. They do not care about going east to the virgin lands. On the contrary, they go as far west as they can—to the Estonian shores of the Baltic sea. These young men and women are Westerners, feel European and are as free from the influence of Communist propaganda as any one born and raised in the Soviet Union could be. Their attitude toward the old Stalinist way of life is symbolized by one youth's act of demolishing an old wall in an Estonian fishing kolkhoz, thinking the while:

I am hitting with a crowbar the old wall that nobody needs
I am hitting the old wall with a crowbar
I am hitting the old wall
I am hitting.

The old wall, like the more visible wall in Berlin, has fenced in the Soviet youth, has artificially isolated it from Western culture, from the modern way of life. To some young people, crushing this wall is as important as any of the aims of the destalinization process. In his new play, *Oranges from Morocco*, Aksionov purposely shows that this spirit is strong not only among the better-educated youth of Moscow and European Russia, but also among the youth of the remote eastern parts of the USSR, Siberia and the Pacific coast.[50]

The influence of the West on Soviet youth has caused a great deal of concern to the party and has been a key issue in the harangue over "fathers" and "sons." In the months preceding the regime's latest line of denial of a "conflict of generations," a full-scale politico-poetic polemic was waged in the Soviet press in which the conservatives deplored youth's interest in things foreign while the liberals protested youth's right to be different from their fathers. In one poem Yevtushenko implored young people ("the boys"):

Be steadfast
Get into disputes
Hold your own.[51]

In reply, the ultra-conservative Gribachev

[47] *Vzmakh ruki*, Moscow, 1962, p. 13.
[48] Voznesenski, "Polskoe," *Treugolnaia grusha liricheskikh otstuplenii iz poemy*, Moscow, 1962, p. 79.
[49] *Yunost*, Nos. 6 and 7, 1961.
[50] *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1963.
[51] "Davaite malchiki," *Novyi mir*, No. 7, 1962.

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cautioned "the boys" who "look at Russia in a slightly foreign manner" to think twice before committing such sacrilege:

To whom have you given your hearts?
The foot slides, the tongue is free to blabber
But there is that terrible borderline moment,
When one step
and you are without kith or kin
And no longer under the Red Banner.
. . .
No, boys,
We did not raise you for it. . . .[52]

Gribachev's position was disputed by the poet Robert Rozhdestvenski. In his "Fellows with Raised Collars," he defended the right of young writers to speak "for the boys," at the same time advising "the boys" to be patient and wait for a more appropriate time to press their demands, meanwhile withstanding "present rains." [53] In angry response, Khrushchev himself took up the attack against the young writers for considering themselves "mentors of the youth" and advised Rozhdestvenski personally to learn from Gribachev.[54]

The "50-50" Approach

Everybody goes East, but we go West.

—V. Aksionov (*Ticket to the Stars*)

Perhaps the greatest transgression of official Soviet prescriptions has been committed by those people who have dared to adopt the so-called 50-50 approach where foreign contacts are concerned. This approach is based on two principles. The first, established by Yevtushenko during his travels abroad, calls for balancing criticism of things foreign with an honest criticism of deficiencies in Soviet society. The second, stressed by Victor Nekrasov, consists of balancing criticism of Western ways with recognition of Western achievements. In line with the first principle, Yevtushenko consistently balanced (often on the same page) his pro-Castro poetry with attacks on the survival of Stalinist practices in Russia. He used the same technique during his press interviews in the West.[55]

On his part, Victor Nekrasov, in his travel notes from Italy and the United States, was careful to give a 50-50 picture of good and bad impressions. While from an American's point of view his picture still seems slanted, it is, nevertheless, the most honest Soviet report on the United States since Ilf's and Petrov's *Little Golden America* of the 1930's.

The 50-50 approach is the biggest step forward taken by the new Soviet Westerners in their effort to establish really meaningful cultural ties with the West. Since the beginning of 1963, the proponents of such balanced views have been under strong attack as advocates of "peaceful coexistence in the field of ideology," deemed to be especially damaging to the minds of youth.[56] As expressed by the mildly conservative old poet Tikhonov:

Our adversaries are willingly taking a course toward rapprochement, they have nothing against ideological coexistence. They know well that it will give them the opportunity to exercise influence over minds and tastes, especially in our young generation.[57]

The struggle for the minds of the Soviet "fourth generation" is far from over. Moreover, this age group probably has another twenty years to wait before it comes into positions of real power and influence.[58] During the interim many of its members will be corrupted, many will adjust to whatever conditions exist, and many will forget their youthful impetus. Yet there is room for hope that the seeds of this generation's protest against conformity will bear the fruit of a genuine liberalization of Soviet attitudes when today's sons become tomorrow's fathers.

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[52] "Net malchiki," *Pravda*, Jan. 27, 1963.
[53] "Parni s podniatymi vorotnikami," *Yunost*, No. 3, 1963.
[54] *Izvestia*, March 10, 1963.
[55] See Ivan Anisimov in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 30, 1963, describing Yevtushenko's behavior at such interviews.
[56] See *Pravda*, March 1, 12 and 17, 1963.
[57] Speech at the Writers' Union Plenum, *Pravda*, March 27, 1963.
[58] This also appears to be Ehrenburg's opinion, since he makes clear that he does not expect the flourishing of Soviet literature before the 1980's.

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Among Students in Moscow: *An Outsider's Report*

By Darrell P. Hammer

A good deal can be learned about the mood of Soviet university students, and about the regime's attitude toward them, from the Soviet press. Much of what is known, for example, about "nihilist" and "anarchist" groups of ultra-revolutionaries comes from such unlikely sources as *Komsomolskaia pravda* (organ of the Komsomol, or Young Communist League). Yet the Soviet press has to be used with care since its function is not to communicate information but to communicate policy. What the press tells us about student behavior will show what the regime is concerned with at a particular moment; it may not tell us what the students are really up to.

One of the most powerful tools for analysis of the Soviet press is the *odnako* principle. *Odnako* (Russian for "however") is the key word which often signals the essential message of a party pronouncement; the alert reader knows that *"odnako"* marks the end of praise and the beginning of criticism. The word might even be translated, "And now let us get to the point." Up until then the mood is one of high optimism: in general things are going quite well (the pre-*odnako* description of a given state of affairs); but the post-*odnako* criticisms then become specific. The idea is that whatever is wrong is untypical, and a deviation from the norm. *"Odnako"* thus is a semantic device which describes all failures and shortcomings as if they were isolated exceptions.

With this tool in hand, one can learn something about the regime's views on the younger generation by studying L. F. Ilichev's speech to the Central Committee plenum of June 1963. Ilichev dealt at length with problems of youth, education, and ideology. It was a remarkable speech, because Ilichev discussed quite frankly the differences between generations, and he confessed that the aura of "revolutionary romance" with which the party has tried to clothe the past was somehow lacking in the present. It is obviously harder to generate enthusiasm now than it was in the heroic age of the revolution, the civil war, and the first Five-Year Plan. But Ilichev insisted that the younger generation was still filled with enthusiasm for the work of "building communism":

There is no basis for sighing that, somehow, the "wrong generation has grown up." Our youth has been and remains an active and brilliant part of socialist society, devoted to the great ideals of communism. (Prolonged applause.)

Then follows the signal:

Life, however, gives birth not only to men who honorably carry out their duties. From time to time it casts up young people who, by their rotten attitude toward life, their fear of labor,

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their Philistine manners and taste, fall into contradiction with the way of thought and action which is predominant in our country. A few young people take the great blessings won by our people at the expense of tremendous efforts as the normal state of things. They believe that they were born only for the pursuit of pleasure. There are still idlers, moral cripples, grumblers, and "beardless skeptics" among our youth.[1]

One can conclude from this statement that while the idlers, the skeptics, and so on may not be typical, they are certainly a cause for concern.

The regime is committed to the view that "idlers" and "grumblers" among Soviet youth are the product of an "alien ideology." The party's reaction, therefore, has been mainly ideological: it has intensified its efforts to indoctrinate youth (particularly university students), to screen out Western ideas, and to encourage Komsomol activists in a ceaseless campaign against nonconformity of all sorts. The purpose of this article is to examine these trends and, insofar as possible, the attitudes of the students themselves. The information comes in part from the Soviet press, and in part from the writer's own experience as a student in a Soviet university.

The Sin of "Indifference"

The party likes to call ideology a "weapon," and it is a weapon which cuts two ways. The enemy, or so the doctrine teaches, is "capitalism"—but "capitalism" takes on two forms. On the one hand, the ideological struggle is a conflict with the "imperialist," "bourgeois," Western world. On the other hand, it is a conflict with the Russian past. For Tsarism has been killed in Russia, but not quite buried. It is a convenient phantom which can shoulder the blame for all the shortcomings of the present system. Thus, in official Soviet doctrine the struggle against all manifestations of "bourgeois ideology" is more than a struggle against Western influence. It is a part of the unending effort to eradicate all "remnants of the past" in the minds of Soviet men. In this environment the gravest sin is not direct opposition (which has the virtue, at least, of being easy to detect), but lack of interest, or what the Russians commonly label *indifferentizm*.

Now *indifferentizm* is not "indifference" in general. It is an indifference to things political, a failure to respond to the urgings of the party line. It is not rebellion against Marxism-Leninism, but rather a vague belief that the official ideology is neither interesting nor relevant to contemporary problems. It is an attitude which finds many outlets among the students—in the behavior of the *stiliagi*, for example, or in the art of the "Marxist futurists"—but no real satisfaction. It really resolves itself into the simple question, "*Kuda nam dalshe?*"—"Where do we go from here?" Sometimes it leads to criticism of the regime—not, however, because the party fails to provide answers (for the answers are readily available, in easy-to-learn form, in the 1961 party program), but because the regime will not allow the younger generation to look for them on its own.

Occasionally this attitude comes into the open, as it did in 1963 in a film violently condemned and withheld from showing. The title, *Zastava Ilicha* (The Guard Post of Ilich), conforms with the official doctrine, since it suggests that the youth of the Soviet Union are in the advance wave of a forward-moving society. But in contrast to the party-approved image of youth, the young men in the picture do ask, "Where do we go from here?" From what has been revealed about the film, its message seems crystal clear: they will find the answer by searching their own souls, and not by studying party dogma.

There is a remarkable scene in the picture in which a character (Sergei) encounters the ghost of his father, who had been killed during World War II. The ghost tells the son not to have regrets about the past, but to live for the present, and the future. Sergei responds by asking his dead father for advice:

"But how?"

The father answers simply, "How old are you?"

"Twenty-three," Sergei replies.

"I am only twenty-one." And with that the ghost leaves the scene.

The writer Victor Nekrasov called the picture "a great event in our art," precisely because it depicted so clearly the independence of the younger generation.[2] But clearly a motion picture with this message is unacceptable to a regime which is still dominated by men of the older generation.

This older age-group—which includes the senior *apparatchiki*—is understandably resent-

[1] *Pravda*, June 19, 1963.

[2] V. Nekrasov, "Po obe storony okeana" (On Both Sides of the Ocean), *Novyi mir*, No. 12, 1962, pp. 120 ff. Cf. Khrushchev's criticism of Nekrasov and the film, *Pravda*, March 10, 1963.

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ful. Its members believe that they have created a unique social order, though at a terrible cost in hardship and deprivation. Now they see that their creation must fall into the hands of an ungrateful and uninspired younger generation. Of course the older men are not, for the most part, of civil war vintage. But they are from the generation which lived through the early Five-Year Plans, the purges, and World War II.

Youth vs. Its Elders

Some of the more sophisticated students will complain that this is exactly what is wrong with the older generation. It *did* live through the Stalin era—and kept silent. "The campaign against the cult of personality did more than just unmask a dictator, it unmasked a whole generation." This is what one Soviet student told me, but it expresses the sentiments of many. Destalinization has undermined the older generation's claim to authority. Why, after all, listen to men who have been so completely compromised by their long silence in the face of unspeakable tyranny, men who survived when greater men perished?

This degree of sophistication, however, belongs only to a small minority. The prevailing mood of Soviet youth is *indifferentizm* toward politics and concern for the material things of life. The students are willing, when pressed, to engage in "political discussion" with foreigners—which usually means a mechanical repetition of the party line. Such political discussions always stay at the level of high generality, or else descend to attacks on the other, "capitalist" system. Most Soviet students cannot discuss the policy-making problems of their own government, because they cannot conceive of policy as a choice among alternatives. They do not, except for a small minority, discuss politics among themselves. The conflict with the Chinese; the problem of industrial organization; the problem of greater incentives for the collective farmers; the allocation of resources: all these are questions of high policy, and at the appropriate time the regime will announce its views. Until then the university student, like other Soviet citizens, is not used to developing views of his own.

Vsevolod Kochetov, in his novel *Sekretar obkoma* (The Regional Party Secretary) has described this attitude in a dialogue between an Old Bolshevik and a young poet. The old man, Chernogus, attacks the younger one for being "cut off from life," for extreme individualism, for ignoring the role of the poet in society. The poet, Ptushkov, breaks in to ask, "What are you trying to say? That 'music and poetry are bombs and banners, a voice which summons the class to rise up in rebellion'?" In the novel, Chernogus is very surprised by this reaction, and the dialogue goes on like this:

Chernogus: *That is about what I wanted to say, yes. In fact you have said it better than I could. But haven't you ever thought about this?*

Ptushkov: *Yes, I've thought about it. But the time of bombs and banners has passed. The class struggle is over, and we no longer have any classes. We have only man, the individual. And man is always man. He has always been falling in love, and he always will. He has always experienced joy and sadness, and he always will. There will always be some who are happy, and some who are unhappy. There will always be jealousy, and sensuality, and—*

Chernogus: *And sex?*

Ptushkov: *Yes, if you want to bring this up, we have always had sex, and we always will.*

Chernogus: *Then what is it that we did in October 1917?*

Ptushkov: *Exactly. What did you do? For people like me—and I suppose for yourselves as well—you won the right to be one's self, the right to be free in what one creates. For this, of course, you have our thanks, and many times over. But how long must you go on reproaching us, and reminding us of the good that you have done?* [3]

Kochetov is no radical. On the contrary he is one of the most conservative and strait-laced of Soviet novelists. But through Ptushkov, who is a transparent caricature of the poets of the new generation, Kochetov has managed to articulate their ideas. Ptushkov sums up the mood of the younger generation. *Indifferentizm* does not mean opposition to the party; it means the desire to be left alone.

Student Attitudes

This outlook is a product of the system. In part it is an understandable reaction against the intense and monolithic internal propaganda —of which Soviet students have always been a prime target. In part it results from an environment which is in sharp contrast to the official propaganda image.

In this image, the ideal student is an enthusiastic and dedicated worker in the "building of

[3] V. Kochetov, *Sekretar obkoma* (The Regional Party Secretary), Moscow, Molodaia gvardiia, 1962, pp. 177-78.

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communism"; presumably, then, the ideal university is his source of inspiration, a treasure-house of science and culture. But there is a great disparity between the ideal and the real, and in practice there are two facts about Soviet universities which are rarely mentioned but which are well understood by all concerned: first, that the university is the surest road to advancement in Soviet society; and second, that its doors are closed to a majority of Soviet youth. Indeed at Moscow University this is quite literally true, for the main buildings are carefully guarded to keep out anyone who does not have an official permit. The other universities are not so obviously closed off, but it is still exceedingly difficult to gain admission as a student. For the youngster of lower-class origin, and particularly for the peasants, admission to a university means a great deal of hard work, perseverance, and not a little luck.

For the offspring of the elite admission is far easier. The fact is that the Soviet universities, and especially the old, established institutions, draw most of their students from upper middle-class families. But even for the middle class, the competition is keen and often cut-throat, and there is a strong temptation to use every possible means to get in. Some parents have gone so far as to bribe a stand-in to take the entrance examinations under a false name. The case of Oleg Sarkisov, who "stood in" for examinations at Moscow and Leningrad at least seven times before he was finally arrested, is hardly typical.[4]

Few Soviet families would take the tremendous risk of direct bribery; and anyway there are more subtle and not necessarily illegal ways to bring influence to bear on the administration of a university or an institute. But the fact that Sarkisov was part of a ring operating in more than one city shows how intense the competition is. In fact, the competitive examinations have become, in student jargon, the *konkurs roditelei*, the "competition of parents." Many students, rightly or wrongly, suspect others of winning undeserved favor because they enjoy the advantages of *protektsiia* ("protection"), the academic version of *blat*. Such practices as bribery and *protektsiia* are probably not widespread. But they are widely known, and they cause a certain cynicism about all examinations, and about academic life in general.

Most of the students are not at the university to get an education, but to acquire a "specialty," which is the passport to future success

—A familiar building . . . looks like the institute my parents arranged for me to attend last year. . .

—From Krokodil (Moscow), Nov. 30, 1963.

in the system. This is quite in keeping with the official role of the Soviet university, which is supposed to be a place of training, rather than a center for research and scholarly inquiry.[5] The student devotes his five years of university study to very intense but rather narrow training in his chosen "specialty." The distribution of job assignments on graduation depends more on his performance as a specialist than on his general educational achievements (though *protektsiia* may be important at this point, too, especially in winning one of the more sought-after assignments). The system is inequitable, but there is little serious resentment among the students, for their own careers, after all, depend on the system. It is usually easy to justify a social order in which one's own status seems secured. Thus one student can say of another, "Oh, he has *protektsiia*," without malice, in a perfectly matter-of-fact way. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the student develops a vested interest in the existing system, but no interest in the official ideology. The ambitious student will try

[4] "K Afine so vziatkoi" (Trying to Bribe Athena), *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Feb. 17, 1962.

[5] It should be noted however that the relationship between the universities and the research institutions has been under debate for some time, and university administrators have complained of the separation between higher education and advanced research. The regime has recently taken a new look at the problem and seems to have leaned toward the view of the universities; it has ordered that they be given more facilities for research. (*Pravda*, March 15, 1964.)

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very hard to distinguish himself in his specialty, but he will not invest very much effort in the political courses.

Ideological Studies

For many years Soviet students have been required to take a series of courses on political subjects: (1) "foundations of Marxism-Leninism," (2) political economy, and (3) dialectical and historical materialism. These courses have accounted for roughly one-fifth of the student's classroom time during his first four years in the university.[6] But the training has always tended to be a one-way monologue from lecturer to student, since the program makes no provision for the "practical work" or laboratory study which Soviet education stresses so much in substantive disciplines.

The political courses are, by all accounts, the dullest in the university curriculum. Most students find the material a routine political ritual, to be learned and recited on appropriate occasions. But it is hardly anything to get excited about. Forty-five years after the revolution, *diamat* (dialectical materialism) has become a catechism and not an idea that deserves critical inquiry. Certainly it demands no emotional or intellectual commitment from most of the students. Thus the department of party history has become, in student jargon, the "department of theology" (*kafedra bogosloviia*) ; those who take the indoctrination seriously are "agitators" if they are careerists, or "idealists" if they are naive. (One of my favorite souvenirs was given to me by a Soviet student. It is a copy of the official *History of the CPSU*, a book which was very hard to come by when it first appeared in 1959. My acquaintance had been lucky enough to obtain a copy to use in preparing for his examination in party history. But once the examination was out of the way, he had no further use for it. He told me that the book was banal, dogmatic, and that anyway "the line will change in another year," and I was welcome to it.)

Now this is not to say that the average student does not "believe " in the principles which he learns as "Marxism-Leninism." But there are different levels of belief just as there are different levels of meaning and understanding, and the student's level of belief is usually that of superficial and uncomprehending acceptance. He believes in "Marxism-Leninism" because he is taught nothing else, and he rarely hears the doctrine challenged. On any occasion when he is pressed about his beliefs, as for example in a meeting with foreigners from the West, he will fall back on the teachings of the party line because it may be the only argument he has. But he finds it difficult to relate what he has learned to his own life experience. He will probably decide, if he ever ponders the question, that it has no relevance at all.

This prosaic and apolitical *indifferentizm* is just as serious, from the regime's point of view, as genuine radicalism. The "revolutionaries" are usually found out. The far larger number who are simply indifferent, on the other hand, have no commitment, seek to convert no one, and would be satisfied to be left alone. The regime has understood perfectly well that its internal propaganda was somehow missing the mark, especially with the students, and that major reforms were required. In 1960 the party officially admitted that its internal propaganda was "divorced from life," narrow, uninteresting, and at times unintelligible.[7] It has tried, since then, to overcome all these shortcomings.

But in dealing with the younger generation, the party has attempted to solve the problem simply by intensifying its indoctrination. A new course of "social studies" (*obshchestvovedenie*) was introduced in the schools. In the universities, students have been required since 1963 to take a new course on "the foundations of scientific communism," in addition to the now traditional courses on party history and Marxism-Leninism. The new course tends to concentrate on contemporary themes, such as "the transition from capitalism to communism —the path of development of all mankind," and "the formation and development of communist society." There are two aspects of the program which stand out. First, for the time being at least, more time is given to "the foundations of scientific communism" in the universities than in the technical institutes. Second, the new course makes no pretense at training the students in Marxism. The instruction is supposed

[6] This calculation is based specifically on the plan for Soviet law faculties for 1955-56 (*Uchebny plan: spetsialnosti pravovedenie*, Moscow, USSR Ministry of Higher Education, 1955). The general pattern has been much the same for all faculties, although a required course in party history was added in 1959 and further supplements introduced in 1963 (see further *in text*). No account is taken here of the political propaganda which is introduced into other subjects, such as American literature or European history.

[7] Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, January 9, 1960: "Ozadachakh partiinoi propagandy v sovremennykh usloviiakh" (On the Tasks of Party Propaganda under Contemporary Conditions), *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1960, Part IV, pp. 593-94.

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to be based on the "practical experience" of the Soviet Union and other countries in building socialism, rather than on the classical texts. The basic document for the course is the 1961 party program.[8]

Lure of the Material West

Part of what the party calls "*indifferentizm*" is the exact opposite of "indifference." It is the hunger for all things Western. In a closed economy with a perpetual shortage of consumer goods, almost anything from the Western world is not just exotica, but an important status symbol. (I once met a Soviet student who had somehow acquired a "flip-top" cigarette box of a popular American brand. The box had gotten a bit worn, but still he would take it out of his pocket with a studied air, carefully choose a cigarette—of Soviet manufacture—and then just as carefully close the box.) But it seems to me that the Western things which hold such fascination for Soviet students are just that: *things*, and not *ideas*. The young people are enthusiastic about American gadgets and hypnotized by Western fads; they crave more of the mass culture of the Western world, but they have little comprehension of its political institutions.

I recall that in 1961, before the appearance of the new party program, some rather curious rumors were in circulation about what it would promise. One young man told me that he had "precise information" that the program would promise the construction of a hundred "American-style" night clubs in Leningrad, to be built in the next five years. (Needless to say, the program contained nothing of the sort.) Another rumor circulating in Leningrad at the same time was the story of the "Finnish store." There were several versions, all of them based (or so I was told) on "precise information." The most common story was that the government had signed a new trade agreement with Finland, and that the Finns were to open a giant department store in Leningrad. The store was the Soviet student's conception of paradise: it would sell only the more sought-after Western products, such as nylon blouses, jazz records, spike-heeled shoes, and wash-and-wear suits. Another version had it that the store was actually operating, but that it was open only to high-ranking party members. Like the night-club rumor, the tale of the "Finnish store" was a myth—but it was a good indication of what many young people want, and what their dreams are made of.

The definition of "scientific communism" as based on "practical experience" could be of great long-run importance. Not only does it conveniently close the door to alternate interpretations of doctrine—whether of Chinese or revisionist origin—but it suggests that experience, as defined by the party, is really more important than doctrine. The fact that Marx and Lenin have been eclipsed by "Marxism-Leninism" is, of course, nothing new. A whole generation of Soviet intellectuals has been brought up on highly over-simplified manuals and very selective compendia, such as *Lenin on the State* and *Lenin on Art*. To the Soviet mind, "Marxism-Leninism" is just another word for the "general line of the party," and the intelligentsia has long accepted this. What is new is that "practical experience" is made the basis, officially, for indoctrination of the new elite.

—You remember, of course, how it was in our youth: we went hungry and naked. . . Now, at least my daughter can get decent clothes to wear!

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), Feb. 20, 1964.*

[8] See "Studentam—marksistsko-leninskoe mirovozzrenie" (For Students—A Marxist-Leninist World-View), *Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1964.

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Still, it is paradoxical that Marx should be extravagantly praised as the greatest thinker of all time and the founder of "scientific socialism," while his works lie unread and half-forgotten.[9]

The On-Campus Activists

What has been said so far applies to the great majority of university students. There remains a small minority of activists who genuinely, and even enthusiastically, identify with the aims of the regime. They take the ideology very seriously, either out of careerism or out of sincere conviction. They are the "agitators," and most of them are destined for careers in the *apparat*—not necessarily in the party, but also in the "public organizations" or the cultural establishment. The Komsomol is their unchallenged domain. (It is worth noting that the party organization, in practice, makes a sharp distinction between rank-and-file Komsomol members, who include the great majority of university students, and the Komsomol activists. Through the Komsomol the activists dominate other youth groups which serve as agencies of social control, recruitment, and mobilization of opinion. The activists set the standard of behavior and of opinion, and they usually have the power to punish non-conformity.

The university has its own system of volunteer police patrols (*druzhina*) and comrades' courts, and they are run by the Komsomol activists—just as, outside the university, these same institutions are controlled by the party. Their purpose is to enforce conformity in taste and in conduct, by means which range from persuasion to outright intimidation, and the standards applied are those of the socially conservative. In fact, the comrades' courts are commonly described by the students as a "conspiracy against the younger generation." They are officially charged with the duty of creating an "intolerant attitude" toward deviant behavior, and their purpose is obviously to demonstrate the power of collective action (under strict Komsomol guidance) against non-conformists.[10] A comrades' court has wide powers to "censure" and to "warn" those who violate the Komsomol's standards—but the standards themselves are somewhat vague.

In practice almost any student whose taste in dress or in conduct is somehow "different" can be denounced as a *stiliaga*, and any *stiliaga* can be called before the university comrades' court. The ultimate sanction, expulsion from the university, is not legally within the power of a comrades' court, but its verdict and recommendations may carry great weight with the deans.

The *druzhina's* task is to maintain order and enforce what are called, in Soviet parlance, the "rules of socialist community life." In practice the interpretation of these rules is left largely to the *druzhina* itself. A university *druzhina* is a patrol, usually of five or six men, carefully chosen on the basis of their having a good Komsomol record. Their symbol of authority is a narrow red armband, worn on the left sleeve. The *druzhina's* power is demonstrated by an incident which took place in Moscow in 1961. A Soviet student who went to a university party with a foreign student was spotted by the *druzhina* patrol and taken to an anteroom for questioning. Badly shaken by this experience, he made a hurried apology and went home. Subsequently the *druzhina* reported him to the dean, and he was again questioned about "consorting with foreigners" and then let off with a stern warning. Now the point is that there is nothing in Soviet law, or in the rules of the university, or even in the rules of the Komsomol itself, which makes it illegal to "consort with foreigners." This was the Komsomol, acting through the *druzhina*, interpreting and enforcing its own concept of the "rules of socialist community life."

If the activists limited their interests to preventing misbehavior and punishing vice, they might serve a useful purpose—provided there was a clear standard of what constitutes "misbehavior." But the real function of the activist element is to serve as a channel of control and communication which extends from the party to the mass of the university students. Here the activists are far more effective than the indoctrination system, for while the obligatory political courses can be treated lightly, the activists cannot be avoided. They have the right to denounce, and the duty to inform. They also have the power to reward, since many of the privileges of university life are directly connected with "public work" (*i.e.*, active

[9] This is not to deny that a small group of scholars has maintained an abiding interest in classical Marxism, and that a few students of philosophy have developed a new interest in the young Marx. But so far this interest has not caught on in the universities.

[10] Darrell P. Hammer, "Law Enforcement, Social Control, and the Withering of the State: Recent Soviet Experience," *Soviet Studies*, Glasgow, April 1963, p. 379.

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participation in the Komsomol). "Public work" may, for example, excuse one from the obligation to help bring in the harvest in the fall. Three young activists with whom I was acquainted were excused in just this way, while a hundred of their fellow students were sent into the fields for three weeks. The "public work," in this case, consisted of planning a gala party (sponsored by the Komsomol) to welcome home the workers from the fields!

That rarest of all privileges, a chance to travel abroad with a "delegation," depends almost entirely on a student's record in the Komsomol. A student delegation may not contain only activists—but it will contain only those whom the activists find acceptable. One of the activists in a delegation will be appointed "senior" (*starshii*) and made responsible for the behavior of the rest.

The activists in the university are committed to the official ideology because it is the key to success. A career in "public work" or in the *apparat* depends, in large part, on the ability to manipulate the symbols of the ideology. The activist must know the right answers to questions about "peaceful coexistence," or the "anti-party group," or relations with China; he must know exactly why existentialism in philosophy or abstractionism in art are "bad." He may sincerely believe that they are bad simply because the party says so; nonetheless he must be able to defend this belief and so must learn the party's official criticism. The activist can learn what he needs to know from the political courses and the standard textbooks, such as *The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism* and *The History of the CPSU*. He takes the process of self-indoctrination very seriously because, unlike the majority of students, he knows that his career depends on it.

That agitators can hardly be considered "revolutionary" goes without saying: having sniffed the heady fragrance of power in the Komsomol organization, they are fully committed to the existing order. But what of the other students? Generalizations are dangerously deceptive, of course, but if my own experience is any guide, I would tend to discount the "revolutionary" inclinations even among the more disaffected students I met. They may look back on the era of the revolution, the civil war, and the Five-Year Plans as a heroic age—but still, an age of the past. To be sure, a good many of them are contemptuous of authority and resentful of the numerous restrictions in which their lives abound. But resentment need not be equated with rebelliousness, and rebelliousness —to the extent that it does exist—is not necessarily tantamount to a political program aimed at the destruction of the entire political and economic order. Most of the students I knew were tired of hearing about the revolution, and bored by the ideology of the class struggle. In Ptushkov's words: "The time of bombs and banners has passed."

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Education in China: A Survey

By Robert D. Barendsen

The Chinese Communists have now been in power for nearly fifteen years. This means that the regime is about to enter a period in which the graduates coming out of mainland China's educational institutions at all levels, including colleges and universities, will have received the whole of their formal schooling under Communist rule. In general, such a turning point may be considered an important milestone in the life of a new regime. If those in power have been successful in remolding education to serve the goals of the new order, it may signify the arrival of a stage in which they can afford to relax a bit; if, on the other hand, their educational policies have not been sufficiently effective in advancing those goals, it may augur continued concern rather than confidence. As the Chinese Communists near this significant point of transition, it may be assumed that they are taking stock of the past fifteen years' achievements in educational work. The time may therefore be appropriate for an outside survey and evaluation of these achievements.

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Chinese Education in 1949

When the Communists gained control of mainland China in 1949, they inherited an educational system whose basic outlines had been established in the 1920's and reflected a considerable degree of American influence. The structure of the system consisted of a complete primary school of six years' duration, a six-year academic "middle" school divided into a three-year junior and a three-year senior section, and colleges and universities offering courses four or more years in length. In addition, there were various kinds of vocational and normal schools roughly paralleling the middle

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schools at the secondary level, as well as abbreviated two- or three-year specialized non-degree courses at the collegiate level.

In the 1946-47 school year, the last one before the resumption of heavy fighting between the Nationalists and Communists, there were about 26 million full-time students in the system—some 23,700,000 at the primary level, about 1,900,000 in all types of secondary schools, and approximately 129,000 at the collegiate level.[1] The great majority of secondary-level students (more than 75 percent) were enrolled in the academic middle schools, and substantially less than 10 percent in vocational schools. The distribution of collegiate enrollment by fields showed appreciably more students in political science and law than in engineering, and sigificantly more in economics than in science. College students were enrolled in some 200 institutions of higher education, of which approximately one-fourth were of full university status. About one-third of the higher institutions were operated by private organizations, including religious groups.

Although Chinese higher education had survived and even expanded during the war with Japan thanks to the courageous action of many of the leading institutions in temporarily transferring their operations to remote areas of Free China, the atmosphere that developed on the restored campuses in the interval between 1945 and 1949 was often one of tension and restlessness. Some professors had been influenced by Marxism ever since it had captured the attention of Chinese intellectuals in the troubled years after the decay of the first republican government. Many students had become fascinated by stories of Communist guerrilla exploits against the Japanese and were flattered by the intensive efforts of Communist organizers and agents to win their support. The climate of opinion in intellectual and student circles was frequently one of impatience with the seeming slowness and heavyhandedness of the Kuomintang government, and of sympathetic attraction towards the Communists, with their simplified explanations of China's problems and their uninhibited promises of quick solutions.

The Communist Approach

When it assumed power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had no experience in operating a large educational system under settled conditions and had developed little in the way of pedagogical theory. However, firmly convinced that knowledge and theory stem from practice, the party leaders proceeded to apply some of the fundamental concepts of Marxism-Leninism to educational problems in order to work out general policy guidelines. One of their basic assumptions was that education and culture, as part of the "superstructure" of society, are mere reflections of the politico-economic base and, as such, serve the interests of the dominant social class. Education for its own sake, or for the sake of the individual, was rejected as a naive notion: in a proletarian-oriented society, education must serve the proletariat. As Central Committee member Lin Feng put it in a speech to a conference of party activists engaged in educational and cultural work in June 1960:

Our country's cultural and educational undertakings . . . are the instruments of the proletarian political dictatorship for educating the people in Communist ideology.[2]

Besides political education, in the Chinese Communist view, the only justifiable kind of education is education for production (*i.e.*, training for a specific vocation.) It follows that the goal of education is to produce individuals who are, to use the current slogan, "both Red and expert"—that is, who possess both a highly developed political "consciousness" and useful specialized knowledge or skills. The long-range aim is to bring into being a new crop of "working-class intellectuals"—educated workers and peasants free from the taints of a bourgeois background. But in the interim the regime realizes that it still need the talents of the "old" intelligentsia, and that it must devote considerable energy to transforming these individuals into trustworthy allies.

From the establishment of the new regime, the Chinese Communists were in a hurry to achieve these goals. They wished to spread their political indoctrination as quickly as possible and also to train rapidly the specialists needed to fulfill the regime's ambitious plans to transform China into a modern industrialized state. In order to move quickly, they committed themselves to the simultaneous use of a variety of means, including full-time, part-time, and spare-time education. In its most recent form, this policy has stressed the importance of promoting the establishment and operation of schools by factories and collective units such

[1] Data from Ministry of Education (ed.), *Chung-kuo Chiao-yü Nien-chien* [China Educational Yearbook], 2nd ed., Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1948.

[2] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], June 2, 1960.

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as the communes, in addition to those run by the state.

Above everything else, the Chinese Communists have always insisted that educational work should be under the firm control and direction of the party. Minister of Education Yang Hsiu-feng summed up the reasons for this when he stated, in an article commemorating the regime's tenth anniversary:

We consider political education in Marxist-Leninist ideology and the political tasks of the party the soul of all work in the schools.[3]

Only through close party supervision, the regime believes, can it make sure that schooling will fulfill its political purposes.

The basic elements of Chinese educational policy—the twin "Red and expert" goals, the simultaneous employment of a variety of means, and the insistence on strong party control—have remained constant throughout the last fifteen years, although they have been expressed in different ways and there have been occasional tactical shifts as to which of the two goals or which means should be stressed and in how direct a manner the party should exercise its control.

The Early Changes

During most of its first four years in power, the Communist regime devoted its energies in the educational field mainly to two tasks—reorientation and reorganization. Political discussion periods or formal political courses were introduced at all levels of the school system. Teachers and older students were subjected to intensive "ideological remolding" to ensure the "correctness" of their political views. Russian pedagogues and educational advisors came to China in increasing numbers, and Chinese students went to the Soviet Union for training. Soviet teaching materials were translated for use in Chinese schools.

Two years passed before the regime announced the basic outline of a new school system.[4] The structure of regular full-time education was modified somewhat, involving a cutback of the primary cycle to five years and the shortening of many college courses. The regime's preoccupation with speeding up the educational process at all levels was further reflected in the establishment of special accelerated schools designed to permit adults lacking prior schooling to complete basic primary and secondary education in as little as five years. Spare-time classes for adults were also instituted at this time, primarily to implement the regime's mass literacy program.

Special attention was paid to the expansion of secondary and higher education since this would produce quicker results in terms of increased numbers of urgently needed technicians. Enrollment in technical vocational schools at the senior secondary level was expanded more rapidly in the early 1950's than enrollment in any other type or level of school, and these institutions were included in the jurisdiction of the new and separate Ministry of Higher Education set up in 1952.

Certainly one of the most important changes in the early period was the wholesale reorganization of higher educational institutions. Following the Soviet pattern, most colleges and universities became "institutes" specializing in one field or several closely related fields, and their course work was divided into "specialties" and "specializations." Particular emphasis was placed on technological institutes, which immediately began to absorb about one-third of total new enrollment in higher-level education. Less than 20 collegiate institutions were allowed to retain "university" status enabling them to continue offering a broad range of courses in the arts and sciences. In the process of reorganization, many of the old institutions were broken up, and foreign-affiliated schools, now officially regarded as instruments of "cultural imperialism," were closed down. From the beginning, the regime assumed the authority to set annual quotas for admission to higher education in each of the various fields, and to assign graduates to jobs chosen by the state.

Period of Stabilization

The initial substantial revision of the educational system was followed by an interval of relative stability between 1953 and 1957. The early attempt to shorten the duration of full-time primary and college education was abandoned, and the number of institutions of higher education remained relatively steady at something over 200. With the country's efforts centered in carrying out the industrialization targets of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), the main emphasis in education remained on training more technicians and engineers in secondary schools and higher educational in-

[3] *Ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1959.
[4] New China News Agency (NCNA) release, Peking, Oct. 1, 1951.

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stitutes. Primary school enrollment, after expanding markedly in the early years, was held down to a relatively small rate of increase during this period in order to save money for industrial investment and to allow time for the augmentation of facilities at the secondary level. The accelerated short-term courses were closed out after 1955, being replaced to some extent by spare-time classes at the primary and secondary levels.

This period also marked the "high tide" of Chinese borrowing and learning from Soviet educational experience. Thousands of Soviet textbooks and teaching guides were translated and put into use in the schools at all levels.

Toward the end of the Five-Year Plan, in 1956, the educational network registered a sharp rise in enrollments. Not only were there striking increases at the higher and secondary levels, but the number of primary school students also expanded by an appreciable percentage for the first time in four years.[5] As the 1956-57 school year began, the regime's educational policies seemed to be progressing rather well.

Before the academic year was over, however, there were unmistakable signs of trouble on the ideological front. Teachers and students were among the most voluble critics of Communist Party leadership during the short-lived climax of the "Hundred Flowers" movement in the spring of 1957. The official response was a strengthening of political education in the schools and a tightening up of political requirements for entrance into higher educational institutions, with the result that new enrollment at the college level dropped off sharply in the fall of the year.

Impact of the Great Leap

The launching of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958 ushered in significant changes in Chinese Communist educational policy. Before the end of that year, the regime had issued a major restatement of its principles and goals in education and had taken steps to adjust to altered conditions. The rationale behind the changes appears to have stemmed from a combination of political and economic considerations. On the one hand, the regime was concerned about the extent to which education was fulfilling the political function assigned to it; on the other, it had misgivings about the high costs involved in the rapid expansion of educational facilities. The approach evolved to meet these problems gradually became apparent in the early part of 1958 and was formally announced in a directive released in September.[6] It called for an educational policy based on three main principles: (1) education must serve the political interests of the proletariat; (2) it must be under the direction and control of the Communist Party; and (3) it must be combined with productive labor.

The first two merely reaffirmed, with new emphasis, political principles which had guided the party's approach to education from the start. The third also was inspired in part by political considerations in that the combination of study and productive labor was designed to further certain ideological objectives. More specifically, the regime hoped thereby to break down the Confucian tradition of looking down upon those who earn their living with their hands, to encourage intellectuals to take a new attitude towards physical work, and thus to promote the elimination of past distinctions between mental and manual labor, considered to be a prerequiste for the attainment of communism.[7]

The requirement that education be combined with productive labor was also designed to save money for the state. To implement the new policy, work "courses" were introduced into the school curricula at all levels. Students in full-time primary and secondary schools were required to spend from four to eight hours of class time per week performing productive labor, while college students had to work an average of three months out of each year. Such student labor was performed either in small workshops or on farms set up by the schools themselves, or in nearby factories under contractual arrangements, and by the latter part of 1958 was reported to be making a significant contribution to national production.

However, the labor programs instituted in the regular schools were of much less economic importance than those in the thousands of special "half-work, half-study" schools newly set up in 1958 as an adjunct to the school system. These schools, concentrated on the secondary level, were established and run by local col-

[5] Statistics covering full-time and spare-time school enrollments for the years 1949-50 through 1958-59 were published in the State Statistical Bureau compilation, *Ten Great Years; Statistics of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the People's Republic of China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, pp. 192 and 198.

[6] Text in *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fa Kuei Hui-pien* [Collected Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China], Peking, Legal Publishing House, 1959, Vol. 8 (July-Dec. 1958), pp. 253-60.

[7] In this connection, see article by Lu Ting-yi, Director of the CCP Propaganda Department, in *Hung Ch'i* [Red Flag], No. 7, 1958 (Sept. 1, 1958).

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lective organizations as part-time institutions where the students regularly spent half the day studying in class and the other half working on farms or in workshops operated by the schools. The schools were designed to be self-supporting, using the income from student labor to meet their expenses. The most widespread and highly publicized schools of this type were the agricultural middle schools, which offered rural youth a watered-down junior-middle-school (7th through 9th grade) education with special attention to vocational training for agricultural work. These multiplied rapidly from 1958 and by early 1960 reportedly numbered some 30,000 with nearly three million students. They were hailed as an answer to the problem of making secondary education generally available in the countryside and also as an illustration of the virtues of the official policy of combining education and labor.[8]

As another facet of the regime's flexible, many-sided approach, all factories, mines, communes and other sizable organizations were ordered in 1958 to set up schools and classes, mainly on a spare-time basis, for their own employees. (Spare-time differs from part-time schooling in that the former is conducted outside of, and in addition to, the usual full workday.) Some of the larger economic enterprises were soon reported to be providing a complete range of schooling, from literacy classes to college-level instruction. Thus, the interweaving of education and productive employment was complete, with schools operating factories, and factories operating schools.

The Leap in Education

Parallel with the establishment of a host of new schools of the half-work, half-study type, mainly at the secondary level, the regime claimed a spectacular expansion of facilities for higher education as well. An official news agency report stated that the number of full-time colleges almost quintupled in 1958, rising from about 230 to 1,065, and that an additional 23,500 institutions offering part-time or spare-time courses at the college level came into being that same year.[9] There were also some well-publicized experiments in setting up self-supporting institutions of higher education.

The regime further claimed a remarkable upsurge in school enrollments at all levels. According to official figures, full-time primary school enrollment in 1958-59 reached 86.4 million (an increase of more than 22 million over the preceding year), or about 87 percent of the total primary-school-age population. Meanwhile, secondary school enrollment rose to just under ten million (not counting two million enrolled in agricultural middle schools), and college students increased to 660,000, a 50 percent gain over the preceding year. Kindergarten enrollment also rose spectacularly, reflecting the placement of many additional children in nursery schools to enable their mothers to join the labor force. As regular education expanded, so also did participation in spare-time classes: altogether, over 70 million people were claimed to be enrolled, 40 million of these in literacy classes and most of the remainder in primary-level courses.[10]

The rapid growth of school facilities and enrollments during 1958 led the regime to publicize an optimistic new timetable for the further enlargement of educational opportunities. This schedule called for the complete elimination of illiteracy among the working-age population by 1962, the universalization of junior middle-school education (through the 9th grade) by 1967, and the opening of higher education to all those qualified for it by 1972.

The 1958 educational reforms also encompassed several important administrative changes. To implement the principle of direct party guidance and control, cadres were ordered to participate actively in the daily affairs of the schools, and large numbers of carefully chosen party functionaries were assigned to top positions in educational institutions (especially colleges and universities). At the same time the central government's move to economize by delegating much of the responsibility for lower-level schools to communes and factories was supplemented by a similar decentralization of the administration of higher education, placing most of these institutions under the aegis of provinces and municipalities. Technical schools at the upper secondary level, which had formerly been operated largely by agencies of the central government, were also shifted to local control. As a result of these changes, the separate central Ministry of Higher Education became superfluous and was abolished.

After the innovations of 1958, Chinese Communist education experienced a period of relative quiet in 1959. For the most part, the system was engaged in adjusting to the changes,

[8] For further information on the half-work half-study institutions, see Robert D. Barendsen, *Half-Work, Half-Study Schools in Communist China*, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.

[9] NCNA report, Aug. 31, 1958.

[10] State Statistical Bureau, *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 198, and 202.

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although enrollments continued to grow, both in regular schools and in part-time and spare-time classes. By the 1959-60 school year, there were reported to be 810,000 full-time students enrolled in higher educational institutions, 12.9 million in secondary schools, and 90 million in primary schools. Another 100 million were claimed to be enrolled in spare-time classes at all levels.[11]

The soaring enrollment figures were accompanied, however, by some less auspicious developments. For one thing, the officially reported number of higher-educational institutions dropped back sharply to 841, without explanation. For another, there were indications of concern, especially in the universities, over what was happening to the quality of education under the new arrangements.

Although the latter development seemed to suggest that some modification of the 1958 approach might be in order, no basic change in educational policy was reflected in plans announced by the regime in the spring of 1960 calling for further alterations in the structure and content of primary and secondary education. The most important feature of these plans was a provision for the gradual shortening of the 12-year primary-secondary cycle to one of about 10 years' duration. The Chinese Communist authorities claimed that this could be carried out without detriment to the quality of schooling in spite of a concomitant increase in the time allotted to student labor and a decrease in the hours of classroom study. The change was justified in essentially economic terms: since youths become physically mature at the age of 16 or 17, the school system should be set up so that they would be able to finish their secondary schooling by that age and be ready for full-time employment.[12]

That academic standards under the prevailing system were far from satisfactory was recognized even by the regime itself. The Minister of Education, for example, stated categorically that "much of the mathematics, physics, and chemistry now taught in middle schools, in particular, is old stuff from the 19th century which in no way represents the science and technology of today."[13] A lowering of standards in foreign-language instruction since 1949 was also acknowledged.

Implicit in the 1960 changes was the emerging conviction of the regime that a growing proportion of Chinese students obtaining higher education would have to do so on a spare-time basis while occupying regular full-time jobs in production. In line with this view, further emphasis was placed on spare-time education through the establishment of a national supervisory commission to develop and coordinate activities in this field. Particular stress was placed on extending spare-time study at the level of higher education (where 300,000 were enrolled in spare-time courses in 1959-60, representing a doubling of numbers for the second successive year) and at the upper secondary level. At the lower secondary level, where the students were generally below 17 years of age, the accent remained on the part-work, part-study approach. Both television and radio were reportedly put to use in a few major cities to supplement the means of providing spare-time instruction.

A final development of note in 1960 was the renewal of the mass attack on illiteracy—this time aided by the introduction of an official system of Romanization designed to facilitate the reading of Chinese ideographs. Despite the acknowledged failure of some of the earlier rapid literacy courses to produce lasting effects, the regime once again mobilized vast numbers of personnel to conduct the revived campaign. Publicity for the drive remained at a high pitch for several months and then fell off in the latter half of 1960 as the domestic economic situation became increasingly serious.

The Retrenchment Years

By the beginning of 1961 it was abundantly clear that the "Great Leap Forward" had stumbled to a halt. The party and government now began explicitly espousing policies of "adjustment" and "consolidation" which had in fact already been the operating guidelines for a good part of the previous year. The regime was deeply preoccupied with efforts to restore critically lagging agricultural production, and it realized that investments in other areas, including education, would have to be held in check. An editorial in the central Chinese Communist youth organ in the summer of 1961 frankly acknowledged:

As our foundation is weak and agricultural production has suffered from natural calamities for several years consecutively, a greater de-

[11] NCNA report, Jan. 31, 1960.
[12] See Robert D. Barendsen, *Planned Reforms in the Primary and Secondary School System in Communist China*, Information on Education Around the World series, No. 45, Washington D.C., U.S. Office of Education, 1960.
[13] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Apr. 9, 1960.

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velopment of our educational enterprise is impossible at present.[14]

The same editorial cited roughly rounded national enrollment figures for primary, secondary, and higher education (presumably covering the 1960-61 school year), showing an overall enrollment nearly a million less than in 1959-60.

Indications that the regime was shifting to a policy of retrenchment in education seem to have contributed to a deterioration of morale among students in the spring of 1961. But this was not the only factor. It would also appear that the cumulative effects of the stress placed on productive labor and political activism under the 1958 educational reforms had seriously affected standards of teaching and learning in the nation's schools, particularly at the upper levels. These conditions gave rise in the spring of 1961 to renewed official concern with the quality of education, finally leading to another important shift in policy.

During the period of the "Great Leap," it had been evident that the regime considered it more important to educate students to be thoroughly "Red" than to be "expert." However, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a speech to a group of college graduates in August 1961, officially announced a reversal of the emphasis and assured students that proficiency in specialized studies would henceforth be the main measuring stick in their evaluation and placement.[15] Press articles publicizing the new line revealed that students, teachers, and school administrators had indeed neglected academic work under the pressure of political and labor activities. In contrast, conscientious teaching and diligent study became the major points of emphasis in the 1961-62 school year.

Efforts to improve academic standards took a variety of forms. Experienced professors were called upon to give greater guidance to young instructors and to participate personally in the teaching of basic courses. These steps were particularly designed to correct deficiencies in the learning of fundamentals, which had been found to be common even among college students and graduates. Teachers were allowed more time for lesson preparation, for the conduct of research, and for the guidance of graduate students, who were being trained in increasing numbers at home because of the developing difficulties with the Soviet Union. Another change reflecting the growing Sino-Soviet estrangement was the official encouragement of a revival of the study of English in Chinese schools, where it had hitherto been subordinated to Russian. There was also a reduction of the time allotted to productive labor and political activities in order to permit greater concentration on schoolwork by both students and teachers.

What Price the Individual?

Chinese education today is solely concerned with preparing the individual for service to his country. His personal predilections and feelings do not enter into consideration. Yet even in this undesirably narrow aim, Chinese education fails miserably because of its excessive emphasis on politics and on intellectual enslavement.

Country first! A noble aim; but this should be a matter of voluntary choice, not of compulsion. No man ever works so well as when he works with a will. Even asses refuse to work when they don't want to, and camels will not budge when mercilessly overloaded. I have a deep pity for those whose educational system denies them the right to choose, whose 'choice' of study, of profession, amounts to some superior body's choice which they are forced to accept. It is a woeful thing for humanity when men in power anywhere in the world begin to rate their fellow men below asses and camels.

—From An African Student in China, by Emmanuel John Hevi (See review, p. 44.)

New Shift in Policy

Although efforts to improve the academic quality of school instruction continued during 1962 and 1963, they were gradually overshadowed by a re-emergence of the regime's preoccupation with political indoctrination. Even during 1961 and early 1962, when indoctrination was being played down somewhat at the higher education level, the regime had devoted considerable attention to stressing the role of the schools in teaching younger children the "revolutionary traditions." After the Central Committee Plenum in September 1962, however, the shift became more pronounced as educational institutions at all levels were called upon to devote greater energy to preparing

[14] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* [China Youth Daily], Aug. 16, 1961.
[15] *Ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1961.

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students for participation in the re-emphasized "class struggle." By the spring of 1963, the pendulum had swung back so far that the central party daily, *Jen-min-Jih-pao,* singled out the strengthening of ideological training as the foremost requirement for improving the quality of education in the nation's schools.[16] This emphasis on educating students to be "class conscious" continued at a high level throughout the balance of the year.

Along with the renewed stress on ideological education, there were signs that the regime was once again giving special attention to the role of productive labor in the educative process. Student participation in physical labor had seldom been mentioned in Chinese Communist mass media between the fall of 1961 and the autumn of 1962, but after the Central Committee Plenum it gradually became a prominent topic again. By the summer of 1963, the regime was once again extolling physical labor, especially on the farms, as the finest form of "class education," and all schools were enjoined to see that their students had the benefit of this experience. A related policy stipulated that many, if not all, new college graduates would be expected to work for a year or more in menial jobs so as to strengthen their ideological awareness before they assumed the specialized positions for which they had been trained.[17]

The requirement that students participate in agricultural labor undeniably serves a vocational as well as a political purpose inasmuch as the regime has repeatedly stated in recent years that the great majority of those graduating from primary and secondary schools will have to be content to go to work in the rural areas. There also are indications that sizable numbers of students have been forced to cut short their schooling in order to go into agricultural work.

Contraction of Educational Opportunity

The fact that the release of annual statistics showing national school enrollments has been suspended since 1960, together with frequent reports of students returning to the countryside, suggests that full-time enrollments in 1962-63 may well have been smaller than in 1959-60. In relative terms, the retrenchment has presumably had the greatest impact on those in the middle-school age group, many of whom have apparently had to return to farm work just before, during, or immediately after their secondary schooling.

Some of those who had to discontinue full-time education because of the retrenchment measures have been able to acquire some additional training in part-time and spare-time institutions. Rudimentary instruction in the "three R's" has been provided in so-called *min-pan* schools ("schools run by the people") set up cooperatively by the members of small collective units to make up for the inadequacy of regular school facilities. Basic lower-secondary schooling, with a strong practical and vocational orientation, has been furnished in the agricultural middle schools, which by the latter half of 1961 had been converted into slack-season schools operating during an abbreviated school year. Youth of college age unable to gain admission to regular full-time study in institutions of higher education have been encouraged to enroll in correspondence or evening courses increasingly made available by these institutions. Such courses offered by 277 institutions reportedly enrolled 266,000 students in 1961-62 and produced about 40,000 graduates at the end of the year.[18]

The statistical picture regarding full-time enrollment and number of institutions at the college level has remained cloudy throughout the last four years. Although some reports have stated or suggested that such enrollment has reached or even surpassed 900,000, this writer considers it more likely that the number as of 1962-63 was not appreciably greater than the 810,000 claimed in 1959-60. Information regarding the number of institutions is similarly obscure. Two Canadian educators who visited China in the spring of 1962 were told that there were then about 745 institutions[19]—some 100 less than had been reported in 1959-60 and far less than the fanciful figure of over 1,000 claimed in 1958. An article in a Chinese Communist English-language magazine for foreign readers in early 1963 stated that there were then only 400 full-time institutions of higher learning.[20] It seems doubtful that over half this reduced number would be recognized as such by the standards of any modern society.

[16] Mar. 27, 1963.

[17] See *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* [Kuangming Daily], Aug. 12, 1963.

[18] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1963.

[19] Geoffrey Andrew, "China: An Academic Appraisal," *The American Scholar,* Summer, 1963, p. 383. The same figure was given by Dr. Andrew's companion, President Claude Bissell of the University of Toronto, in an article in the *Washington Post,* Sept. 30, 1962.

[20] Chou Pei-yuan, "Higher Education in China," *China Reconstructs,* Vol. XII, No. 2 (February 1963), p. 9.

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The Record in Retrospect

It is difficult indeed to evaluate the effectiveness of Chinese Communist efforts in the educational field over the past decade and a half. An authoritative assessment could only be made on the basis of a systematic and discriminating analysis of solid documentary data, supplemented by the first-hand observations of qualified foreign specialists. However, because of the critical difficulties which have beset China in the last several years, a regime which was formerly voluble in publicizing its accomplishments has become reticent and close-mouthed about its internal affairs, confining itself largely to vague claims and hollow generalizations. Moreover, it has not encouraged detailed on-the-spot surveys by impartial foreign visitors sufficiently knowledgeable about China, communism, and education to be able to interpret the significance of what they see and hear. In this situation, the outside observer can offer only tentative judgments.

Few would criticize some of the things that the Chinese Communist regime has attempted to achieve by its educational policies—*e.g.*, to counteract the traditional disdain for manual labor, or to place more stress on science and technology. The regime's attempt to bring about a closer integration of book-learning, experimental research, and practical work is also unobjectionable by any standards. The emphasis on quantity rather than quality in an early stage of national economic development is likewise defensible, and the resort to a variety of less-than-full-time schooling devices appears rational enough in this context.

Up until 1957, the Chinese Communists made substantial progress in increasing the number of people with basic educational skills and in expanding the supply of middle and upper-middle-level technicians. The main problem at that juncture was the low level of academic standards, attributable particularly to an acknowledged shortage of trained teachers.

The record since 1958 is not so impressive. The reckless expansion of schools and enrollments during the "Great Leap" placed an added strain on the supply of teachers and thus further lowered the quality of instruction. The expansion then gave way to a prolonged phase of stagnation and contraction under the impact of the severe economic crisis brought on, in large part, by the excesses of 1958-59.

Viewed from the perspective of early 1964, the educational system of Communist China seems far from achieving its goal of turning out citizens who are "both Red and expert." Despite the ubiquitous political indoctrination courses, the regularly recurring ideological remolding campaigns, and the systematic exposure of students to physical labor, recent college graduates—who have had almost their entire schooling under the Communist system—have been deemed by the regime to need further "steeling" in order to become reliably "Red." At the same time, the authorities have officially acknowledged that college students require better training in fundamental theory and factual knowledge in order to become "expert" in their particular fields of specialization.

Under present conditions, weakness in specialized education poses a particularly serious problem for the regime. The need for an adequate indigenous supply of thoroughly trained "experts" is now greater than ever before, since China, in view of the break with the Soviet Union, must be prepared to provide its own advanced training without the help of a major developed country. As the training of most recent Chinese graduates has been excessively narrow, this task will put a heavy strain on the dwindling numbers of broadly qualified specialists capable of conducting basic research and guiding advanced students.

By all odds, however, the biggest problem that has recently confronted the regime in the educational field stems from the imbalance in the national development effort. Educational expansion in the latter 1950's was geared to an overly ambitious industrialization plan. By the end of the decade it was clear that this plan could not be supported by the resources available from the relatively neglected agricultural sector of the economy. As a result, industrial investments as well as other expenditures, including those on education, had to be held down while special efforts were made to restore farm production by increasing incentives and making more manpower available. In the process of adjustment, a substantial number of schools were closed down, and enrollments were reduced. Many students were sent to work in the rural areas, and their high expectations of attaining better economic status, built up over the previous years, were dashed. There can be little doubt that these students are disgruntled with their lot in the countryside, and their disgruntlement may well have political repercussions. It is in this context that the stepped-up effort which the Chinese Communist regime has been putting into ideological education during the past two years must be understood.

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BOOKS

Enter N. S. Khrushchev

By Jerry F. Hough

UNEXPECTEDLY, perhaps, the publication of Khrushchev's selected papers on agriculture* turns out to be an event of major interest to students of the USSR, for besides previously-published material—which makes up the bulk of the seven volumes—the collection also contains a number of heretofore unpublished speeches as well as nineteen memoranda addressed by the First Secretary to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The work is therefore a source of fresh and illuminating information on many facets of Soviet political life in the post-Stalin period.

Many of the speeches that have now appeared in print for the first time were delivered at closed meetings of high party and state officials, and some of them reflect considerable frankness and supply useful new material. However, it is the memoranda that lend the collection its main interest. Some of them are formal presentations of proposals—*e.g.*, that of January 22, 1954, on the virgin lands (Vol. I, pp. 85-100) and that of September 10, 1962, on the bifurcation of the party apparatus (Vol. VII, pp. 163-177)—but most are informal travel reports in which Khrushchev relates to the Presidium his impressions of the regions he has visited and his ideas about needed policy changes.

The size of the collection is staggering: there are over 3,400 pages of documents in the seven volumes. But the material is also rich, and in spite of the title there is something of value for scholars in many fields.

A geographer, for example, would surely be fascinated by the memorandum Khrushchev wrote after his 1960 trip to Astrakhan (Vol. IV, pp. 137-150). It contains a thorough discussion (documented with statistics) of the effect the construction of the Volga hydroelectric stations has had upon the water levels of the Lower Volga and the Caspian Sea, and upon fishing in that area. "The [local] comrades," Khrushchev reported, "talk as if the hydroelectric stations were some kind of calamity for the country. Listening to them, one would think that it was necessary simply to destroy the electric stations" (Vol. IV, p. 142).

An economist might be interested in a brief discussion of the forthcoming unemployment problems in the Kirgizian coal fields and of the failure of the central planning organs to pay any attention to them (Vol. VII, pp. 268-269). Or he might wonder (as did a pained Khrushchev) how, in the planned, presumably rational Soviet economy, Turkmen officials could undertake to design and build, at great cost, their own small Kara-Kum Canal steamer while similar vessels were being built much more cheaply in many other locations in the USSR (Vol. VII, p. 231). A psychologist might find interesting the great pride the officials took in

* N. S. Khrushchev, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie selskovo khoziaistva* (The Construction of Communism in the USSR and the Development of Agriculture), Vols. I-VII, Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literarury, 1962-63.

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showing this ship to Khrushchev, as well as the reasons why they so badly miscalculated their leader's reaction.

WHILE THERE ARE thus tidbits of interest to almost anybody, it is, of course, the problems of Soviet agriculture that are pressed most persistently and vividly upon the reader's consciousness. The history of the long, painful, and unsuccessful struggle to improve Soviet agriculture comes alive, as does the passage of faded hopes: the hope of producing ten to eleven billion poods of grain by 1960 and of catching up with the United States in per capita production of meat; the hope that corn would solve the livestock problem, which would solve the manure problem, which would solve the problem of low yields; the hope attached to the countless reorganizations, each guaranteed to end the bureaucratic approach and to unleash the creative energy of the Soviet collective farmer.

With every disappointment another hope fades away. In 1953 Khrushchev wrote in his memorandum on the virgin lands that "there is every justification" to estimate that the new lands will produce "not less than 14-15 centners per hectare."[1] In 1954 he reported to the Presidium that "we can export grain even to the capitalist countries" (Vol. I, p. 303), and in the fall of 1958 he exuberantly predicted that "soon" grain production would be so high that the state would "buy grain from those collective farms that will sell it at the cheapest price" (Vol. III, p. 297). Yet, a little over a year later, we find the Soviet leader explaining to a group of representatives from Eastern Europe that "we still do not have necessary reserves of grain to satisfy the growing requests of the friendly socialist countries" (Vol. IV, p. 115), and in 1962 he sadly reports that yields in the virgin lands are only six centners of grain per hectare (Vol. VII, p. 191). In 1963—well, the volumes do not contain those speeches, but we are already quite familiar with their contents: after a disastrous harvest, grain must be bought from capitalist countries to feed the Soviet population, and the virgin lands experiment is virtually acknowledged to be a failure.

The documents in this collection repeatedly remind us of the awful dilemmas that perennially plague Soviet agriculture. Scarcely a year passes without bad weather wreaking havoc somewhere in the USSR; and if it is not the climate that cuts through wishful harvest plans, it is soil erosion, or lack of capital and technology, or human mismanagement. Thus, not only better money incentives are needed for the peasants, but also funds for the construction of housing and schools and clubs on the farms; not only a wider variety of modern machinery, but also better seed, insecticides, and weed-killers; not only more chemical fertilizer, but also roads and trucks to transport it and warehouses and paper bags to protect it.

But the collection contains more than such reminders. In the previously-unpublished selections there are many new facts and statistics which students of Soviet agriculture will undoubtedly find valuable. Never, for example, has this reviewer seen such a frank and detailed official discussion of Stalin's post-war agricultural policy as that found in Khrushchev's memorandum on the virgin lands. In this report Khrushchev not only presented year-by-year statistics on actual grain deliveries, but he also broke the deliveries down by method of collection in order to document the gradually worsening position of the collective farmer during this period.

The memorandum makes it clear that part of the farmers' problem resulted simply from stagnation in production: 2,118,000,000 poods of grain were delivered in 1952 as against 2,225,000,000 poods in 1940. But, more important, there also occurred a substantial change in the collection policy during this decade. In 1940, 888 million poods were received from the collective farms in the form of obligatory deliveries, 93 million in the form of purchases (*zakupki*), and 874 million in the form of payments for MTS (Machine and Tractor Station) work (*naturoplata*). (The rest came from sovkhozes and "other sources.") In 1953, only 530 million poods were received in the form of obligatory deliveries, none as purchases, and 1 billion 130 million as payments to the MTS. Khrushchev did not hesitate to spell out the meaning of this change:

In contrast to obligatory deliveries and purchases, collective farms are not paid for grain delivered for payment to the MTS. In practice, a large extraction of grain for MTS payments under conditions of low productivity led to a situation in which little grain remained in the collective farms for distribution as payment for work-days, for the needs of the livestock and for sale on the market. (Vol. I, p. 97)

In addition, the memorandum severely criticized the "incorrect planning of state deliveries of grain, under which the sum of the collective

[1] Vol. I, p. 89, In 1962 Khrushchev spoke differently: "When we began mastering the virgin lands, we planned to get an average of eight centners of grain per hectare." Vol. VII, p. 191.

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farms" obligations for deliveries and MTS payments significantly exceed the total state plan as well as the capacity of many collective farms." In 1952, for example, the state plan called for total deliveries of 540 million poods, but the collective farms were assigned delivery obligations totalling 842 million poods. The same year it was planned that the collective farms pay 1 billion 57 million poods to the MTS, but the farms received bills from the MTS which totalled 1 billion 460 million poods (Vol. I, p. 98).

Again, Khrushchev was quite frank in discussing the consequences of this practice:

Under such a system of planning, large arrears are accumulated in the collective farms' accounts. . . . The existence of large arrears gives the government the opportunity to present the collective farms with demands for grain delivery which are made independently of the obligations already fulfilled in the given year. From what has been said it follows that the existing norms for deliveries per hectare lose their significance in many cases, and grain deliveries acquire the character of surplus-accumulation (prodrazverstki). *Such a practice impairs the farm economy and the farmers' confidence that a sufficient quantity of grain will remain for the public needs of the collectives as well as for distribution as payment for work-days after the obligations for the given year have been fulfilled.* (Vol. I, p. 98)

BESIDES FURNISHING new information about Soviet agriculture, the volumes under review also provide fresh insights into the political techniques of their author and his role in the Soviet political system. To be sure, the generally-accepted image of Khrushchev's personality is not substantially changed by this work. The First Secretary continues to appear as a shrewd and self-confident leader with a masterful ability to combine humor and toughness in pursuit of his objectives. His speeches may not be delivered in classical Russian, but they do demonstrate an impressive capacity to play an audience—especially one assembled to discuss agricultural questions.

The speeches and memoranda make clear, however, that the purpose of Khrushchev's frequent trips to various parts of the country is not merely to harangue and persuade appreciative—if captive—audiences. The First Secretary seems to be a leader who learns easiest by seeing things with his own eyes and by discussing matters with local officials. (Both in his speeches and in his memoranda he often shows surprise at facts which one would have expected him to have learned before through briefing or reading.) In short, his travels are an extremely important means of acquiring the information needed to rule.

It is also evident that Khrushchev goes to a good deal of trouble to ensure that he receives useful information during his travels. Not only does he constantly ask questions, but usually he also brings along staff members of the Central Committee Secretariat and assigns them the duty of collecting additional information or interviewing officials he does not have time to meet himself. Moreover, he frequently reserves for himself the decision as to which collective farm will be visited in a particular area. He is quite candid about all this:

How many years I have been taken [*to collective farms*]*! I have experience in this business. It's clear how they go about it: where they take me and the methods they use in giving me the runaround. I would select the collective farm myself, but sometimes the weather is so poor that we cannot turn off the road, and they take advantage of this. But if there is good weather, I say: "Turn here!," and I go where I want. I drop in unexpectedly like snow on the head.* (Vol. II, p. 95)

Even when he is in his office, Khrushchev seems to have a thirst for information and a preference for obtaining it directly from the officials involved. As early as 1955 he remarked: "It is well known to me that when I began working in the Central Committee after the death of Stalin some comrades expressed dissatisfaction because they were asked about so-called "details" in the Central Committee" (Vol. II, p. 126). He raised the point not to apologize but to demand that all party secretaries follow his example in order to acquire a detailed knowledge of their regions.

THERE ARE THOSE who believe that despite his constant efforts to be informed Khrushchev has never understood the complex nature of agricultural problems nor the economic prerequisites of agricultural development. They contend that Khrushchev has the "Bolshevik notion" that everything can be solved easily if only the magic form of organization is discovered, if only the right organizers are appointed.

To this reader at least the Khrushchev who emerges from these seven volumes is not such a foolish optimist. True, he keeps proclaiming with each reorganization that the perfect solu-

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tion has been found and that each collective farm can be a "Kalinovka" if only good chairmen can be appointed. Yet, often he also demonstrates an understanding of the needs of agriculture that is quite inconsistent with some of his more simplistic statements.

Without doubt Khrushchev has often been told what steps are required to promote agricultural development. Consider, for example, the following passage from his speech addressed in February 1960 to representatives from Eastern Europe:

I should say to you that when we prepared for this [December 1959] plenum [of the Central Committee], our agricultural organs—the agricultural departments of the Central Committee for the union republics and for the RSFSR as well as the Ministry of Agriculture—worked out fairly sweeping suggestions for the development of all branches of agriculture in the Soviet Union. We turned these suggestions down. (Vol. IV, p. 109)

The precise nature of the suggestions is not revealed, but the First Secretary was probably referring to one of them when he stated at the December 1959 plenum: "In order to replace the necessary amount of organic fertilizer by mineral fertilizers, we would have to build many new plants and invest tens of billions of rubles in this area" (Vol. IV, p. 80). It is clear that Khrushchev rejected then the idea of a crash program in mineral fertilizer production, not because he considered the plan inherently unsound, but because it was inexpedient in terms of other programs. "Of course," he declared on the same occasion, "we cannot yet take this path. We cannot produce as much mineral fertilizer as is needed" (Vol. IV, p. 80).

Khrushchev returned to the same problem in the summer of 1962 when he explained the reasons for the government's raising of the price of meat. He spoke of the need to increase the peasants' incentives and of the difficulty of doing this given the excess purchasing power already in the hands of the population (Vol. VII, p. 33). He admitted that the decision to raise prices was unpleasant for the population, and that it had not been a pleasant decision to make. Then, however, he added:

Of course, our enemies, the enemies of the socialist order, would have wanted another decision. And there could have been another decision. What kind of decision would this have been? To assign additional large-scale appropriations for the development of livestock at the expense of industry and at the cost of reducing capital investment for the country's defense. This our enemies would have wanted. But, comrades, such a decision would have retarded the development of our industry and would have undermined the defense capacity of the country. With such a decision we would have created conditions which our enemies await. This we cannot do. (Vol. VII, pp. 36-37)

In the light of such statements, we must be very careful before attaching too much significance to Khrushchev's declarations of faith in certain forms of organization, or the effectiveness of virtuous collective farm chairmen and the "laboring enthusiasm of the masses." After a leader has made a particular investment decision, it costs very little to emphasize other measures which do not involve capital expenditures. Indeed, such a practice may be shrewd political tactics serving many useful functions —including that of distracting attention from the original investment decision.

What is more, statements such as that quoted above should make one hesitate before asserting that Khrushchev is the beleaguered leader of a "consumer bloc" in the Presidium, or, for that matter, the head of any beleaguered faction. These collected papers—particularly Volume VII with its eleven memoranda to the Presidium written between August 1962 and March 1963—suggest that Khrushchev enjoys a position of authority in the leadership that is unique and decisive.

THE MOST STRIKING evidence about the First Secretary's dominant role is found in a series of six previously-unpublished speeches and five memoranda to the Presidium dating from his trip to Central Asia in late September and early October 1962.[2] (Two of the memoranda were written during the trip, three afterwards.) On the basis of these materials, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the decision to create a unified economic administration in Central Asia was made by Khrushchev personally during the trip. Moreover, the documents indicate that Khrushchev had sufficient authority at the time to tell the Central Asians about his decisions before consulting or even

[2] The date is worth noting for two reasons. In the first place, this is a period in which some believe that Khrushchev's power was at a low point. See, *e.g.*, Leon Smolinski and Peter Wiles, "The Soviet Planning Pendulum," *Problems of Communism*, No. 6 (Nov-Dec.), 1963, p. 41. In the second place, this is the period when the missile buildup in Cuba was beginning to approach its climax. Khrushchev's jovial attitude towards the end of his trip demonstrates a remarkable ability to conceal concern over a potentially grave international situation.

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informing other members of the Presidium.

The trip to Central Asia began in Turkmenia, and the conditions in that republic seem to have genuinely shocked Khrushchev. The primitive nature of irrigation construction there in comparison with that in the Hungry Steppe in Uzbekistan, the backward state of agriculture on the state farm which he visited (and it was one of the best in the republic), the farm officials' total lack of familiarity with the work of the cotton research institute in Tashkent—all this appeared to catch him by surprise. Khrushchev's conversation with the leading Turkmen officials at the state farm turned into a severe interrogation punctuated by severe expressions of dissatisfaction with most of the answers (Vol. VII, pp. 184-196). As the talks at the sovkhoz continued, Khrushchev seemed slowly to reach the conclusions about a unified Central Asian administration which he expounded throughout the rest of his trip. He spoke first of the need for coordinated scientific research, then of the need for general supervision in the realm of cotton growing, then of the need for common direction of all economic activity.

AFTER leaving the state farm, Khrushchev turned the various gatherings in Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan, and Uzbekistan into forums of plebiscitary democracy. In his speeches he persistently raised the question of a unified administration, always professing to do so in order to see "how you react" (Vol. VII, p. 216). He would describe his ideas on the subject and then declare: "If you agree, then I would like to prepare a memorandum for the Central Committee, leaning on your opinion. What do you think, will this be useful?" And always "the voices" answered, "Useful!" (Vol. VII, p. 232). (It is striking to observe the eagerness with which all the officials in Central Asia—including those interviewed by the Central Committee staff—welcomed Khrushchev's proposals—proposals that were certain to reduce their power and independence.)

By the time he reached Uzbekistan, Khrushchev was in high spirits, and his performance became polished:

Now I would like to talk with you about some other organizational questions. I already have touched upon them in my conversations with the Turkmen and the Tadzhiks. And they supported me. As you see, I have support. (Gay animation.) *True, today Kazakhs and Uzbeks —representatives of the two large republics— are present, and they can overcome us. But we will fight, and I think that they will support us too.* (Animation in the hall, applause.) (Vol. VII, p. 228)

Although he had already stated several times that the cotton-growing regions of southern Kazkhstan would also be supervised by the Central Asian Cotton Administration, he returned to the subject at the major conference in Tashkent which concluded his trip:

It is possible that we ought to subordinate even the cotton-sowing regions of Kazakhstan to this production administration. What is your opinion of this, Comrade Kunaev?" [Kunaev was the First Party Secretary in Kazakhstan and a member of the CPSU Central Committee.]
D. A. Kunaev: *Correct!*
N. S. Khrushchev: *There, you see, the Kazakhs agree.* (Vol. VII, p. 245)

KHRUSHCHEV WAS careful to gain the unanimous "support" of the Central Asians, but he apparently did not bother to consult with the Presidium before seeking this "support." Indeed, the First Secretary went out of his way to emphasize this point. For example, speaking to a group of Uzbek cotton scientists about the creation of a Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee, he remarked: "I still have not expressed this idea to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee" (Vol. VII, p. 232). The next day, talking about the organization of irrigation construction, he said: "When I visited the Turkmen, I presented to them my ideas on this question. *Afterwards* [italics added] I wrote a memorandum to the Central Committee with some suggestions" (Vol. VII, p. 235).

The memoranda Khrushchev wrote at that time confirm the sequence of events described in his speeches. He began his first memorandum by saying: "I should like to convey to the members of the Presidium some thoughts that occurred to me during my visit in Turkmenia" (Vol. VII, p. 197). Later he continued:

I must say that there is very much unnecessary parallelism in the industrial production of these republics and much primitiveness in the work of the industrial enterprises. . . . The more I become acquainted with the conditions on the spot, the more firmly I conclude that it is necessary to create a single sovnarkhoz. . . . When I am in Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan, I will consult on this question with the Tadzhik and Uzbek comrades. I will listen to their opinions, and upon my return to Moscow we will discuss

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all this in the Presidium of the Central Committee. Now I am saying all of this in order to raise the question (v poriadke postanovki voprosa), *not to pronounce final judgment. . . .*

The sharp difference in the level of farming in Turkmenia as compared with Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan suggested to me the necessity of creating a single production-agricultural administration for the republics of Central Asia. . . . I express my thoughts about the creation of such a production administration as a suggestion for the time being. During my visit here, and also in Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan, I will talk about this question with people on the spot, with the party aktiv, *with the agricultural officials. . . . When I return to Moscow, my ideas on this question will be more complete and I will report on them to the Presidium of the Central Committee.* (Vol. VII, pp. 200-203)

While Khrushchev would always be deferential in his memoranda to the Presidium and would preface his remarks with phrases such as "if the Presidium approves" (Vol. VIII, p. 256), he had clearly made the decisions on the economic administration of Central Asia long before he returned to Moscow. Even many of the details of the final decision were worked out and announced in Central Asia, including the name of the man who was being "recommended" to head the agricultural administration. Indeed, Khrushchev predicted that after reporting his proposals to the Presidium, "we will take a corresponding decision" (Vol. VII, p. 244), and the prediction proved to be eminently correct.

We do not know, of course, what discussion in the Presidium preceded the trip to Central Asia, and one cannot exclude the possibility that the question of administrative reorganization had been raised then. It is certainly true that the idea of amalgamating economic regions had been "in the air" for some time. Yet, as one reads and rereads these fascinating one hundred pages, the strong impression prevails that the subject had not been much discussed before Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. True, the First Secretary may have been guilty of false pretenses while speaking in Central Asia, but this explanation cannot possibly be applied to the language of his memoranda. And to suggest that these documents have been "creatively" edited is to assume that Khrushchev's role is even more dominant than the memoranda suggest.

SINCE THE DECISION in Central Asia is the only one thoroughly documented in the volumes under review, we do not know whether it is a typical example of Soviet policy making. There are, however, other scattered pieces of evidence in the collection which also suggest that decision making in the Soviet Union is still a far more personalized process than one would expect in a bureaucratic society. Again and again, administrative action appears to depend upon what the First Secretary sees, whom he consults, how he interprets reality. By the time we reach Volume VII, it somehow no longer seems fantastic to read that the failure of the Soviet Union to have a soybean harvester in 1961 was in large part the result of Khrushchev's failure to realize that such a machine existed in the United States. If Western specialists have long believed that initiative in the Soviet system can too frequently flow only from the center, then these papers suggest that too frequently it must flow from the very top.

It is almost always difficult to bring a review of an extensive collection of documents such as this to a timely conclusion; invariably there remain other passages worthy of quotation, other points deserving of discussion. This reviewer has focussed attention on some of the political implications of the Khrushchev papers, neglecting thus much of the data that would be of interest to, say, an agricultural economist. Yet, if the impression has been conveyed that there is a wealth of valuable materials in these unwieldy seven volumes and that courageous students of the Soviet Union will be amply rewarded if they plunge into that sea of words, the purpose of this review will have been realized.

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A Precarious Legality

JOHN N. HAZARD: *Settling Disputes in Soviet Society,*
New York, Columbia University Press, 1960.
HAROLD J. BERMAN: *Justice in the USSR,*
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.
PETER ARCHER: *Communism and the Law,*
Chester Springs, Dufour, 1963.
GLENN G. MORGAN: *Soviet Administrative Legality,*
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962.

Reviewed by F. J. M. Feldbrugge

SINCE ADMINISTERING the law is a relatively cumbersome process involving loss of time and money, people are tempted again and again by the vision of a society which would do away with law altogether, or at least rigidly restrict its application, in favor of solving disputes in a simpler and more direct way, without troublesome formalities. This aspiration, nourished more or less nostalgically everywhere as a natural reaction to the existence of a formal legal order, finds an additional stimulus in the Marxian ideology with its concepts of the eventual withering away of state and law and their replacement by administration through informal social action.

In his *Settling Disputes in Soviet Society,* Professor Hazard examines what he terms the formative years of legal institutions in the USSR—*i.e.*, the first post-revolutionary years when aversions to the old legal system and the desire to introduce novel ways of regulating social relations were strongest. Tsarist law was abolished completely, but the Soviet government soon realized that it could not dispense with the courts. Within a few weeks after the revolution, new Soviet courts were set up and staffed with lay judges who were to try cases according to their "revolutionary conscience," without relying on codes of law. However, this Arcadian situation did not last, and it was only a few years before the Soviet Union possessed a complicated system of courts trying cases according to precise rules of procedure and guided by a number of codes regulating all the main branches of law.

Mr. Hazard offers two possible explanations of this development: first, that it is very probable that a modern society cannot function without an elaborate system of laws and courts; and, secondly, that the people who played the key part in fashioning the Soviet legal system were themselves lawyers. It was clearly the opinion of these men that law should play an

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important role in the construction of a Communist society. In many cases they preferred the use of legal institutions to other means of social control; they succeeded in having the revolutionary tribunals abolished in favor of the ordinary courts, and they achieved a temporary eclipse of the Cheka (secret police).

On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that the professional lawyers as a group were opposed to certain basic tenets of the new political order. Those lawyers who were most influential in the formation of Soviet law were themselves close to the political summit; and Lenin himself took an active part in the elaboration of the first Soviet statutes. The minds of these men reflected both revolutionary fervor and aversion to disorder—as well as the latent conflict inherent in this combination. As Mr. Hazard points out (p. 482), "they were revolutionaries in their loyalties to the political regime of Bolshevism, but they seem to have been imbued at the same time with a desire to progress in orderly fashion towards communism."

From the years described by Professor Hazard to the present day, the path of Soviet law has been tortuous and eventful. Yet, basic features of character acquired in early childhood are not easily effaced—not even in the Soviet Union. At this moment, as a reaction against the cult of the living Stalin (or in an effort to recapture lost revolutionary fervor?), there is a conscious tendency in Soviet political life to return to the first years after the revolution, accompanied by a cult of the embalmed Lenin. In economic and social development, as well as in the legislation connected with it, much has happened in the Soviet Union since 1917; in the basic Soviet views on law, there has been much less change.

THE PRESENT situation of Soviet law is discussed by Professor Harold Berman in *Justice in the USSR,* a revised edition of his earlier *Justice in Russia,* published in 1950. Obviously, enough has happened since then to warrant a new edition; the death of Stalin and ensuing developments left their imprint, and the extensive legislative reforms effected since 1958 have markedly changed the face of Soviet law. But if one should ask whether the law has been altered beyond recognition, the answer is "No." For, as Professor Berman notes, "despite the very substantial changes which they [Stalin's successors] introduced, the Soviet legal system remained Stalinist in its basic structure and its basic purposes" (p. 67).

This quotation also suggests what sort of changes did take place. In some cases it was necessary to adapt the law to new situations; in others, new forms had to be elaborated. The emergence of new types of economic crime elicited a sharp legislative reaction—reflecting, in the author's view, the temptation of a planned economy to take Draconian measures against private enterpreneurial activity leading to the accumulation of personal wealth (p. 151). In this light, another statement by Berman to the effect that the individual victims of these severe measures need not command our sympathies ("They were, presumably, scoundrels," p. 86) sounds unduly harsh. Among them, admittedly, there were ordinary swindlers, but there were also persons guilty of nothing more than trying to make a little extra money through private enterprise—and, in any case, to impose capital punishment for economic crimes under normal circumstances is barbaric.

Mr. Berman's study is written in a lively, vigorous style, and a reviewer can hardly be expected to resist the temptation to repeat some of the terse phrases in which the book abounds. For instance: "What the state owns, nobody owns. Everybody's business is nobody's business" (p. 98)—a statement to be contemplated not only by Soviet politicians. Of course, it is not the author's intention (I assume) to advocate the abolition of all state property, but his remark points to an inherent psychological disadvantage of property without an "owner" (that is, a person, or persons, having specific powers with regard to such property and able to profit from it).

The matter of economic crimes is illustrative of another aspect of Soviet law: the tension between long-term evolution and short-term requirements. Present-day economic crime in the Soviet Union is the child of a long economic and social evolution, a structural phenomenon of Soviet society. The legislative reaction to it, however, does not offer an adequate, much less an effective, answer; indeed, it cannot very well do so because, to quote Professor Berman again, "the Soviets are stuck with Marxist slogans which do not correspond to the underlying economic and legal realities either of their society or of ours" (p. 153).

The Soviet response, in short, was crude and panicky. Barely a few months after the enactment of the new Criminal Code of the RSFSR (in October 1960), the central government issued a series of decrees drastically increasing the penalties for various economic crimes—currency speculation and other proscribed financial dealings, counterfeiting, theft of socialist property, planning frauds, etc. In serious cases of most of these crimes, the death penalty could

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be applied. Obviously, those in power had become irritated by the growth of particular forms of economic activity, and their reaction, primitive but not unusual, was to step up the penalties. In doing so, however, they ignored the deep-rooted origins of these activities and failed to come to grips with the real problem—namely, that some people just like to make money, and that the structural shortcomings of a Soviet-type economy offer vast opportunities to such people.

MR. BERMAN'S "interpretation of Soviet law" (the subtitle of his book) endeavors to explain that law as the product of three components: Communist ideology, the Russian heritage, and the "parental" attitude of the state. Under these three headings all the main aspects and branches of Soviet law pass in review. About the parental character of the law he says:

Soviet law cannot be understood unless it is recognized that the whole Soviet society itself is conceived to be a single great family, a gigantic school, a church, a labor union, a business enterprise. The state stands as its head, as the parent, the teacher, the priest, the chairman, the director. As the state, it acts officially through the legal system, but its purpose in so acting is to make its citizens into obedient children, good students, ardent believers, hard workers, successful managers. (p. 366)

This, I think, is quite true, and the parental character of the law is a legitimate distinction. However, in Professor Berman's view, it is more than that: it is a third dimension of Soviet law inasmuch as that law "cannot be fully explained either by the logic of socialism or by the experience of Russian history or by both together" (p. 279). This statement, in my judgment, goes one step too far, and the examples given by the author to illustrate his point seem unconvincing. In the activities of the comrades' courts, in civil and criminal procedures, and in labor law, it is indeed true that Soviet citizens are not treated as responsible adults: the state is permanently present in an educating and leading function. But this is entirely consistent with the Communist idea of law as a tool of the state; and it is also completely in line with Russian tradition. Therefore the "parental" aspect as a third dimension of Soviet law appears superfluous: Soviet law is sufficiently characterized by its Russian roots and its Communist ideology.

Occasionally, in his otherwise critical and penetrating analysis, the author too easily repeats Soviet statements without comment, *e.g.*, in saying that the legislation enacted in the late 1950's and early 1960's was worked on by representatives of thousands of organizations (p. 79), that the "anti-parasite" laws have not been used against political opponents of the regime (p. 233), or that the sanity of an accused person is not presumed but must be

— Скоро начнете?
— Как только скамью для подсудимого доделаем!

Рисунок С. КУЗЬМИНА

A PLEA FOR SEVERITY

Poster reads: Today the Comrades' Court will try drunkards and shirkers.
Below: —Will you begin soon?
—As soon as we're finished fixing the bench for the accused!

—*From* **Krokodil** *(Moscow), Aug. 30, 1963.*

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proven by the prosecution (p. 323). All these statements contain dangerous half-truths which, unless put in their proper setting, tend to become three-quarter falsehoods.

Nevertheless, *Justice in the USSR* gives the total impression of an eminently readable book written with vigor and providing real insight into the present situation of Soviet law. The inclusion of much new material in this edition has added considerably to its value, although it is a pity that the delightful story (given in the original work) of the prerevolutionary Russian jury which acquitted an accused because it was beautiful springlike weather and they could not bring themselves to ruin a man on such a fine day has been dropped.

A WORK OF similar purport, in that it concerns itself with the entire field of Soviet law, is Mr. Peter Archer's *Communism and the Law*. It would, however, be unfair to both authors to draw a comparison between *Justice in the USSR* and *Communism and the Law*. Not only is the latter one-fourth the size of the former, but Mr. Archer evidently did not aim at anything more than presenting a short introduction, without the extensive notes and references provided so abundantly in Professor Berman's work. The shortness of Mr. Archer's book is perhaps its chief failing, though despite this it contains an amazing amount of information.

It is, indeed, a masterpiece of packing. The Communist doctrine of law, the history of Soviet law, the judicial system, the main aspects of property law, planning, family law, criminal law, procedure and state arbitration are all discussed, not only concisely but also accurately and in sufficient detail. Yet, somehow, the many brilliant little pieces fail to unite into the colorful mosaic that one would like to have seen. This is, of course, very much a matter of personal taste and expectations. For the non-specialized reader who wants to familiarize himself with Soviet law, the book provides a veritable Aladdin's lamp, and even the more initiated can admire the author's deft stroke. In the last few pages of his book Mr. Archer comes closest to the kind of inspiration that one would have liked to see permeate the entire volume. Some of his concluding observations deserve to be quoted in full:

. . . democratic modes of behavior and ways of thought require to be supported by rules and institutions, lest the path of least resistance lead, directly or imperceptibly, to tyranny. For then it is too late to introduce rules and institutions. It is easier for freedom to die, whether from murder or from inertia, than it is to resurrect it. Among any people liberty may be silently smothered, and constitutional safeguards do not breathe life into the dead.

The lesson is timely. A hungry people may be tempted to choose food before freedom. The choice is a false one, but unless the West can demonstrate that a people may be both free and fed, some newly-emerging nations may discover in time to come that they have consulted the constitutional lawyers too late.

A CARDINAL ROLE in the administration of Soviet justice, both in theory and in practice, falls to the Procuracy, the hierarchically organized body of state attorneys. Not only is the procurator one of the central figures in criminal proceedings, but he also serves as the chief guardian of "legality" in general—a function which he carries out primarily by means of "general supervision." It is mostly to this latter institution that Professor Morgan's *Soviet Administrative Legality* is devoted. After tracing the origins of the Procuracy back to Peter the Great, the author discusses its scope, methods and powers, particularly with regard to general supervision.

The Procuracy exercises its supervision over the execution of laws and over the conformity to the law of subordinate legislation. It supervises all the lower authorities, private citizens, and so-called public organizations (*e.g.*, kolkhozes). The activities of law and policy-making bodies of the autonomous republics and, higher up, of the union republics and the USSR are excluded from the scope of Procuracy intervention; however, Professor Morgan cites a few recent cases of successful protests by the Procuracy against enactments by the Council of Ministers of an autonomous republic, and even by Councils of Ministers of union republics.

The obvious difficulty posed by an institution like the Soviet Procuracy is not only how high it should be allowed to reach, but also how deeply it should be permitted to dig. On the first point, the answer, with some reservations, seems to be the autonomous republic. With regard to the second, there are apparently many instances of procurators inspecting even the feeding of pigs or the maintenance of machinery. Such action would appear to be beyond the scope of their assigned task, but in principle it can still be construed as supervising the execution of the law. At any rate, it seems difficult to draw a sharp line of demarcation indicating exactly where the procurator should stop worrying.

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In exercising his function of general supervision, the procurator typically acts by lodging a protest or submitting a proposal. (Where a crime appears to have been committed, he instead institutes criminal proceedings.) The proposal is a less formal action than the protest, but otherwise the difference is not very great. Protests are normally addressed to the agency found acting in contravention of the law, or to a superior agency; however, they do not suspend the unlawful action or enactment. Proposals are submitted to party or government agencies when measures on their part are required in order to prevent certain violations in the future.

In conclusion, Professor Morgan maintains that general supervision ought to be an anachronism in the Soviet Union but unfortunately is not. On this point, however, his demands seem a bit hard to meet. He reproaches Soviet law for having general supervision and for being unable to do without it, and he would prefer to see it replaced by judicial review of administrative acts. But then he says that this would be no good either since the judiciary is not independent. I agree with his facts, but not with his complaints. As long as the Soviet Union is what it is, I am glad that there is a Procuracy entrusted with general supervision. On the other hand, I would be happier with judicial review, even if it were by judges who are not sufficiently independent.

EVEN IF THE underlying principles have not changed to any great extent, the developments which have taken place in Soviet law since the death of Stalin are remarkable. The "thaw," to be sure, was not a real thaw followed by sweet spring; but neither was it merely interglacial. To those who think that the Soviet Union has returned to complete sanity after the Stalinist lunacy, I would call attention to the legislation against economic crimes, the anti-parasite laws, and the new confiscation campaign against "unearned income." To those who point to these things as proof that nothing has changed, I would say: much has changed, but do not expect too much in too short a time.

One indicator of the present atmosphere may be found in the reactions of Soviet lawyers to Western criticisms of their legal system. Indeed, by examining some recent Soviet writings, we may learn both what is new in the outlook of Soviet legal scholars, and what still smacks of the Stalinist past.

Expressions of Soviet sensitivity to Western criticisms may be traced back to the lead article in the May 1960 issue of *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Soviet State and Law), which declared that the unmasking of bourgeois ideology and slanderous fabrications concerning the Soviet state should be carried on not only in articles but also in reviews of books.[1] Since then there has been a sustained output in the USSR of critical reviews of Western discussions of Soviet law. The tone of the Soviet authors is invariably aggressive, and their main attacks have been directed against the reproach that Soviet law is merely an instrument of the state, as well as against the thesis that there is a certain amount of *rapprochement* between Soviet and Western law.

One of the Soviet counterattackers, P. I. Grishaev, sees the reproach that law in the USSR is nothing but an instrument of the state as "an attempt to employ the notorious theory of the *Rechtsstaat* to discredit the Soviet state and law."[2] It has been proven repeatedly, he asserts, that the doctrine of the Rule of Law is a pure fiction based on an anti-scientific interpretation of the relations between state and law. According to him, the history of mankind refutes this fiction and confirms the Marxist-Leninist position that there is no law outside or without the state, and that law derives its specific content and functions from the class-type of state (*klassovyi tip gosudarstva*) and the political regime prevailing in a given society.

The *rapprochement* theory (*i.e.*, that all modern industrial societies have common problems such as, say, economic planning or juvenile delinquency, and that consequently their legal institutions and practices have certain points of contact) is blasted by another Soviet writer in an article entitled "The Reactionary-Utopian Conception of a 'Synthesis' of Socialist and Bourgeois Legal Systems."[3] According to the author, S. L. Zivs, anti-Communist ideology is now obliged to resort to less overt, more disguised ways of fighting (this, by the way, seems to be his own private opinion, since the general Soviet line still is that the hard-pressed bourgeoisie is being forced more and more to

[1] "Rabotu zhurnala—na uroven novykh zadach" (The work of the journal must be raised to the level of the new tasks), *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1960, p. 9.

[2] P. I. Grishaev, "Protiv antikommunizma v voprosakh teorii prava" (Against anti-communism in questions of legal theory), *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1963, p. 10. In the same vein, see V. A. Tumanov, "Chto skryvaetsia za lozungom 'gospodstvo prava'?" (What is hidden behind the slogan 'Rule of Law'?), *Ibid*, No. 9, 1963, p. 57 ff.

[3] S. L. Zivs, "Reaktsionno-utopicheskaia kontseptsiia 'sinteza' sotsialisticheskoi i burzhuaznoi pravovykh sistem," *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1960, pp. 53-64. The greater part of this article has been incorporated in the author's book, *Ideinaia nishcheta antikommunizma* (The ideological poverty of anti-communism), Moscow, 1963, pp. 80-106.

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come out into the open and to resort to violent and undisguised attacks against Communist ideology). Bourgeois lawyers, asserts Mr. Zivs, have realized that they can no longer ignore Soviet law, and they have therefore started trying to explain the development of socialist law as a process of taking over traditional institutions from bourgeois law, leading to the eventual effacement of the fundamental differences between socialist and bourgeois law and an ultimate synthesis of the two.

Mr. Zivs answers this interpretation in typical Soviet fashion: that is to say, he does not in fact answer it at all. He confines himself to assuring his readers that Soviet law is far superior to bourgeois law and arguing that improvements in the former cannot have anything to do with bourgeois influences, but on the contrary furnish additional proof of the vitality and progressiveness of Soviet law. Similar views were firmly reiterated last January in another editorial article in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* which declared that "it would be most erroneous and politically harmful to contend that in the field of Soviet law there can be any borrowing from bourgeois legal science."[4]

THE ARGUMENTS presented by semi-official Soviet reviewers of Western literature on Soviet law consistently conform to this negative pattern. For instance, to Mr. Berman's remarks about a Byzantine and Mongol heritage and about Western influences in Soviet law, Mr. Zivs simply replies that such views are scientifically inconsistent and politically harmful.[5] Mr. Zivs and Mr. Grishaev invariably avoid any real discussion, merely repeating their stereotyped argument that anything Soviet is excellent, hence any attacks upon it must be slander; that anything bourgeois is bad; that consequently the two are mutually exclusive of each other and there can be no question of parallel development or of any *rapprochement.* This lofty reasoning is expressed, particularly in Mr. Zivs' writings, in a hearty proletarian style evoking memories of the late Andrei Vyshinski.

What is most objectionable about this manner of argument is that it tends to lead the opponent to resort to similar methods. There are quite a few Western authors who discuss Soviet law in an objective, dispassionate, and businesslike way. But as long as they continue to be treated by Messrs. Zivs, Grishaev and the like in an unbusinesslike, inadequate, insulting, and indeed ridiculous way, it becomes pointless for them to try to explain or refute anything. Thus, the prevailing type of discussion being carried on by Soviet legal spokesmen with Western critics of Soviet law appears hopelessly sterile and, as far as I am aware, serves only as a source of merriment outside the Soviet Union—and perhaps inside as well. It offers not so much arguments to be opposed by lawyers as material to be studied by psychologists.

On the other hand, one must bear in mind that, if real and direct discussion is absent, there still is communication. There have been instances of Soviet legal draftsmen heeding suggestions and criticism from the West, and notwithstanding vociferous Soviet proclamations to the contrary, the achievements of Western legal science are being studied and, on occasion, taken over in the Soviet Union.[6] Furthermore, for all the "deeply scientific" theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviets cannot escape the empirical fact that the legal order is not simply a tool of the state. The more it becomes embedded in the life of the community, the more it will acquire a life and vigor of its own. The maintenance of a legal order ultimately requires the upholding of such values as objectivity, due process, fair trial, protection of the individual against the state, and many others, all of which can be summed up as the Rule of Law. The Soviets are still far from recognizing this, and exalt their "socialist legality" as the solution of the law-power antithesis. But some day they will find out that law and communism cannot always be reconciled, and then their celebrated "socialist legality" will be one word too long: it will be either "socialist" *or* "legality."

[4] "Za vysokuiu partiinost v sovetskoi yuridicheskoi nauke" (For a high degree of party-mindedness in Soviet legal science), *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* No. 1, 1964, p. 10.

[5] See Zivs article cited above, p. 60.

[6] Of course, only unsuccessful moves in favor of borrowing from the West have been publicized in the Soviet Union. For instance, at a Leningrad University conference on criminal law in 1961, Professor M. D. Shargorodski mentioned "the enormous progress in new methods of crime prevention in capitalist countries" and suggested that Soviet legal practice could profit from it. The indignation aroused by this statement resounded for over a year in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo.*

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Are Russia and America "Converging"?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON:
Political Power: USA/USSR, New York, Viking Press, 1964.

Reviewed by Max Beloff

SPONSORED jointly by the Russian Institute and the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University, and written jointly by two eminent specialists on the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, this ambitious and scholarly study should command a wide audience despite the fact that—by reason, perhaps, of the dual authorship—its style tends towards the ponderous. The authors have set themselves two tasks, neither of them easy. They have tried to find a conceptual language that would allow meaningful comparisons between political systems as different from each other as those of the United States and the Soviet Union. They have also tried to answer the question that has become so topical in recent years—namely, whether something in the nature of a "convergence" between the Soviet and American systems is taking place; whether, that is, the impact of increasing industrialization and its effect upon the social order and habits of daily life may not bring about similar responses from the peoples concerned, with a consequential development of near-similar institutions and political styles.

Professors Brzezinski and Huntington pursue these two themes, with the former perhaps uppermost, first through a series of general chapters concerned with such matters as the role of ideas in the politics of the two countries, the relationship in each between the individual and the political system, the nature and development of political elites, and the question of the extent to which political leaders are subject to pressures from social groupings within the two societies. Later chapters examine the same range of problems through specific examples: policy-making in the field of agriculture; civil-military relations as exemplified in the Khrushchev-Zhukov and Truman-MacArthur affairs; dilemmas about intervention abroad—Hungary, 1956, and the Bay of Pigs; and finally, alliance management or mismanagement as illustrated by the Soviet-Chinese and American-French imbroglios.

THROUGHOUT the book the level of discussion is high, and there are no overt concessions to the mentality of the Cold War. That there should be some unconscious assumption of the normality of American development and of the abnormality of the Soviet experience was perhaps inevitable, and an imaginary observer from Mars—someone wholly outside the Soviet-American conflict—might raise certain queries. Some of the questions asked about the two systems are such as would come naturally only to students basically committed to a Western democratic—or even a purely American—approach to politics. Which system, the authors ask, "has a more effective

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method of recruiting political leaders and of regularly changing the wielders of power?" But why should regular change be regarded as a normal feature of a healthy polity? Indeed, when we come to the discussion of the first Cuban crisis, we find the authors pointing out how amateur and inexperienced, as compared with their Soviet opposite numbers, were the group of men around President Kennedy who were responsible for the ultimate fiasco.

OR AGAIN they ask: "In formulating policy in each system, what are the roles of professional politicians, civilian bureaucrats, military leaders, industrial managers, intellectuals, public opinion?" Now this would certainly be a perfectly good way of beginning a comparative study of, say, the American and British systems. All the classes of persons mentioned are to be found in each of the two systems, and in each of them "public opinion" plays a recognizable role through its various channels of expression. But, in a society so heavily politicized as that of the Soviet Union, it is not clear that public opinion is a meaningful concept. How would one define, analyze or measure it? How are professional politicians and civilian bureaucrats to be distinguished from each other in a country where state and party form a single interlocking hierarchy? In what useful sense can industrial managers be distinguished from either group? When we come to the actual analysis of the two systems, however, the authors' performance is much better than their promise, and only rarely do they strain towards an artificial comparison of the basically incomparable.

The authors rightly stress what is too often forgotten by the preachers of "convergence" —namely, the basic ideological dissimilarities between the two systems. On the one hand, a country in which the social has priority, and in which political institutions are merely the instruments of social pressures; a country whose ideology is limited to the constitutional sphere, to the world of means rather than of ends; a country with a rather high degree of ideological homogeneity, but of a spontaneous rather than a forced variety. On the other hand, a country dominated by an ideology looking to the complete transformation of society by the use of political power, where the political has complete priority over the social, a country prepared to use every kind of coercion necessary to preserve ideological homogeneity, whatever the internal pressures.

In the light of this perfectly valid analysis, the authors are certainly right to repudiate either of the two crude versions of the "convergence" theory: the straightforward Marxism of Khrushchev's "We shall bury you!"—that is to say, convergence through the eventual universal triumph of communism —or the equally Marxist oversimplification which proclaims that the single fact of industrialization will bring everything else in its train. The authors have no difficulty in showing, first, that the political system in the Soviet Union is much more than a "superstructure"; and, second, that even if greater affluence resulted from increased industrialization, it would be "collective" affluence, not the private affluence of Western consumer-oriented economies. But it is possible that by their choice of topics for investigation they may have omitted another aspect of "convergence"—*i.e.*, the special pressures that might bring American society closer to the Soviet system without necessarily transforming it entirely in that direction.

The United States, for instance, may be becoming more ideological; the South has produced its share of ideologists already. The authors relate that many schools in the United States teach courses "devoted primarily to exposing the evils of communism" and that "at times this is done with a crudeness fully matching that of Soviet descriptions of the United States." It is true that the Soviet educational system is still far more directly political in its aims than that of the United States; but once political indoctrination begins, it is difficult to limit its ravages. In other words, the Cold War tends to impose on the adversaries of communism some of communism's own features.

FURTHERMORE, although it is no doubt of some importance that the United States has a basically privately-owned economy while in the USSR the state is the sole owner of property, some importance should be attached to the fact that under Cold War conditions the US Government remains the principal customer of an important section of industry, and that the security of employment in important areas depends upon the maintenance of demand for weapons of war unless adequate substitutes can be found. In such circumstances, the "military-industrial complex" which worried President Eisenhower cannot simply be dismissed as a figment of left-wing imagination, however far-fetched the conclusions that left-wing writers may draw from it.

It is harder today than it was a quarter of a century ago to see the state as something external to the economy and to society at large. The authors take the conventional view of American liberal thinkers that the administration and the American

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"Establishment" represent liberal and internationalist forces, while Congress is more likely to be responsive to mass movements of a less enlightened and more fundamentalist kind. They point out, for instance, that the latter dissents from the "Establishment" on "key issues of Cold War strategy, foreign aid, nuclear testing and disarmament, civil rights, and civil liberties"; and they are at the moment obviously right to hold these views. But not all members of the "Establishment," and not even all those connected with the present administration, respond to the external and internal pressures of the day with equal liberality or an equal degree of internationalism. The contemporary challenge to traditional American values in politics and to traditional American political methods would seem to a non-American observer to be rather greater than the authors allow.

IN THE concluding chapter, Brzezinski and Huntington point out that the appeal of the "convergence" theory in the West largely springs from the view that it is the only hope for peace, that a greater similarity between the two systems would make armed conflict between them less likely. The authors are right to point out the hollowness of this argument; great wars in the past have most often been waged between countries with very similar social and political patterns. On the other hand, the inhibitions against large-scale war that have been effective in the post-World War II period have owed nothing to any similarity of structure or basic aims between Russia and America. Each has been guided by enlightened self-interest, and if this continues to operate, no more is needed.

To rely on "convergence" to bring peace is to be more pessimistic than one need be. International tensions and internal political developments are indeed connected, as the authors show in studying Khrushchev's chequered course in the perennial competition between heavy industry and consumer interests for scarce resources. But in the case of the Soviet Union, where external goals are codetermined by ideology, foreign policy will not be shifted simply because Soviet citizens demand a more relaxed existence at home.

THE CHAPTERS devoted to foreign affairs are worth studying for the light they throw on the two countries, rather than as signposts to a problematical future. The authors are struck by the extent to which solidity of doctrine as well as the concentration of highly-placed and experienced decision-makers upon important issues of principle may give the Soviet Union an advantage in some aspects of foreign affairs, particularly in view of its freedom from any moral inhibitions about the use of force.

The relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe do have a good deal in common with the relations between the United States and Latin America. In both cases the preponderant power is feared, disliked, and regarded as culturally inferior by the lesser ones. But the Soviet Union can decide exactly what degree of dissidence it will tolerate, and can move rapidly, as in Hungary, if the mark is overstepped. In relation to Cuba, the United States has never been able to establish a satisfactory criterion for intervention—except in relation to nuclear missiles—and its policy of limited harassment, itself conditioned by the impact of equal uncertainties about relations with other Latin American countries, has proved much less effective, if more humane.

On the other hand, in the matter of relations with allies, the lack of a rigid ideological framework can help to keep dissension within bounds. France has some grievances against the United States which are similar to those that China nourishes against the Soviet Union—though there is not of course the element of direct territorial rivalry. But the United States has been able to put up with French obstruction to its policies and with French criticism without attempting to have France excluded from the Western camp because no basic challenge to America's self-confidence or ways of thought is involved. De Gaulle is not trying to reinterpret the Founding Fathers, and there is no Gaullist party in Washington. The Soviet Union and China have allowed tactical differences of approach to spill over into an ideological dispute with immense ramifications in the entire Communist world.

HOW FAR this striving for ideological conformity is inherent in the Communist system itself, and how far it is reinforced by the social background of the Soviet ruling elite, is difficult to say. The authors are influenced by American sociological theory which tends to equate doctrinal absolutism with a low position on the social and educational scale, and they find a parallel in Soviet experience:

The peasant-worker origin of the Soviet elite has left an imprint on its behavior and mores. . . . It also stimulates a marked tendency, common among the less educated masses, to simplify issues and reduce them to black and white categories. To the extent that this facilitates mass indoctrination, it may be done consciously, but there is also ample evidence that Stalin, Khrushchev and others reason in fairly simple dichotomic categories.

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To some extent this fact may be relevant to another of the book's main conclusions. Whereas in the United States the struggle for power is institutionalized in a form which divides it from the policy-making process—party platforms have little binding force and make little difference as to who wins—in the Soviet Union "policy-making . . . is not nearly as distinct and identifiable as it is in the United States. Instead, it is one aspect of the struggle for power and is absorbed in it." Because of this fact and because of the importance of ideology, "competition for power in the Soviet Union tends to magnify policy differences between the contestants; in the US it tends to moderate them."

BUT ONE should not overlook the fact that in both countries the grip of dogma may inhibit rationality—or if one prefers it, economic rationality may be subordinated to social preferences. In the Soviet Union, industry has been consistently favored as against agriculture; the country's lack of food and its basic cause, the law productivity of agriculture, could only be remedied by abandoning certain "socialist" principles of organization and by providing peasants with incentives at industry's expense. But this would run against the regime's dearest convictions. The Americans, on the other hand, face a constant threat of glut encouraged by the subsidies given to agriculture; and these in turn are justified by the Jeffersonian agrarian myth which makes special treatment of the farmer a paradoxical exception to the country's general commitment to *laissez-faire*. By a final twist, each country is helping by its own policies to maintain the *status quo* in the other: "The Midwestern politician or grain exporter who wishes to sell to the Soviet Union is helping to maintain the collective system in Soviet agriculture. The Soviet *apparatchik* urging grain purchases from the United States is helping to alleviate the dilemma of American overabundance and to perpetuate its basic causes."

The fundamental question remains the position of the individual. The Soviet system has many strong points—this book will give no comfort to those who still look for signs of its speedy downfall; but the strengths of the system are incompatible with any real respect for individual rights. Even in non-political matters the degree of deviant misbehavior that can be tolerated is very limited; each departure from the norm is viewed as a symptom of *political* alienation and treated accordingly. "For this reason attempts to discuss with the Soviets the common problems of industrialized society, such as juvenile delinquency, are unfruitful." The insulation of so much of the Soviet public against knowledge of the external world and its prevailing currents of thought keeps the mental gap from diminishing. It is because of this mental gap that in the end all attempts at making comparisons except within the narrowest limitations come up against insuperable obstacles. In these circumstances "convergence" seems as far off as ever.

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Bringing up the Communist Man

EMMANUEL JOHN HEVI: *An African Student in China,* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963.
EDMUND A. KING (ED.): *Communist Education,* New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963.

Reviewed by Allen Kassof

AS THE Russians have discovered to their sorrow, wooing students from the new nations with a free ride at Soviet universities isn't nearly as easy as it sounds. The angry westward exodus of individuals and groups charging mistreatment at Soviet hands, and such propaganda disasters as the demonstrations by young Africans in Red Square some months ago alleging foul play in the death of one of their fellows, are only the most dramatic signs of friction between the Communist hosts and their student guests.

It is only fair to say that foreign students anywhere are likely to be set on edge by language problems and homesickness. If one also considers the unaccustomed rigors of the continental winter and the supersensitivity understandably harbored by many non-Europeans about color, it is no wonder that there are frequent eruptions of discontent. One Soviet attempt at a solution is Moscow's Lumumba (formerly Friendship) University, established as a separate institution for foreign students. But the educational benefits of attending a third-rate institution are questionable, and the enforced separation from regular Soviet students has led to charges by some that Lumumba U. is really "Apartheid U." Moreover, the most serious sources of discontent—unwelcome ideological indoctrination, suppression of voluntary student organizations, restrictions on freedom of speech, travel, and association—cannot be eradicated until the Soviets are ready to drop the political price-tag from what they advertise as free education.

Now we have a very similar story from Communist China, where the Soviet errors have been repeated on a grander scale. Emmanuel John Hevi, a young Ghanaian, went to Peking in 1960 to study medicine. Less than two years later, after an unsuccessful struggle to reconcile his vision of socialism with the miseries and humiliations that he and his fellows suffered in Communist China, he left (along with almost all the other Africans) in despair and disillusionment. An ardent nationalist with no special sympathy towards the West, Hevi came away filled with profound fears about the consequences of importing the Chinese variety of socialism to his native continent.

WHILE appreciating the need for austere living in a developing economy, the African students found it almost impossible to make ends meet on their meager allowances and were dismayed at discovering that Chinese students were forced to live on far less, even to the point where many suffered from malnutrition. Chinese cant in denying the existence of the problem was even more disturbing.

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Why Do They Leave?

[The exodus of students from China] was not confined to Africans. . . . There were Yemeni and Cuban students who also left because they were dissatisfied with conditions. The Chinese government and its agencies paid our fare to China. One would have thought that any student who was dissatisfied had just to tell the authorities "I want to go home," and then get his air or railway ticket with the minimum of delay. But the Chinese realized, as we also did, that every student returning home in disillusionment constituted an argument against China. Those students were not dumb; they could speak, and China's international reputation wasn't going to be improved if a whole lot of returned students started talking in the outside world in a big way. On one occasion, some Somali students who had gone back home circulated a pamphlet stating the conditions in China and giving reasons why they quit. Some time later a letter, purporting to come from the returned students, was sent in from Somalia condemning the pamphlet. The students all went back home for health reasons, the letter said. It was clear from the copy I read that either the students wrote that letter under duress from their party, or else someone else wrote it without their knowledge and consent. In either case, it must have been written at the instance of the Chinese. One of our Chinese tutors brought me my copy and triumphantly brandished it before my eyes. I asked him two simple questions. *First,* if the twenty-two Somalis left the paradise which is China only for health reasons, how is it the first batch found it necessary to stage a three-day hunger strike to be allowed to leave the paradise? *Secondly,* if all these students who had travelled thousands of miles to study for six or seven years were forced to leave China within less than a year because of ill health, then clearly this does not say much for the ability of Chinese doctors, does it?

The Chinese could find no answer to these questions; his face was redder than a Spanish tomato when he left me!

Therefore, the Chinese resisted any attempt by students to leave the country. Students were forced to adopt extreme measures to press their demand for repatriation. They went on hunger strikes. I was witness to one of these in spring 1961. (I cannot recall the exact date on which they started the strike, but I remember that it was just after our return from Shanghai where we had spent part of the winter vacation. That must have been in the month of March.) A group of five Somalis and one Sudanese had asked for repatriation because the Chinese had consistently refused to improve our conditions of living. They went in a body and plonked themselves down in armchairs in the President's reception room, refusing all food and refusing to leave till they were assured of their return tickets. The strike went on for about three days during which the Chinese piled the tables high with all sorts of delicacies they never thought of serving to us in quieter times. Mr. Sokoro, head of the political party which sent the Somalis to China, was himself in the country at that time and had to ask the Chinese to repatriate any of his students who wanted it. It was only then that the comrades yielded and permitted the students to go home.

This hunger strike was actually the second in the series. There was one other in 1960 not long before I went to the country, involving twelve students from East and West Africa. They found conditions so horrible that they, one and all, demanded repatriation, but the Chinese were having none of it. The students went on hunger strike. All of them, except one, Ibrahim of Sudan, finally went back home.

From those pioneers we learned the value of hunger strikes and strikes in general as an instrument in our anti-Chinese struggles. These strikes were fully justifiable. There is never a concession a man can obtain from the Chinese by speaking soft. Softness and diplomacy are things those people do not seem to understand. The choice is between threatening them and getting what you want, or sitting tight and waiting till doomsday. We were not dealing with "gentlemen"; we were dealing with "comrades" who knew not what it was to be "gentlemen."

The Chinese lived in dread of demonstrations and strikes by foreign students. For one thing these served to show to the Chinese people that the party is after all not as impregnable as it appears. Such activities could be a very bad moral example to Chinese nationals who, for their part, are never allowed to strike or demonstrate in any way except it be on the orders and to the benefit of the party.

—*From* An African Student in China, *pp. 138-40.*

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When a biology professor, who obviously knew better, told him that "proteins, fats, and carbohydrates are interconvertible during human metabolic processes" and that "the people of China therefore do not suffer any nutritional loss in consequence of their diet's deficiency in fats and proteins," Hevi began to have doubts about the quality of the medical education he was supposed to be getting and about the nature of a system that required its scientists to teach falsehoods. His socialist idealism was also shaken by evidences of gross social inequality between party bureaucrats and ordinary citizens, by what he viewed as the elementary inhumanity of the commune system, by the preaching of xenophobic hate, and by the patronizing attitude of some Chinese officials who treated Africans as members of an inferior and benighted civilization to be dealt with like children.

IN THE university itself Hevi and his compatriots found themselves isolated physically and socially from the Chinese students—except those specially assigned to watch and report on their activities. Chinese girls caught associating with them were taken away and punished. The Africans experienced many other unmistakable manifestations of racial prejudice and were even deliberately insulted by being called the Chinese equivalent of "nigger." As if this were not enough, they soon discovered that the instruction offered them at the university was inferior in quality as well as overladen with objectionable political indoctrination ranging from propaganda phrases in language textbooks to compulsory "discussion" sessions.

According to the author, the final straw was the Chinese effort first to prevent the African students from organizing at all, and then to take control of their organization after its formation by dealing separately with various factions within it. The Chinese were especially worried by a meeting called by the Africans to protest an incident in which Chinese police had allegedly beaten up a Zanzibari at a Peking hotel and had also assaulted a second Zanzibari (and his pregnant wife) who had tried to go to the victim's assistance. Chinese interference with the students' meeting—marked by the arrest of two Africans—led to a hunger strike and eventually to requests by the Africans for speedy repatriation to their homelands. According to Hevi's figures, 96 out of 118 Africans studying in China in 1961-62 had already departed at the time he wrote, and another ten were threatening to leave.

HEVI HIMSELF admits that he is not an expert on Chinese life; nevertheless, what he managed to see of it at first hand enables him to give us a rare, insider's view of conditions there in 1960-62 and an illuminating account of the Chinese program to exploit education-hungry Africans for political ends. The ambitions of the Chinese Communists to establish a foothold in Africa and their recent insinuations that they are bound to their black "brothers" by ties of racial sympathy take on a special irony in the light of Hevi's report. Judging from the book, the clumsy transparency of the Chinese' attempt at political courtship of their African guests was matched only by its resounding failure. Presumably the experience has taught the Chinese something about the costs of ignoring African intelligence and dignity, and we may suppose that their future performance will benefit from it. However, they cannot undo the fact that the several dozen young men and women in Hevi's group were decisively alienated and sent home with an unhappy and important story to tell their countrymen.

SUCH SPECTACULAR failures with foreign students should not, of course, lead us to forget the generally impressive achievements of Communist countries in the field of education. Edmund J. King and his associates have given us a series of essays on this subject, dealing principally with the Soviet educational system but also with those of East Germany, Communist China, and Poland (the last essay by a Polish educator). Those already familiar with the excellent literature published in this field in recent years (by Bereday, DeWitt, and others) will not find much new factual material here, but the thoughtful analyses by a group of specialists in comparative education who are also knowledgeable about Soviet-type systems should be useful in placing Communist education in clearer perspective.

Speaking in a very broad sense, the Communist and Western systems of education are not without certain similarities. Both share—though with quite different emphases—faith in knowledge as a key to human betterment; both have developed in response to the need for mass literacy and technical competency in modern society; and both have had to work out methods for locating and nurturing talent. Even in areas where Communist educators claim to depart most radically from Western assumptions, the differences are sometimes not nearly as great as they first appear. For example, as Professor John J. Figueroa points out in his article on "Selection and Differentiation in Soviet Schools," the original Leninist injunction of equal education for all has in fact—despite So-

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viet claims to the contrary—been largely lost in a highly selective system which directly and indirectly sorts out intelligence and aptitude in response to the differentiated requirements of the Soviet economy. In this case as in some others, the structure of education is affected less by manifest ideology than by the functional requirements of industrial systems.

For all these broad similarities, however, there remain critically important differences in atmosphere, and above all in purpose, between Communist and Western education. The essays under review reveal how an educational philosophy and method deriving from the same common tradition of enlightenment as those of the West can be molded to serve the needs of a Communist authoritarian order. This, indeed, is the paradox of Communist education. Miss A. Elizabeth Adams, in her essay on "The Role, Status, and Training of Teachers in the U.S.S.R.," makes the point nicely:

In Uzbekistan, . . . the prospect for girls in pre-revolutionary days was not only a complete lack of education but a stifling existence through a veil, deprived of nearly every kind of human intercourse and doomed to a life of physical and mental sickness. Nowadays in these desert towns and villages, little girls and boys leave their homes together, dressed in school uniform, and carrying their satchels. In school they are taught by newly trained young men and women, full of hope, good will and confidence in the future. What a tragedy that these generations, although enlightened by much scientific study, are also burdened by out-of-date, though newer, mystical doctrines and confused by irrational myths and prejudices!

IF THE influence of Communist ideology of the formal curriculum is mitigated by a practical awareness of what it takes to turn out physicians, coal miners, and ballet dancers, it is nevertheless strongly felt in the area of moral or character education. Miss Mary Waddington, in her admirable article concerning "Russian Children at Home and in School," describes with great sensitivity some of the personality-training practices favored in Soviet education. Writing of the meaning attached to play activities, she points out:

In the socialist countries, as elsewhere, play is valued as the chief educational factor in the life of young children; but on the Russian side it is recognized primarily as a preparation for school life, whereas in the West it is felt to be essential for the development of the personality, for social adjustment and for the release of emotional tension. The Russian values which play is designed to serve seem functional, and concerned with personal success, whereas those of the West are, comparatively, humane and esthetic.

As the mounting documentation of recent years shows, educational systems of the Soviet type have proved, by and large, well able to staff the growing manpower needs of the societies they serve. However, the longer-range question of whether the attainment of mass literacy, technical proficiency, and scientific sophistication will someday be followed by enlightenment in the more basic social and political sense is much harder to answer. Although it would be inaccurate to ascribe a uniform view to the twelve authors of the King volume, one senses in general a cautious optimism on their part that the humanistic elements which underlie both Western and Communist education will eventually flower in the latter as the more urgent tasks of modernization are gradually solved. Of course this is possible, but in the reviewer's opinion the record to date serves only to demonstrate that the Communist regimes have managed to suppress the freedom-generating potentials of organized knowledge while turning it to other purposes. The key perhaps lies in what King correctly identifies as the unique feature of Communist education—

the total control of intellectual, technological and (as far as possible) esthetic and moral life. It is concentrated in the all-enveloping power of the party over government, productivity, investment, schooling, extra-curricular activity, advertising, and every scrap of reading or entertainment.

So long as this basic characteristic remains unchanged, the ultimate blessing of modern education—its liberation of the mind—is likely to go unrealized in the Communist lands.

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Prelude to Revolution

J. L. H. KEEP: *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963.
RICHARD KINDERSLEY: *The First Russian Revisionists—A Study of "Legal Marxism" in Russia,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963.
ARTHUR P. MENDEL: *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia—Legal Marxism and Legal Populism,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.

Reviewed by Marc Raeff

THE APPEARANCE of several works dealing with the same problems or period reflects the "logic" of research in a given field. The revolution of October 1917 has held the attention of contemporary historians because the event not only changed the destiny of Russia but directly affected the whole modern world. The study of Communist and Soviet development has impelled historians to probe backward in time to the wider context of the emergence of the Russian labor movement and socialist parties, of Russian Marxism, and of the economic and intellectual climate at the turn of the century.

The aim of such research is to analyze and to describe accurately the economic, social, political and cultural matrix out of which the revolution was born. Although we are mainly concerned with the end result, we cannot fully understand what brought about October 1917 without knowing what the possible "alternatives" were. This does not imply a retrospective glorification or justification of either Lenin's rivals or the imperial regime, nor should it lead to the conclusion that 1917 was nothing but a dreadful accident. It merely means that Lenin and his Bolsheviks have to be seen in the broader context of Russian Marxist social democracy, which in turn must be seen as the product of a labor movement reacting to the social and economic consequences of Russia's industrialization, and of an ideological crisis on the part of intellectuals responding to the cultural and moral implications of "modernization."

The three books under review examine some of the facets of this Russian prerevolutionary reality around the turn of the last century. J. L. Keep's study is concerned with the first decade of existence of the Russian Social Democratic Party (RSDRP). He carries the history of the movement through the revolutionary events of 1904-05, which climaxed in the December 1905 uprising in Moscow. By this time, he argues, the basic characteristics of the factions within the movement had emerged. As Mr. Keep's main interest is in the movement as a political party (albeit an illegal one), he focuses on questions of organization and on the high command's relation to local party units. He is only tangentially concerned with the leadership's relationship to the working class as such and to the spontaneous organizations of workers that sprang up.

While Lenin occupies the center of the stage in much of the

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account, Mr. Keep also devotes major attention to the Mensheviks, who of course were to become Lenin's main opponents. They are his heroes: although he points out their political ineptness and criticizes their dogmatism, he is on their side morally and intellectually. For this reason, he sees the history of Russian social democracy almost as a Greek tragedy, with Lenin as the Fate that punishes the intellectual and political *hubris* of men much superior to himself.

Mr. Keep systematically plays down the role of ideology in the social democratic movement, dealing with the internal history of the RSDRP much as one would with that of the British Labor Party, the French SFIO, or the German SDP between the two world wars. While this approach is useful as a means of pointing up the errors in certain dogmatic party histories, it fails to account for the role that ideology played in the debates and even in the personal lives of the leadership. The latter consisted for the most part of intellectuals so much cut off from Russian life and so steeped in historical-philosophical ways of thought that ideology became the very fabric of their thinking. Lenin is made out to have been a party boss primarily motivated by a drive to dominate the party. This is only partly true, for Lenin was also motivated by a vision of the future (however vague and flexible) and a conception of historical development. Under such impetus he became a dictator, but not a tyrant (as did Stalin): the distinction is of importance, and it is unfortunate that Mr. Keep's account tends to blur it.

The valuable information provided on the relationship between the central and local RSDRP organizations adds a new and important dimension to Mr. Keep's account of the events of the revolution of 1905. This is perhaps the major contribution of his study, and no brief summary can do it justice. Yet one wishes he had pushed his investigation even further; he does not, for example, give adequate attention to the impact of government policies on the local level. And after all, the social democratic movement's success or defeat were in part conditioned by what the government did or failed to do in its everyday actions.

IN A CHAPTER headed "The First Heresies," Mr. Keep discusses the conflict that opposed the "orthodox" Marxists (more particularly Lenin) to the so-called "legal" Marxists. The latter are the subject of Richard Kindersley's valuable book. The Legal Marxists were academically oriented and spoke and wrote openly within the limits permitted by the somewhat lackadaisical Tsarist censorship. They became the first Russian proponents of revisionism, and still later most of them moved farther away from revolution to liberalism and even to moderate conservatism.

The brilliant names among this group—Peter Struve, Sergei Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdiaev, Simon Frank—attest to the high intellectual level on which the Legal Marxists conducted their debate with the orthodox and revolutionary Marxists. As Kindersley shows so well, the Legal Marxists were not primarily motivated by any tactical political considerations, but by a compelling need to face the intellectual truth squarely. They also are witness to the intensity and depth of the spiritual crisis Russia underwent at the turn of the century; it is not surprising that the main proponents of Legal Marxism later ranked among the influential thinkers of Russia's "Silver Age"—and it is a pity, by the way, that Kindersley leaves his heroes on the very threshold of this age.

Like the revisionists in Western Europe, the Russian Legal Marxists were essentially concerned with the clarity and truth of the philosophical implications of political, moral, and economic theories. Their philosophical quest for truth was bound to clash with the political commitment to revolutionary change of men of action like Lenin. Of much use is the author's clear exposition of their basic neo-Kantian philosophic presuppositions, and the theoretical economic and political implications thereof. Their searching criticisms of Marxist concepts were interestingly close to those of contemporary analyses of Marxism. And this for a simple reason: both the Russian Legal Marxists in the 1890's and the analysts today view Marxism not as a guideline for revolutionary action, but as a tool for the analysis of deep-seated problems of the modern industrial world.

For Struve and his friends (as for many scholars today), Marx' greatness was as a social scientist, not as an economist or political leader. This perspective led the Legal Marxists to examine the problem of the evolution of capitalism, especially on the basis of its history in the West. Implicitly this investigation raised the question of alternatives to the revolutionary path advocated by the orthodox Marxists and the Social Democratic Party. In retrospect, therefore, Struve and his friends emerge as the perceptive analysts of the basic dynamics of their own society and as advocates of an alternative evolutionary path for Russia. While the impartial and skeptical historian may not agree that the evolutionary alternative was a very real one given Russian conditions, the Legal Marxist view of it helps to put the circumstances of Lenin's eventual triumph into broader perspective.

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One becomes particularly aware of the tragedy of the split that occurred in the Russian intelligentsia in the first decade of the 20th century between the "doers of deeds" and the scholars, the "speakers of words." While the latter had a grasp on philosophical truth, the former had psychological reality on their side.

MR. KINDERSLEY'S sympathetic and sophisticated treatment of Legal Marxism stresses the debate between orthodox and revisionist Marxism. Mr. A. P. Mendel affords us a glimpse into a parallel and simultaneous debate between Legal Marxists and Legal Populists. The Populists were essentially advocates of a Russian path of economic and social development (based on existing social and economic institutions like the *mir* and *artel*) and defenders of the primacy of the individual person over historical determinism. Mendel's sympathies for them lead him to exaggerate the forcefulness of the Legal Populists' position and its potential practical implications for underdeveloped countries today. When all is said and done, the Populists defended a program not only fraught with conflicting aims and claims, but also unworkable in economic or political terms under conditions of Russian psychological and social reality. Mendel tries to prove the Marxists—both "Legal" and orthodox—wrong morally, politically, and economically. This may be; but it is no proof that the Legal Populists were more right or had a workable alternative.

Stimulating as are the books here reviewed, one has some sense in all three of dwelling in a rather rarefied atmosphere, cut off from the reality of overall Russian social and political life of the time. It is true that Mr. Keep discusses the down-to-earth organizational problems of social democracy. But the debate carried on by Lenin against the advocates of economism and spontaneous action by workers, and his advocacy of an elitist organization of the party, can be understood only if the mass labor movement of the 1890's and 1900's is taken into account.

In this connection, two other recent studies might be commended, in passing, to the reader's attention. One is an excellent and suggestive little book by Richard Pipes, entitled *Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963). As his title suggests, Mr. Pipes clearly perceived the need to discuss the ideological debates and organizational quarrels of the Left against the broader background of the development of the labor movement. Though he is guilty of some overstatement, he has handled this task very well. The second book, by Dietrich Geyer, is *Lenin in der Russischen Sozialdemokratie—Die Arbeiterbewegung im Zarenreich als Organisationsproblem der revolutionaren Intelligenz 1890-1903* (Köln, Graz, Bohlan Verlag, 1962). This study—deserving of more attention than it has gotten, in the reviewer's opinion—touches to some degree on the themes of all of the works reviewed herein, again contributing to our comprehension of the Russian scene at the turn of the century.

Today there are signs that historians in the Soviet Union are becoming more concerned with the pre-history of Bolshevism, and it is possible that we may get some interesting new materials from their pens. The books discussed above can then serve as a complement to such scholarship—and also as a check on its reliability—since they embody the testimonies (published and unpublished) and points of view of those whose existence and historical role the Soviets might choose to deny. In the meantime our knowledge and understanding of the conditions that led up to October 1917 have been greatly enhanced.

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China Before Mao

A. DOAK BARNETT: *China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963.

Reviewed by Michael Lindsay

AS HE EXPLAINS in his preface, Mr. Barnett was in China for two years from the autumn of 1947 as a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs and correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*. During this time he wrote about forty reports for the Institute, and the book under review is a selection of twenty-three of them, with some cuts and revisions in style but no rewriting in the light of hindsight.

The reports are divided into four parts. The last part, "Communist Takeover," contains some interesting information about the siege of Peking and the negotiations that led to the surrender of the defending Nationalist forces of General Fu Tso-yi. However, it has very little to say about the succeeding Communist regime because, as the author notes, foreigners, and especially news correspondents, were promptly isolated from all important contacts.

The third part, "Fragmentation: Warlords, Borderlands, and Political Disunity," is the longest and in some ways the most interesting section of the book. It shows the extent to which largely autonomous local regimes had survived around the periphery of the area controlled by the Nationalist Government and how mistaken it is to think of all the provincial "warlords" of the pre-Communist period as fitting a common pattern.

In the north-central province of Shansi, for example, there was Yen Hsi-shan, who in the 1920's had become known as the "model warlord," not without some justification. By 1948, however, in those parts of Shansi which he still controlled, Yen was trying to compete with the Communists by developing his own version of a totalitarian police state embodying radical social changes. His programs had virtually eliminated private property in land and buildings and had squeezed out most private business. His "Soldier-Farmer-Unification" program had apparently failed to produce better troops and in addition had caused a serious food shortage, but the accomplishments of the local regime in developing heavy industry impressed Barnett as quite remarkable.

Meanwhile, in the neighboring province of Suiyuan, Fu Tso-yi, a former subordinate of Yen Hsi-shan's, seemed to be providing both good government and an efficient army. Farther west were two Moslem warlords: Ma Pu-fang, whose rule in Chinghai, though authoritarian, appeared to have won considerable popular support through progress made in irrigation projects, education, health services, etc.; and Ma Hung-k'uei in Ninghsia, whose regime seemed less progressive and more brutal, though still fairly efficient.

Yunnan and Sinkiang were provinces in which the Nationalist Government had managed to squeeze out the ruling warlords a few years before Barnett's visits, although the new governor of Yunnan was maneuvering in 1949 for greater autonomy. The author's report

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on the remote and almost entirely non-Chinese province of Sinkiang has an interesting bearing on the history of Sino-Soviet relations. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the former local warlord, had owed his power to Soviet support in 1933, and Soviet influence in this border province had steadily increased until 1942. The restoration of central government control consequently was a setback to Soviet ambitions. Barnett's report indicates that at the time of his visit the Chinese Nationalist officials of Sinkiang were having to cope with local rebellions fairly clearly sponsored by the Soviet Union.

EXCEPT FOR Shansi and Suiyuan, however, all these areas were marginal to the main Communist-Kuomintang struggle for control of China. If one is interested primarily in finding clues to the causes of the Kuomintang's defeat in this momentous struggle, the first two parts of Barnett's book are the most relevant.

The second part, "Stagnation: Nationalist China's Rural Hinterland," is an illuminating study of a rural *hsien* (Pahsien) in Szechuan. The picture that emerges is one of conditions which urgently demanded reform but which were not likely to change through internal revolution. Rents were high, and the lower levels of government were dominated by the local gentry, although this was traditional and largely taken for granted. At both the *hsiang* and *hsien* levels, most of the budget was used up simply in maintaining the machinery of government, with the result that very little was left to finance positive projects.

But the greatest weakness was the absence of any real drive or enthusiasm. Some officials and local leaders realized the need for land reform, and proper enforcement of the national government's land law might have produced it. However, to do this, the *hsien* had only one Land Administration Officer with one assistant for a population of about 800,000. Again, the local leaders had wanted to organize a local militia and had started to do so by the middle of 1948; but they complained that the central government had sought to discourage such efforts because it was afraid of arming the people. The Direct Tax Bureau had an office in the *hsien* capital but admitted that it had not been able to make anyone pay income tax. Membership in the Kuomintang seemed to be a prerequisite for appointment to any responsible position in the local administration; yet it appeared to Barnett that the party had "no roots, no mass following, and no program or activities."

NEVERTHELESS, if the situation in Pahsien was typical of the Chinese countryside in general, Barnett's report would seem to indicate that a Communist-inspired revolution was not inevitable. There were no signs of the "oppressed masses" being ready to revolt against the Kuomintang in order to assist their "liberation" by the Communists. Moreover, the author's reports from other areas suggest that in so far as the people could "vote with their feet" (in Lenin's phrase), they were more disposed to "vote" against than for the Communists. For instance, even though Yen Hsi-shan's rule was extremely unattractive, there was a refugee movement into the areas he controlled, and the author reports that people seemed to fear the Communists quite as much as the Yen Hsi-shan regime, if not more. Communist publications themselves admitted that the more radical land program imposed in the Communist-controlled areas after 1946 had alienated the support of many of the "middle peasants"—a fact which the refugee movements out of these areas would seem to confirm.

AS MR. Barnett brings out, Pahsien was not without competent officials and local leaders who realised the need of reforms and would have liked to carry them out. What was lacking was the organization and the overall leadership and support from above which would have enabled them to act. In its ability to support and encourage those who wanted to effect progressive reforms at the local level, the central government seems to have been inferior to some of the provincial warlord regimes.

When the central government did get around to appointing some competent local governor, its action usually came too late. Thus, for example, the author's report from Hainan (in Part Three) shows that the development projects carried out there by the Japanese had been allowed to run down and disintegrate until the appointment of General Ch'en Chi-t'ang to govern the island in April 1949. General Ch'en made considerable progress in the next six months, and he told Mr. Barnett when the latter visited Hainan in November, "In two years time, I could have really done something." By then, however, the influx of disorganized Nationalist soldiers fleeing from the mainland, where the Communists were sweeping everything before them, was making his problems insoluble. Similarly, Nationalist Chinese who have more recently been connected with the land reform program on Taiwan have remarked to the reviewer, "If only we had been allowed to carry out on the mainland the reforms we have made on Taiwan, the Communists would never have won." But the

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sad fact is that on the mainland they were never given the opportunity to act until it was too late.

The first part of Mr. Barnett's book, entitled "Disintegration: Nationalist China's Urban Base," confirms the diagnosis that the basic cause of the Kuomintang's defeat was a failure of leadership. The author's reports from both Shanghai and Tientsin indicate that there was little evidence of strong pro-Communist sympathies even among the urban industrial workers. On the other hand, in all the cities he visited, he observed a steady loss of confidence in the Nationalist government and a growing feeling of hopelessness. The cities were particularly affected by the runaway monetary inflation, the effects of which were further intensified by badly administered controls. People in Tientsin, for example, complained that unrealistic official exchange rates had ruined their export trade, and that the central government's controls were being administered to favor Shanghai.

ONE OF THE faults of the Kuomintang leadership was its lack of confidence in the people. It was always afraid to admit the seriousness of the situation and, in its efforts to gloss over the truth, may even have become confused by its own publicity. In order to justify drastic measures that would have been distasteful to the powerful vested interests within the ruling group, the government would have had to acknowledge publicly that the situation was desperate and that only such action could stave off total defeat. Yet, as the author mentions in one of his reports, President Chiang Kai-shek's speech to the Chinese National Assembly in April 1948 expressed "complete faith in the government's ability to defeat the Communists" and blamed fears of the Kuomintang's collapse on "Communist propaganda and the predictions of foreign newspapermen and observers." Barnett's report goes on to say that Chiang's "account of the state of the nation was amazing. The gist of it was that 'everything's fine and dandy.'"

SO LONG as this remained the official propaganda line concerning the internal crisis, the Kuomintang leaders were incapable of making a rational response to the situation and instead felt impelled to blame their difficulties on fictitious scapegoats. Thus, a young official in Nanchang, in talking with Barnett, quoted a prominent Kuomintang leader as his authority for believing that China's economic troubles were due partly to President Truman's refusal to recognize the new Chinese currency and partly to the black-market activities of Russian agents. He refused to admit that anything at all was wrong with the government's economic policies.

Among the educated public, the government's attempts to conceal bad news merely produced a complete distrust of all official statements. A good deal of the criticism directed at the Kuomintang leadership was irresponsible—the author found the "liberals" of the Democratic League naive, vague and unconstructive—but the government, in trying to deal with the criticism by suppressing the critics, only succeeded in further discrediting itself. From Mr. Barnett's account of student opinion in Peking, it would seem that no official attempt was made to offer the intellectual community any reasoned statement of the government's case.

It is still a matter of controversy at what point the Communist victory in mainland China became inevitable, and whether there was a period during which a different policy on the part of the United States might have prevented it. The information furnished by Mr. Barnett's book fits in with other evidence suggesting that an absolute prerequisite for a different outcome would have been some means of inducing the Kuomintang leadership to face reality. Even as late as 1948, it seems possible that the drift towards disaster might have been checked if the top Nationalist leaders had admitted clearly to themselves that they were losing both the military struggle and the support of the people, that they themselves must bear the primary responsibility for this, that defeat could be averted only by drastically improving the performance of the government and thus regaining popular support, and that this demanded giving full support to people able and willing to work for reorganization and reform regardless of the selfish wishes of the vested interests and the effect on the political balance of power.

HAD SUCH a readiness to face reality existed in the Kuomintang leadership, American assistance might have been decisive; without it, American assistance merely risked providing the Nationalist regime with an excuse for even greater reluctance to face up to the need for drastic reform. On the military side, for example, almost all observers were agreed that the essential requirement for improving the government's war effort against the Communists was that command should be given and resources allocated to generals of proven military competence. To have placed more American equipment at the disposal of generals appointed solely or largely for political reasons might only have resulted in swelling the supply of arms available to the Chinese Communists for the Korean war.

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One very general conclusion that might be drawn from the Nationalist collapse in China is that in the modern world Confucianism is no longer a possible basis for a viable political system. The underlying argument was very well stated by the French historian Marc Bloch when he criticized the attempt of the wartime Vichy regime to work for a paternalistic authoritarian system in France. He contended that the only alternative to totalitarianism is government based on the support of an informed public opinion because "the masses no longer obey. They *follow*, either because they have been hypnotized or because they *know*."

The Chinese Communists could allow considerable local initiative among party members and could base promotions on competence because they could be sure of their followers' ultimate loyalty. If a Communist general had tried to set himself up as a warlord in opposition to the party, it is unlikely that his Communist officers would have followed him. And in the areas they controlled the Communists had some spontaneous popular support and could win more by indoctrination. Their programs could be carried out because, right down to the village level, there were people who felt a personal responsibility for implementing them.

The only type of political system in China which could have competed effectively with the Communists would have been one in which the people followed because they *knew* and in which the leaders received support and could delegate initiative to their subordinates because all were cooperating for common purposes that were agreed upon and understood. In the Chinese conditions of the latter 1940's, such a system need not have been democratic in the sense of working through popularly elected organizations, but it would have had to be democratic in the sense of depending on popular support, encouraging popular initiative, and adjusting its policies in the light of public criticism and discussion. There were many competent and patriotic Chinese who would gladly have worked for such a government.

The Confucian tradition, however, was paternalistic and authoritarian. What it required from the people was obedience rather than cooperation. And because it emphasized obedience, it distrusted local initiative as a rival source of authority. The Kuomintang organization always emphasized control from above, which was often effective in a negative sense but did not ensure that positive programs were carried out (*cf.* the fate of the land reform law). The leaders were always afraid of delegating power except to those bound to them by ties of personal loyalty. Because they demanded obedience rather than cooperation, they tried to manipulate public opinion rather than inform it, to suppress criticism rather than answer it.

Given the deeply-rooted influence of Confucianism among the Kuomintang leadership and the great power and influence of the vested interests opposed to reform, it would have required very forceful and skillful outside intervention to bring about a viable non-Communist regime on the Chinese mainland after 1946. If one is looking for a period when a different American policy might have changed the future of China, the greatest possibilities probably lay in the period from 1942 to 1945.

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NOTES & VIEWS

The Parts of the Party

By J. W. Cleary

The November 1962 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee initiated organizational and institutional changes affecting a wide range of both state and party organs in the USSR. The planning committees were once again modified; the administrative bureaucracy responsible for new technology and construction was centralized; a unified system of party and state control was established; and the sovnarkhozes (regional economic councils formed in 1957) were amalgamated into larger units. But the innovation which attracted the most attention, both in the Soviet Union and abroad, was the restructuring of the CPSU itself according to "the production principle." This involved the creation in most oblasts (provinces) of two independent party committees —one for industry, the other for agriculture. All lower party organs were divided into two sections and subordinated to one or the other party committee, while at the higher echelons—*i.e.*, within the central committtes of the republic party organizations and the CPSU —separate bureaus were formed to cap the bifurcated party hierarchies of the oblasts.

From the wealth of comment by Western observers on the reforms of November 1962 there has emerged a general consensus that greater centralization was the overall effect of the changes. With this conclusion there can hardly be any quarrel. The central government structure is now more complex than at any time in the history of the USSR, while the apparatus and leading organs of the party Central Committee have become a maze of bureaus, commissions, committees, and departments. The list of new central bodies alone provides prima facie evidence that the pendulum has swung far from the decentralization of 1957.

Also discernible in recent literature is a measure of agreement on the economic role of the party after the November 1962 plenum. Almost without exception it is held that, at least in agriculture, if not also in industry, the party has been strengthened at the expense of the state apparatus and has assumed a more direct role in the day-to-day administration of the economy. It has even been suggested that the party will become so engrossed in production matters that it will be utterly depoliticized and, in effect, transformed into the principal agency of national economic administration.

Soviet descriptions of the nature of the reorganization certainly have given the impression that the party was assuming extended responsibilities; the key phrases in the CC's resolution on the party's future role were "more concrete and systematic leadership in industry, construction and agriculture," and "more attention to questions of production." [1] In view of the place of the CPSU in Soviet society it was inevitable that analysis of the reorganization should focus on these pronouncements. At the same time, however, it is worth noting that identical phrases were, and are to this day, being used to

A newcomer to these pages, Mr. Cleary is also a relative newcomer to the field of Soviet affairs. He is a research student at the Australian National University (Canberra), engaged in the study of the politics of Soviet agriculture since 1953.

[1] *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1962.

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Local Administration of Agriculture



Local Administration of Industry



* In large cities only.

describe the post-reform role of the soviets, the trade unions and the Komsomol.

Western observers, understandably, have shown little inclination to believe that the trade unions have moved much closer to their purported role of "active participation in the management of enterprises." And there has also been general agreement that of all the institutions affected by the reorganization, the local soviets emerged as by far the most emasculated: they had previously lost control of local industry to the sovnarkhozes, and now the raion soviets were removed altogether from their traditional place in the administration of agriculture. But while no one has found any difficulty in rejecting claims that these institutions would assume a more active part in the direction of the economy, the possibility that similar official forecasts regarding the party's economic role might also prove to be misleading has scarcely been considered. Recent complaints by Khrushchev about continuing adherence by party organs to "outmoded" patterns of leadership [2] make it particularly appropriate at this time to take a second look at the effects of the 1962 reorganization on the economic role of the CPSU.

In the sphere of agriculture, the "production directorate" (sometimes referred to as "production administration") is now the state agency operating at the enlarged-raion level. These directorates had actually been set up (as the "basic link in the leadership of agriculture") [3] in March 1962, but because of ensuing jurisdictional disputes and the fact that no corresponding party organ was in existence at the time, lines of responsibility remained somewhat confused until the November plenum firmly upheld the authority of

[2] *Ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1964.
[3] *Sbornik reshnii po selskomu khoziaistvu*, Moscow, Selkhozizdat, 1963, p. 579.

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the directorates and decreed the establishment of a party committee within each of them. The latter move constituted a reversion to the familiar pattern of two parallel organs of party and state power, and our problem here is to determine whether it also entailed a return to the pattern of relationships that had existed until 1962 between raikoms (district party committees) and raiispolkoms (district soviet executive committees), or whether, as most observers have concluded, the balance was disturbed in favor of the party. In other words, is the production directorate merely a staff of technical advisers for the party committee which makes all the operative decisions, or has the directorate inherited all the responsibilities previously held by the raiispolkom?

As a starting point, let us take a specimen case and consider a report on the activity of the party committee of the Frolov Production Directorate, in Volgograd Oblast. (The report was published as a result of a study made by the CPSU Central Committee's commission on party organizational questions.)[4] The party committee was said to be concentrating "its main efforts on the solution of concrete questions of production"; working in coordination and harmony with the production directorate, it has aimed to influence the organization of production, but in doing so it "does not supplant the leaders and specialists of the directorate. The party committee sees as its chief concern the raising of the fighting spirit of party and Komsomol organizations, the correct placement of Communists and Komsomol members, the education of cadres in the spirit of exactingness, responsibility and discipline." At the same time, according to the report, the committee has carried on organizational and political work among the masses and mobilized them for the fulfillment of production plans. Some brief criticism is also included, but the general tone is one of approbation: in publishing its findings the CC commission was clearly offering a model for all directorate party committees.

There is little indication here of any switch from general control by the party organization to specific direction of the farms. "Questions of production" have always been the central concern of rural party organs, and the remaining items are all perennial features of party work. At the same time, it is worth noting that a good deal of attention is being devoted to increasing the effectiveness of the farms' primary party organizations, because these had often been ignored by former raikom officials in their dealings with farm chairmen or directors. The "enhanced role" of the primary party organization has indeed become a recurrent theme in exegeses of the plenum resolution, especially in connection with the regime's campaigns to improve the performance of backward farms; and what is more, the laconic accounts of what happens when these local organs go into action scarcely conceal virtual "take-overs" by the party.[5] While such crash campaigns may not constitute an adequate basis for generalizations about the role of primary party organizations, the influence of the latter on farm management does appear to be running at a higher level than usual. It must be remembered, however, that cavalier treatment of these basic party units, exemplified by raikom officials who had found it convenient to bypass the primary units in production affairs, was also condemned in the past. Officials of the directorate party committees may yet revert to the same pattern, and it is too early to conclude that the dual system of direction and control of the farms from above has been permanently extended to intra-farm affairs as well.

Despite the trends towards revitalizing the lowest link in the party chain, it remains apparent that the operative units in the management of the farms are the production directorate and its party committee. These are the two agencies that receive the praise or blame for harvest results, for the elimination or continued existence of backward farms, in short for everything connected with agricultural production; it is around them that almost every discussion of the reorganization in the countryside has centered. In the exemplary case cited above, the directorate and the party committee worked "in harmony," complementing each other. The formula implies that neither the head of the directorate nor the party secretary has complete charge of the farms, and that there must thus be some division of responsibility on which this "harmony" is based. If one could discover where the dividing line is drawn, arguments about the degree of involvement of the party in the administration of rural production could be resolved in a trice. It is therefore worth quoting Khrushchevs prescription on the subject in some detail, even if some repetition of what we have already learned is involved:

With what is the production directorate expected to concern itself?—The organization of production in each collective and state farm, the training of cadres on the basis of the best models of labor, the introduction of the most advanced experience into collective and state farms, so as to raise in this fashion the general level of production. . .

With what should the party committee of the production directorate be concerned?—Also with production, but from a different position. The committee is called upon to raise the fighting readiness of the party and Komsomol organizations, to place Communists and Komsomol members correctly, to educate cadres in the spirit of exactingness,

[4] *Pravda*, June 7, 1963.

[5] *E.g.*, see a report concerning the case of a farm where "many local Communists transferred to decisive sectors of production . . . . Communists were able . . . to strengthen labor discipline . . . ." *Pravda*, Dec. 6, 1963.

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responsibility and discipline.[6]

To say that this formula leaves room for clarification would be an understatement. It is, in fact, less illuminating than most pronouncements on party-state relations, and it is no wonder that "to this day some workers are racking their brains over the problem of who has the commanding role, who should be subordinate to whom." It is true that I. Yu. Yusupov, First Secretary of the CP of Kazakhstan, who made this admission, contended that to pose the question in this way displayed a lack of understanding of the plenum decisions, but if those most intimately concerned in implementing the CC resolution are confused, it is not surprising that outsiders find difficulty in deciding whether the party has assumed close supervision of production.

Some examples of the confusion about responsibilities were given by Yusupov:

(a) When information about the progress of socialist competition was required, both directorate and party officials pestered the farms instead of going next door to obtain it. (Who should do what was not stated.)

(b) Another party committee did not know what questions were to be decided by the directorate; and the directorate did not know what responsibilities belonged to the party committee. As a result, officials from both organs unexpectedly confronted each other at a farm, while another farm had not been visited by anyone for a long period.

(c) A party committee adopted a decision obliging a collective farm to carry out a list of tasks ranging from artificial insemination of its herd to steaming and enriching hay for fodder. This was condemned as usurping the functions of the directorate.

(d) The head of one directorate ignored the views of the party committee on the disposition of cadres, and employed certain specialists in spite of party opposition.[7]

In practice, then, the demarcation line of duties is somewhat blurred and there is some crossing of wires both on issues of importance (cadre placement) and in routine work (recording competition results). This in itself is strong evidence that the plenum resolution has not been interpreted as a clear mandate to party committees to assume closer direction of the farms. Rather, as a result of the obscurity of the resolution, it seems to be largely left to the individuals concerned to reach a workable arrangement of duties. "I have come to an agreement with the secretary of the party committee," stated the head of one directorate, "on which questions are to be discussed in the committee, and which in the directorate. If some question of primary importance has to be decided, we examine it jointly."[8] He admits at the same time that "parallelism and disagreement can arise," but does not comment on the procedure for resolving persistent differences. There is, however, strong motivation for the practice of mutual accommodation, for both "are answerable for one and the same task," namely plan fulfilment. One should also add in regard to the loose arrangement described here, that under the old system, there had never been any doubt as to whether the former raikom secretary or the raiispolkom chairman held more authority. It belonged to the former.

It is very difficult at this time to determine the overall effect of these local arrangements for the very reason that they are local and are likely therefore to vary from one area to another. Another reason is the lack of sufficient case histories. Nevetheless, clear instances of a trend away from close party tutelage of the farms are already visible. Thus the head of one production directorate declares categorically that "we now settle in the directorate many questions which were previously decided by by the raikom."[9]

The relationships between agents of the production directorate (inspector-organizers) and those of the party committees (inspector-party-organizers) are equally relevant to our problem. Briefly it may be said that here, too, the same ambiguity in the division of labor exists. The party agent is censured if he becomes involved in everyday production affairs to the extent of supplanting the state official and neglecting "work among the people." Whenever he does concern himself with the minutiae of farm life, he should—according to the model of those singled out for praise—work in collaboration with the directorate agent; in other words, he is not allowed complete freedom of action in supervision of farm affairs.[10] In contrast to this, there have certainly been periods within the last decade when party officials were expected to take a much more direct part in farm management; in 1954-55, for instance, raikom instructors were scarcely, if ever, censured for usurping the role of the state in agriculture. Then, as now, the party official was expected to produce results by persuasion and not by bossing, but he also seems to have received unlimited encouragement to concern himself with production as such.[11]

If we then find that the prevailing relations between local party and state agencies in agriculture do not accord with predictions of increased party involvement in the administration of the Soviet economy, it would be surprising to find the situation different in the industrial sphere: his-

[6] *Pravda*, Mar. 14, 1963.

[7] *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, June 14, 1963.

[8] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1963.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*, June 4, 1963.

[11] See, *e.g.*, M. Yefremov, "On the Work of the Party District Committee," *Kommunist*, No. 7, May 1954.

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torically, for various political and economic reasons, direct party interference has always been most manifest in agricultural production.

Accordingly, there has been relatively little discussion of the 1962 reorganization as it relates to industry. The simple reason for this is that the functions of gorkoms (party city committees) and urban raikoms have not been affected. The only new feature of the party's structure at this level is the establishment in areas with a mixed rural and industrial economy of "zonal industrial party committees." These new organs overlap physically the areas of responsibility of the rural party committees, but the division of functions is the same as elsewhere.

Soviet reports on the work of these zonal committees pay formal tribute to the wisdom of the reorganization, but fail to demonstrate any widening of the scope of the party's industrial leadership. To take one example, the bureau of the Tapask Zonal Party Committee in Estonia consists of a secretary, his deputy and three members. They meet only once a month and in the first quarter of 1963, the complete agenda of their meetings was as follows: (a) improving mass-political work at a railway junction where wastage and breaches of labor discipline were rife; (b) formation of a commission to investigate the work of a building trust which had taken four years to build a bakery; (c) introduction of technological advances at two plants. "If we look formally at this list," wrote a Soviet reporter, "there appears to be little variation from the usual plan of a raikom bureau, and one cannot but agree."[12] Since this is a typical example,[13] one may also safely conclude that the center of local industrial direction certainly does not lie in the zonal committees.

[12] I. Gaspl, "The First Bureau of the Party Committee," *Sovetskaia Estonia*, Jan. 16, 1963.

[13] See article by E. Kiager, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1963, for a similar example.

Twelve months after the November 1962 reorganization the innovations in party leadership of industry, as seen by raion officials were summarized in *Kommunist*;[14] they were few and insignificant. The secretary of one raikom discerned two novel features: daily compilation of the results of socialist competition, and weekly visits to industrial enterprises by all members of the raikom apparatus. Another referred to the formation of a raikom department on technological progress as an aid to more qualified guidance of industry. But apart from such marginal matters the *Kommunist* list consists largely of such well-worn formulas as "the gorkom is more deeply concerned with organization of production" and "the raikom has moved closer to primary party organizations." The general effect of the reorganization on industry has probably been accurately described by one non-conformist, who flatly declared: "The reorganization hasn't affected us, nothing has changed in party and economic leadership." The writer of the *Kommunist* article hastened to add that this remark referred to a particular workshop, but its pertinence is obviously broader.

[14] G. Shitarev, "After the Reorganization," *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1963, pp. 65-67.

Nothing of what has been said so far is aimed at minimizing the reality of party supervision of both agricultural and industrial production. Factory and farm leaders, as party members, are obliged to fulfil party directives in their place of work, and are well aware that tenure of office is dependent on fulfilment of these directives. Nor has there, of course, been any intent to imply that overall economic policy is not determined by the party's central leadership. What it is intended to suggest is that most comment on the 1962 changes has exaggerated the degree of party involvement in the actual administration of production.

If this contention is correct, the question of the objectives of the reorganization has to be faced. A complete explanation is, of course, impossible without taking into account central institutional changes in Moscow and the new configuration of power that has emerged. But even without going this far, it is possible to arrive at a partial explanation by observation of the local scene.

Plus ça change . . .

The production directorates and their party committees are a strong force in the leadership of the collective and state farms. Into these organs have been sent the experienced cadres of our party. By their concrete, purposeful organizational activity they direct the mighty creative force of the workers of the countryside in utilizing the rich reserves and possibilities of our agriculture.

—Pravda, March 15, 1963.

All farms are now large-scale enterprises. It was to give them leadership that we established the production directorates. Unfortunately, many of these are working with the same methods with which the raion agricultural departments used to work. Leadership amounts to general appeals and resolutions, general directives. The form of leadership is thus new, but the content remains unaltered.

—Khrushchev, Pravda, Apr. 28, 1964.

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In the first place, the splitting of the party into two separate hierarchies below the republican CC level is not in itself proof that more direct participation by the party in the management of the economy was intended. It might merely have given extended expression to the division of labor that has always existed. Rural raikoms were always primarily concerned with agricultural production, just as their successors, the party committees of the production directorates, now are. Similarly the principal concern of urban raikoms was, and remains, supervision of industrial enterprises, transport, communications and construction.

At oblast and republican committee levels, according to Khrushchev's plenum speech, party forces were dispersed and leadership was plagued by "campaignism," *i.e., periodic concentration* of attention either on the agricultural or the industrial sector—to the neglect of one or the other, followed by a reversal of priorities.[15] The creation of two separate oblast committees and two bureaus of the republican CC's was aimed at eliminating this fault by establishing a clear allocation of duties. Essentially, therefore, what the reorganization has done is to establish definite lines of responsibility within the intermediate strata of the party hierarchy. The range of party activity is an entirely separate question. Confusion of these two aspects of the problem arose mainly because Soviet leaders expressed unduly optimistic forecasts about the effects of a relatively minor structural party reform.

It was only a minor reform because, although the careers of numerous party cadres were affected, perennial Soviet problems such as the conflict between rigid planning and local initiative, and the rationalization of material incentives were left untouched. Description of the reorganization as a "party-administrative solution" was therefore exaggerated, except in the sense that the party endeavored to put its own house in order.

Secondly, the division of party organizations according to the "production principle" may be regarded as the logical outcome of the growing professional specialization of individual party members. The increasing complexity of production processes has pushed the party towards a policy of recruiting and training a higher proportion of specialists so as to retain even the existing measure of influence at research and production sites. It is sometimes argued that this policy will lead to a dilution of the party's ideological fervor, the Soviet specialist allegedly being an ideological agnostic and poor material from which to shape the educator of the "new man." For the purpose of this brief discussion it must suffice simply to register (a) the connection between individual and organizational specialization, and (b) the awareness of party leaders of the ideological danger presented by pragmatic, problem-solving attitudes. They are determined, as the June 1963 plenum has again demonstrated, that the CPSU will remain the "guiding and directing force of society," and not merely an organ of economic administration.

Within the bounds of this general formula, there have been in the past marked fluctuations in the degree of the party's involvement in the administration of production, and no doubt similar variations will recur again. Since the failure of the 1963 harvest, one has indeed been able to detect a trend towards closer party supervision of the farms.[16] But this phenomenon is a regular concomitant of economic crises in the USSR and has only tenuous connections with the party reform of 1962.

Finally, it is difficult to subscribe to the view that the economic involvement of the CPSU could increase to the extent of even a partial abdication of the party's political tasks. In the eyes of the Soviet leaders, the two functions are inseparable. The uninitiated may well boggle at a decision of the Central Committee that the unsatisfactory state of Turkmen cotton farming is due to weak political work,[17] but to the party functionary the finding is highly meaningful. Fulfilment of production plans can be taken as presumptive evidence that the workers concerned accept the existing politico-economic order and are prepared to labor within its framework. Nonfulfilment, on the other hand, may be attributable to technical or organizational disorders, but it may also be politically significant. Output is regarded as a measure of acceptance of the existing order, of the leading role of the party itself, but output in turn is held to be dependent on inculcation of orthodox social and political attitudes. The November 1962 reorganization did nothing to break this chain of reasoning or lead to a neglect of mass-political work, Khrushchev's "pragmatic" leadership notwithstanding.

Whether or not one believes that there is a built-in mechanism in the Soviet political system that prevents the transformation of the party into an essentially economic organ, there are good grounds for rejecting earlier assumptions that in November 1962 Khrushchev moved towards erasing the dividing line between the organs of state administration and the party machine and directed all the latter's energies into economic-administrative channels. In fact it is doubtful whether there has been even a moderate swing in this direction.

[15] *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1962.

[16] See, *e.g.*, *Pravda*, Nov. 1, 1963, wherein primary party organizations are criticized for tolerance of breaches of labor discipline and expansion of private farming. Also, *Pravda*, Feb. 11, 12 and 15, 1964. Directorate inspector-organizers are now to specialize in one branch of farming instead of being responsible for all branches in several farms. Unless the duties of their party counterparts are similarly revised, the party men will be left with the overall supervision of each farm.

[17] *Pravda*, Nov. 10, 1963.

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The Soviet Consumer—A Discussion

EDITORS' NOTE: In the pages below we present a discussion centering on the progress of Soviet consumers' welfare under the Seven-Year Plan. The debate was initiated by Professor Goldman's response to the article "And What of the Consumer?," by Imogene Erro, published in the November-December 1963 issue of Problems of Communism. *Because of the importance of the subject and the wide areas of disagreement between the two writers, we decided to invite additional specialists—Mr. Becker and Professors Turgeon and Nove—to contribute their comments to the discussion, and then, in turn, to offer Mrs. Erro an opportunity for rebuttal. Readers will note that in his commentary Professor Nove also takes up some of the points made by Professors Smolinski and Wiles in the article that appeared as a companion piece to Mrs. Erro's original contribution.*

A DISSENT

By Marshall Goldman

It is indeed true that the rate of growth in the USSR—as recently revealed by the CIA—is now lower than it was a few years ago. However, one must be cautious in analyzing the situation—and this applies to predictions as well as to interpretations of what has happened along the way.

Because of shortcomings in agriculture, there seems to be little doubt that consumer welfare in the USSR is not improving as rapidly as it was a few years back. But this in itself does not necessarily mean that the consumer is being neglected in the provision of non-food goods; nor that consumers can expect little in the way of further gains in the near future. If anything, the well-being of the Soviet consumer, as reflected in his purchases of non-food items, has improved and continues to improve significantly.

While Mrs. Erro refers to the reduced rate of growth in the production of many non-food items, she neglects to point out that this seems to have resulted from the dictates of consumer demand rather than from any callousness on the part of the planners. Despite evidence of adequate purchasing power, lower prices, installment credit and advertising, the stocks of many goods exceed demand. Furthermore, the production of some other important non-food items such as washing machines and refrigerators, to which Mrs. Erro does not refer, has been maintained at a dazzling rate.

The economy of the Soviet Union today is a much more complex mechanism than it used to be. Consumers have accumulated large quantities of disposable income. Deposits in savings accounts grew by 60 percent from 1958 to 1963, now amounting to about 14 billion rubles.[1] Savings deposits have thus increased at a much faster rate than sales, which grew by only 35 percent in the same period. Increments in sav-

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[1] Data taken from *Pravda*, January 24, 1964, *SSSR v tsifrakh* for 1962, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* for 1961, 1958, and 1956.

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ings often reach the figure of one billion rubles a year, equivalent sometimes to one-third of the increase in annual retail sales. A comparison relating the increase in savings deposits to the size of the wage fund suggests that percentage increments in savings also have exceeded percentage increments in money wages.[2] Together, these comparisons seem to warrant the impression that the marginal propensity to consume has been falling in the Soviet Union.

At one time an increase in the volume of savings deposits could be explained by pointing to the unavailability of goods in Soviet stores and warehouses. In recent years, however, inventories of certain items have been increasing rapidly. As of September 1962, inventories exceeded planned norms by more than two billion rubles.[3] This is slightly less than the amount by which savings increased from 1960 to 1962. Furthermore, stocks increased by 70 percent, while retail sales volume increased by only 31 percent from 1958 to 1962.[4]



". . . In our department store you can dress your child from head to toe."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), May 20, 1963.

The growing tendency of Soviet consumers to insist on better quality and style has created problems heretofore unknown in the Soviet Union. Demand estimation is now a headache. Economic planners can no longer take for granted that sales will follow production. Say's Law no longer applies.[5] Inventory accumulation of fabrics, clothes, and shoes has been especially high. In contrast to her earlier more comprehensive survey also published in this journal,[6] Mrs. Erro limits her recent study to these three items. However, generalizations based on the production and sale of these goods necessarily lead to misleading conclusions. While sales of all types of fabrics, clothing and shoes increased by 22 percent, or 3 billion rubles, from 1959 to 1962, the inventory of these items doubled, rising by 3.8 billion rubles.[7] Consequently, for every ruble's worth of these items that was sold, inventory rose by one ruble and thirty kopecks. Once these trends are made clear, there seems less reason to criticize the reduced growth in the production of these items.

It should not be concluded, of course, that every Soviet consumer is satisfied. Not only are there food supply problems, but consumer wardrobes are still quite bare by West European and American standards. Furthermore, much of the buyer resistance and inventory accumulation is due to the poor quality and styling of the merchandise. But the very fact that the Soviet consumer can hold back and wait until something better comes along strongly suggests that living conditions, in terms of availability of non-food goods, are much better.

Inclusion of production and sales trends of consumer goods other than those considered by Mrs. Erro strengthens the above conclusion and indicates continued improvement as well. She refers in her article to "light industry" and "consumer welfare." While consumer durables may perhaps be properly excluded from the former, they should be included in any consideration of the latter. The production and sales patterns of important consumer durables are striking by any standards and should have been included in her analysis. While production of textiles increased between 1958 and 1963 by only 16 to 22 percent, and

[2] S. P. Figurnov, *Realnaia zarabotnaia plata i podem materialnovo blagosostoiania trudiashchishsia v SSSR*, Moscow, Sotsekgiz, 1960, p. 198. I am indebted to Leonard Kirsch for this citation as well as other suggestions.

[3] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), September 29, 1962, p. 12.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Law deriving from Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832), which asserts that the total supply of economic goods must always equal the total demand for them.—*Ed.*

[6] "Catching Up and Outstripping: An Appraisal," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1961.

[7] *Sovetskaia torgovlia*, September, 1963, p. 9.

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the production of shoes and clothing by only about 30 percent, the production of furniture items increased by as much as 70 percent, and the production of television sets more than doubled.[8] Production of refrigerators and vacuum cleaners also more than doubled, while the output of washing machines quintupled to a level of about 2,300,000 a year, more than half the American level. This represents an annual increase of almost 30-40 percent a year, which is impressive, notwithstanding the poor quality of Soviet merchandise.

However, as has already been noted, consumer tastes and market patterns in the Soviet economy have become so complex that the production and sales patterns of certain other consumer durables are quite different. Thus production of watches increased by only 9 percent from 1958 to 1963, and of radios by only 23 percent. Production of some items, notably sewing machines, cameras, bicycles, and metal beds, even fell. Still more interesting, sales of all these items fell in 1962 from their 1961 level, and some continued to show sales declines in 1963. Meanwhile, inventories of all these items have increased sharply. If it had not been for stepped-up exports of many of them, such as the export of 5.5 million watches in 1962, inventories would have been even higher.

It is not that Mrs. Erro's figures are wrong, but rather that the nature of the Soviet economy is no longer as simple as it once was. Thus, while production of some items is increasing at a rate that some observers did not anticipate in 1959,[9] production of other items has fallen. Yet both trends seem to indicate improved living conditions.

An intriguing question remains unanswered, however. If the rate of production of certain consumer goods has already slackened or fallen, what will be the impact on the growth of the Soviet gross national product when sales of other items begin to fall and inventories begin to accumulate even more? It is a problem which each year becomes less and less of a theoretical exercise. Finding the solution to this situation may prove to be one of the real challenges to economic planners in the USSR.

[8] These figures and those to follow come from *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu*, pp. 178 and 640; and *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1962 godu*, pp. 98-100 and 312-313. *Pravda*, January 24, 1964.

[9] Marshall I. Goldman, "More for the Common Man? Living Standards and Consumer Goods," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1960.

COMMENTARIES

By Abraham Becker

Mrs. Erro argues that in 1959-60 Khrushchev was converted to the espousal of higher priority for consumer goods, but that this course was repudiated in or after 1961 "either because of strong political opposition or because of conflicting demands on the economy—or perhaps both." Tracing the development of Soviet light industry since the inception of the Seven-Year Plan in 1959, she finds declining rates of growth, scarcities of raw materials, and—she implies—a rediversion of investment funds to other sectors. Thus, she concludes, "Khrushchev's consumer program reached its climax in 1961 and has since undergone a continuing decline in priority." She sees little hope for substantial gains in the future.

The comments below are directed largely to the question of the pace and pattern of consumption growth since 1958 but will also touch briefly on Mrs. Erro's chronology of economic policy and on the prospects for the future. Mrs. Erro concentrates on the rates of consumption growth for textiles, clothing and footwear, while her critic, Marshall Goldman, points instead to the rates for consumer durables. It would seem most appropriate, however, to consider the total picture.

To this end, the accompanying table presents evidence in the form of estimated indexes of household consumption expenditures for the years 1959-62. Consumption outlays are broken down into three categories: (1) food, including farm income consumed by peasants in kind; (2) nonfood commodities; and (3) services, comprising rent (*including rent imputed, at state* rental rates, to privately-owned housing), utilities, transportation and communication, recreation, repair of clothing and household goods, etc. Since Mrs. Erro detects a change in emphasis from household outlays to public services, the indexes for the third category are computed net of public-sector expenditures on health and education, so as to focus attention on household outlays alone. The calculations are crude; in particular, farm income consumed in kind has been assumed constant throughout (the effect of a change in this assumption will be taken into account below). The results should be considered tentative and are meant to be merely illustrative.

If the estimates are correct, "real" household consumption outlays (deflated for price changes) increased in the first four years of the Seven-Year Plan period at an average annual rate of five percent for food, seven percent for nonfoods, seven percent for rent and other services, and six percent overall. If, instead of remaining constant, consumption of farm income in kind declined, say, 15 percent by 1962, the average

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Indexes of Consumption in the USSR, 1959-62

(1958 = 100)

	1959	1960	1961	1962
"Real" household outlays on				
1. Food, including consumption in kind*	105	111	115	121
2. Nonfood goods	109	121	123	131
3. Rent (including imputed rent) and other services, excluding education and health	107	116	124	133
4. All categories	106	115	119	125

* Excluding military subsistence.

Sources: Weights estimated from household outlays in 1958 (Nancy Nimitz, *Soviet National Income and Product, 1956-1958,* The RAND Corporation, RM-3112, June 1962), except that 1958 purchases in state-cooperative trade are allocated between food and nonfood goods in proportion to total sales in that year (TsSU, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo v SSSR v 1962 godu,* 1963, pp. 520-521). Indexes—official indexes of the physical volume of sales in state-cooperative and collective farm market trade (*ibid.,* pp. 512, 540); consumption of income in kind assumed constant at the 1958 level; services based on estimates from a forthcoming study of Soviet national income in 1959-62 (rent and utilities outlays estimated from changes in the housing stock, other services from official data on the volume of passenger transport and communications, attendance at theaters and movies, and the value of repair, cleaning and tailoring services).

annual growth rate of outlays on food would be reduced to four percent and that of total outlays to somewhat better than five percent.

Over the four-year period considered, the population rose seven percent. Hence, per capita consumption, based on the data in the table, increased 17 percent, or roughly four percent per year.[1] Clearly, this is the smallest rate of increase for a comparable time span recorded in the past dozen years.[2] As compared with the trend in the 1950's, the rate of consumption growth has definitely slowed down; indeed, it is doubtful that peasant consumption rose at all, at least through 1961. Overall growth would also appear to have been slower than was hoped for in the Seven-Year Plan.[3] Nevertheless, several observations of a contrary bent come to mind:

1) The estimates of the table give no indication of a slowdown in consumption growth within the 1959-62 period. The rates of increase of household outlays were at or above the four-year averages for all categories in three out of the four years; only in 1961 were the rates of increase below the four-year average—far below for nonfoods, less so for food and services. Rates of growth in 1962 show no distinguishable pattern of reduction from those of 1959-60.

2) Mr. Goldman rightly points to the growth of disposable personal income and of savings deposits and suggests that the share of the marginal ruble of income devoted to consumption has been declining. There is some evidence also that cash hoards were being increased in 1961-62; at least this is the implication of estimates by this writer of household money incomes and outlays in the period 1959-62.

3) Except for the fact that it was attained partly at the expense of the peasantry, a four or five-percent rate of growth of per capita consumption after a decade of even more rapid progress is, by international standards, a respectable achievement. The outbreak of civil disorders in the USSR in 1962-63[4] is not, in the author's view, to be taken as evidence of a reversal of the trend, but rather as further confirmation of the historical generalization that revolutionary tensions are more likely to occur when expectations aroused after a long period of severe deprivation seem to be in danger of frustration.

Turning now to the chronology of Soviet economic policy, it seems to this writer that it is Mrs. Erro's concentration on light industry that leads her to discern important turning points in that policy in 1959-1960 as well as in 1961. A broader view of consumption must recall, for example, the grandiose proclamations of 1957 regarding the ten-year housing construction program and the intent to overtake the United States in production of meat, butter, and milk. One would also recall that the decision to allocate additional investment funds to light-industrial development over and above the amounts targeted in the Seven-Year Plan was explicitly linked to success in overfulfilling the plan,[5] and that expansion of the repair and service network was ordered in March 1959.[6] More generally, what happened in the early stages of the Seven-Year Plan appears to have had more to do with euphoria and "dizziness from success" than with reaction to American plenty. The bumper harvests of 1956 and 1958, the high pace of industrial expansion in the 1950's, the successes of the sputnik and the ICBM—these and other developments probably fostered the illusion that all things were now possible. This sense of intoxication was reflected in the Seven-Year

[1] Because of rounding, incorporation of the alternative reduced rate of growth of consumption in kind would not affect the indicated rate of increase of per capita consumption.

[2] Nancy Nimitz, *Soviet National Income and Product, 1956-1958,* The RAND Corporation, RM-3112, June 1962, p. 13.

[3] A. S. Becker, *Soviet National Income and Product in 1965: The Goals of the Seven Year Plan,* The Rand Corporation, RM-3520, March 1963, pp. 46-47.

[4] See Albert Boiter, "When the Kettle Boils Over . . .," *Problems of Communism,* No. 1 (Jan.-Feb.), 1964, pp. 33-43.

[5] *Pravda,* July 17, 1960.

[6] *Ibid.,* March 13, 1959.

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Plan, which called for a rapid rate of overall economic growth along with satisfaction of all claims—consumption, investment, and defense. The illusion began to be dispelled under the inexorable pressure of agricultural stagnation and high capital-output ratios, to mention but two economically endogenous factors. This, in the writer's view, is the background of the events Mrs. Erro discusses.

As to the future, one can only wait and see. The year 1963 was undoubtedly a bad one for the Soviet consumer, but the paramount factor in operation was the weather. Mrs. Erro is surely correct in questioning the ability of the regime to make good on its more extravagant promises, but it would be hazardous to predict a significant downturn from the 1959-62 pace of consumption growth. As the evidence suggests, the record of those years was not an absolutely bad one.

By Lynn Turgeon

In her article, Mrs. Erro analyzed the effects of the slowdown in Soviet economic growth on the satisfaction of consumers' needs. It was her conclusion that Soviet "consumers can expect little in the way of substantial gains in the near future" and that Khrushchev is unlikely to make good his promise to meet the consumer goals of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65).

Since her article was written, the Chairman of the USSR Gosplan (State Planning Committee), P. F. Lomako, announced the production results for 1963 and outlined the annual plans for 1964 and 1965. The new data and revised targets for 1965 now permit us to gauge somewhat more realistically the effects of the overall expansion slowdown on consumer welfare.

According to Lomako's figures (summarized in Table 1), gross industrial production in 1965 is scheduled to exceed by roughly 85 percent the product of 1958, compared with the originally planned increase of about 80 percent. Heavy industry (Group A) is expected to overfulfill the earlier target by about 5 percent, while the target for light industry (Group B) has been lowered slightly, compared to the initial goal. The 1965 output of the latter group, which chiefly affects consumer welfare, is now scheduled to exceed by 61 percent, rather than 62-65 percent, the output of 1958.[1]

Since the output of light industry in 1963 was only slightly over 40 percent higher than in 1958, meaning that over one-third of the total planned increase in consumer goods production during the Seven-Year Plan must take place in the remaining two-sevenths of the allotted time if the plan is to be fulfilled, the Soviet leadership must have a good deal of confidence in its ability to accelerate the rate of growth in the Group B industries during 1964-65. Inasmuch as this prospect is somewhat at variance with Mrs. Erro's short-term prediction, we might well investigate the bases for the Soviet planners' optimism.

Contrary to popular opinion, the priority assigned to light industry relative to heavy industry in Khrushchev's Seven-Year Plan—both in the original plan and in the actual results—is lower than that which prevailed in the early 1950's. According to official Soviet figures, the increase in the output of heavy industry between 1950 and 1957 was 13 percent higher than the increase in the output of light industry (see line 4 of Table 1). This earlier gap between the two rates of growth is smaller than that originally scheduled under the Seven-Year Plan, and less than the gap already evident by 1963. Similarly, the goals announced by Lomako for 1965 provide for an increase in the output of heavy industry 22 percent higher than the planned increase in the output of light industry.

Thus, the overall slowdown in Soviet economic growth during the Seven-Year Plan has occurred despite a factor which we might have expected to accelerate growth: namely, the tendency to favor heavy industry to a greater extent than during the previous period. Undoubtedly, the escalation of Soviet defense expenditures during the years of the Kennedy Administration played a contributory role in this deceleration,[2] just as did the increase in actual deliveries—as opposed to the decline in new commitments—connected with Moscow's foreign assistance program.

But even if there had been no increase in either defense expenditures or foreign aid deliveries, it was possible to predict—as indeed the original Seven-Year Plan targets indicated—that the rate of overall Soviet economic growth as well as the rate of increase in consumption would decelerate in the early 1960's. The likelihood of such a development derived from the disastrous effects of World War II on the Soviet birth rate, resulting in a drastic reduction in the supply of new entrants into the Soviet labor force in recent years. As a result, despite an increase in labor participation rates from 82 percent in 1958 to 86 percent in 1963

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[1] While these gross industrial production series, unlike net industrial production series, produce an upward bias in the growth rates, there is little reason to think that the bias is greater in heavy industry than in light industry. For a discussion of the defects of this measure and its relationship to net industrial production, see the author's *The Contrasting Economies*, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1963, pp. 30-31.

[2] For a further discussion of the relationship of defense expenditures and growth in the Soviet Union, see the author's "The Enigma of Soviet Defense Expenditures," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, June 1964.

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TABLE 1

Relative Growth of Heavy and Light Industry in the USSR

Description	1950-57 (1950=100)	1958-65 Original 7-Yr. Plan (1958=100)	1958-63 Achieved Increase (1958=100)	1958-65 Revised Plan (1958=100)	1950-57 Growth as % of expected 1958-65 growth
All industry	225	180	157	185	122
Group A industry	235	185-188	166	197	119
Group B industry	208	162-165	141	161	129
Increase in Group A as % of Group B	113	114	118	122	—

Sources: Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1962,* Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1963, p. 118, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu, statisticheskii ezhegodnik,* Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1960, p. 131; also, *Izvestia,* Dec. 17, 1963, p. 3.

(largely through additions of potential college-level students, wives and oldsters), the annual rate of increase in employment appears to have dropped from 1.7 percent in 1950-58 to 1.3 percent in 1958-62.[3] At the height of the labor shortage, only about one-half of the normal inputs of new young labor were available. Beginning this year, however, the supply of young workers should begin to improve, and for the remainder of the decade steadily increasing numbers of young and more highly skilled workers can be expected to enter the Soviet labor force.

This forthcoming upturn in the supply of young laborers is undoubtedly the principal basis for the higher planned rates of growth in investment and production for both heavy and light industry in the final two years of the Seven-Year Plan. For example, investment in light industry (including the food and fish sectors) in 1964-65 is scheduled to rise by 53 percent compared with the preceding two years; as a consequence, it is claimed, more fixed capital will be put into production in Soviet light industry than in the preceding five years combined.[4]

Because of the anticipated steady improvement in the supply of labor and the corresponding possibilities for increasing the rate of investment in the near future, it is probably somewhat premature to assume—as Mrs. Erro appears to do in her article—that the Soviet Union in 1958 entered a period of "secular deceleration" in its economic growth.[5] Instead, the period of the Seven-Year Plan may simply turn out to be a dip in the normal long-term growth rate.

It may also be pointed out that the rates of growth so far achieved in textiles, footwear and clothing—which are cited by Mrs. Erro in support of her thesis that no immediate improvement is in sight for Soviet consumers—tend to be below the 1958-63 average increase in the output of consumer goods as a whole. As the data in Table 2 indicate, the principal areas of improvement during the past four or five years have been in consumer durables (except for watches and sewing machines) and foods (with the exception of butter, vodka and cigarettes).

The differences in year-to-year rates of growth for different consumer goods are determined to some extent by the timing of new investment in each sector as well as by the length of time required to transform the investment into new capacity. Since the output of cottons, woolens and linens in 1963 actually exceeded the annual planned targets, the slow overall growth in the output of textiles during the first five years of the plan may simply reflect the fact that substantial new productive capacity in these industries has not been scheduled to come into operation before 1964-65.

With respect to long-term Soviet goals in consumer welfare, which Mrs. Erro feels have been virtually abandoned, we might look once more at what Khrushchev actually said about overtaking the United States:

I want to re-emphasize that in the production and consumption of all consumer goods that man really needs, *we shall in the not very distant future draw abreast of the USA, the wealthiest of the countries of the capitalist world, which, as it were, epitomizes capitalist prosperity.*[6] [Emphasis added.]

It would seem that the Soviet leader has allowed himself a loophole of considerable proportions. Presumably, the Communist leadership has no intention of duplicating either our range of products or our distribution and use of leisure. It seems likely, for example, that both the private ownership of auto-

[3] *Cf.*, V. Starovski, "Pobednye shagi sovetskoi ekonomiki i zhalkie potugi nedobrosovestnykh 'ekspertov,'" (Triumphant Pace of the Soviet Economy and the Pitiful Attempts of Unconscientious "Experts"), *Pravda,* Mar. 14, 1964, p. 3, and Joint Economic Committee, *Annual Economic Indicators for the USSR,* Washington, D.C., US Gov't Printing Office, 1964, p. 95.

[4] *Izvestia,* Dec. 17, 1963, pp. 7-8.

[5] For a similar interpretation, see Joint Economic Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 91 *et seq.*

[6] Speech to the Supreme Soviet, *Pravda,* May 6, 1960.

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mobiles and suburban living in individual homes—upon which a number of our consumer activities depend—are beyond the pale as far as Soviet planners and tastemakers are concerned.

Finally, a word concerning Professor Goldman's contention that the growing tendency of Soviet consumers to insist on better quality and style has so affected effective demand that "Say's Law no longer applies." He cites recent increases in personal savings combined with increases in inventories of certain clothing items as evidence of growing consumer sluggishness and suggests the possibility that future declines in the rate of increase in sales of additional consumer goods might have an adverse effect on the growth of the economy.

Professor Goldman stresses the point that the percentage increase in savings has been double that of sales in recent years. However, if we break down retail sales and savings deposits into rural and urban categories, we find that it is rural sales that have consistently lagged behind urban sales, while rural savings have ordinarily risen at a faster rate than urban savings. Between 1958 and 1962, urban sales rose by 33 percent, compared with a concomitant increase in urban savings of 43 percent. Rural sales rose by only 18 percent during this period, while rural savings increased by 60 percent. In 1962, the latest year for which we can compute this relationship, the percentage growth in urban sales actually exceeded the growth in urban savings. Since levels of living are significantly higher in urban than in rural areas, any growth in savings must still be considered primarily a sign of poor distribution, especially in the countryside, rather than of consumer resistance in a growing buyers' market.

It is difficult to predict the effect which an eventual general satiation of the consumers' market (at existing or lower prices) might have on Soviet economic growth. One option for Soviet decision-makers might be the gradual substitution of leisure (accompanied by a cut in total hours of labor) in place of additional consumers' goods, in which case the rate of growth would surely slow down. But since there is no *necessary* connection between the economic functions of distribution and production in the Soviet economy, any future consumer sluggishness might alternatively allow the leadership to devote more resources to investment and production in suppot of aid to the underdeveloped world. Should Soviet authorities decide to commit additional resources to these purposes, Soviet GNP might actually continue rising at a relatively rapid rate.

To sum up, it seems to me that by focussing her attention on a rather limited sector of consumption (clothing), Mrs. Erro has presented an unduly pessimistic picture of recent gains in Soviet consumer welfare and short-term consumption possibilities. She appears also to have misinterpreted the nature of Soviet consumer expectations. Professor Goldman, on the other hand, while giving a more balanced picture of the gains achieved by Soviet consumers, has projected the current problems of capitalist-oriented economies into the Soviet setting, where they are somewhat out of place.

TABLE 2

Growth of Consumer Goods Production in the USSR, 1958-63
(1958 = 100)

	INDEX		INDEX
Washing machines	496	Soap	132
Vacuum cleaners	255*	Margarine	130*
TV sets	255	Leather shoes	130
Refrigerators	253	Sewn garments	129
Motorcycles	162	Confectionery	125
Fish	160	Radios and phonographs	123
Meat (factory output)	160	Woolen textiles	122
Milk and milk products	158	Cotton textiles	118
Wine	158*	Butter (factory output)	117
Canned goods	157	Linen textiles	116
Sausages	143	Silk and rayon textiles	116
Vegetable oil	143	Hosiery	116*
Beer	142*	Vodka	111*
Cheese	139	Watches	109
Underwear	139	Sewing machines	100
Knit outerwear	137	Cigarettes	99*

* Increase from 1958 to 1962 only.

Sources: Indexes are based on physical output data for 1958 and 1962 given in Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. statisticheskii ezhegodnik,* 1962, Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1963, pp. 191, 202 and 203. Outputs for 1963 were published in *Izvestia,* Jan. 24, 1964, p. 1.

By Alec Nove

The November-December issue of *Problems of Communism* contained a typically brisk and valuable article on Soviet planning problems by Leon Smolinski and Peter Wiles, and a very useful survey of Khrushchev's consumer program by Imogene Erro. It is certainly not my purpose to quarrel with their general conclusions: the burdens of centralized administrative planning have overwhelmed the planning organs; it is impossible to go on in the old way;

A familiar name to our readers, Mr. Nove is Chairman of the Department of International Economic Studies at the University of Glasgow, Scotland.

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reforms are necessary; and there are debates between the centralizers and decentralizers and arguments about the role of computers and the profit motive.

Advocates of "computerization" are not necessarily centralizers: thus Academician Nemchinov, who is a strong supporter of Liberman-type reforms (and goes even further towards advocating "commercial" decentralization), has also been very active in advocating the use of linear programming and computers. Conversely, some of the centralizing conservatives are apt to regard the computer with little enthusiasm and less understanding. The party leadership, in turn, seems uncertain and instinctively reacts to developing shortages by imposing tighter administrative controls and reorganizing the state and party planning mechanism—even while permitting (or encouraging?) professional economists to engage in wide-ranging discussions and experiments.

For the moment, with the superimposition of a giant chemicals investment program on an economy already fully stretched, one must expect severe strains on resources and all kinds of unplanned cuts in non-priority investment projects. It is also likely that import plans have had to be recast owing to the unexpected need to spend so heavily on importation of wheat while also expanding purchases abroad of chemical machinery. Consequently, some plans which depend on imports of materials or equipment have probably had to be revised downwards. The net effect of such measures may well help to explain the poor showing of the textiles and clothing group, which, as Imogene Erro conclusively showed, is very far behind its Seven-Year Plan targets. A major revision of investment plans in midstream is apt to have disorganizing effects throughout the industrial structure and may also be partly responsible for the general tendency of industrial growth to slow down.

However, some of the detailed arguments of Smolinski and Wiles seem to me misleading, especially those relating to the labor force. What, for example, of the estimate, which they accept, of "6.1 million . . . engaged in the

ANOTHER UNANSWERED LETTER

On December 18, 1962, we dispatched a letter to Professor P. S. Romashkin, Director of the Institute of State and Law in Moscow, inviting him to contribute to a discussion of certain aspects of Soviet law in the pages of our journal. Our letter (reproduced in the May-June 1963 issue) was never answered.

Perhaps naively, we tried again—this time by asking Academician Anushavan Arzumanian, an eminent Soviet economist and Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow, to send us his views of Mrs. Erro's article. In the letter, dated March 19, 1964, we stated:

In the case of the Western participants in the discussion, we have asked them to restrict their contributions to 1500 words. In your case, however, we should be happy to extend the limits to 3000 words. Should you wish to submit your commentary in Russian, we shall make a translation and submit it to you for your approval. Should you wish to submit it in English, we shall, of course, publish it without any changes whatsoever. Since we are planning to publish the symposium in our May-June issue, we must have your contribution by April 13 at the very latest. We reserve our right to have Mrs. Erro reply to your commentary, but we shall be pleased to carry your rebuttal, too, if you so desire.

In closing, let me urge you earnestly to accept our invitation in the spirit in which it is offered. I assure you that the reason for the invitation is not to be sought in any desire for "sensationalism," but in our wish to confront our readers with the point of view of a distinguished Soviet scholar, on a subject which is, of course, of great significance as much to the Soviet Union as to the rest of the world. Whatever our respective conceptions of "peaceful coexistence," we trust you will agree with us that such a confrontation is necessary for any serious clarification of our ideological differences. It is for this reason that we hope to hear from you, affirmatively, in the very near future.

(The letter was signed by A. Brumberg, Editor, *Problems of Communism.*)

Exactly two months later, on May 19, we addressed another letter to Academician Arzumanian, enclosing a copy of the first communication. It had occurred to us that Professor Arzumanian might have regarded the first deadline as unreasonable; or, we thought, our original letter might not have reached him in the first place. We took the precaution, therefore, to have the US Embassy in Moscow forward the letter by registered mail. And we also extended our deadline, having decided—just in case Prof. Arzumanian *wanted* to reply—to publish the symposium in our July-August issue. We have in our possession a receipt from the Moscow Post Office, dated June 3, 1964, attesting to the fact that our second letter was delivered. There has been no reply to that letter, either.

—The Editors

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administrative apparatus"? Readers might suppose that this figure relates in some sense to administrators or bureaucrats as we usually understand these terms. Yet plainly it includes a vast number of office personnel, most of whom are busy doing things similar to those performed by clerical employees in Western corporations. A typist in a department of du Pont, a bookkeeper in a supermarket buying office, clerks behind most of the innumerable doors of the Empire State Building—these are "administrators" by such a definition. Many of them, just like their counterparts in the USSR, are engaged in accountancy or bookkeeping of some kind, and it would require a major piece of research (not yet undertaken) to determine which system employs more such personnel relatively to its total labor force.

In the West, "white-collar" staffs in general have rapidly increased in the last few decades, as any census will reveal, though the mechanization of office work in the most recent years may now set off a contrary tendency. By contrast, the Soviet census of 1959 shows an increase of only 10 percent since 1939 in the total number of a group comprising economists, statisticians, bookkeepers, accountants, cashiers and clerical workers. Smolinski and Wiles hint that some of this work is done by persons in other employment categories, which could well be so, though this too is common enough in Western countries. But are we therefore to ignore the evidence of the Soviet census? Moreover, if one looks at the statistics of those engaged in materials allocation (as distinct from retail trade), the increase over the 20 years is again small, at most 20 percent. All in all, the evidence, surely, is not of huge numbers of administrative and planning staff, but of inadequate numbers, with far too few clerks and typists, struggling against a rising flood of work.

Equally misleading is the quoted statement that the proportion of "engineers, technicians and salaried personnel" is to rise greatly in the next decade. Of course it will, in the Soviet Union as elsewhere, but in the Soviet Union above all because of the effect of long-needed mechanization of labor-intensive processes—again a universal phenomenon with nothing specifically Soviet about it.

To repeat, I do not at all dissent from the main thesis of the authors of the article: the planners are overwhelmed, and it would not greatly help to add to their numbers since the problems of coordination of a vast complex of interlocking decisions would become only more complicated and more intractable.

Meanwhile, not only has there been a slowdown in growth, but there is increasing realization that the real cost of the inefficiences of the planning system falls on the consumer. Consider, for instance, the sensible conclusion of A. Yefimov in *Voprosy ekonomiki* (No. 1, 1964):

An increase in the output of producers' goods—machinery, equipment, raw materials, components, fuel—cannot be an end in itself; the output of producers' goods in the last analysis is necessary in order to supply the growing needs of the people. Therefore, if an economic basis exists for bringing closer together the growth tempos of groups A and B [producers' goods and consumers' goods] in industry, the possibility must be fully utilized, since it is obvious that, given the maintenance of rapid growth rates and increased consumption, the smaller the gap [between A and B], the more effective is the management of our economy.

To illustrate the practical implications of Yefimov's remarks, let us take the following example: Suppose that inefficiency takes the form of using seven ships for transport when it would be possible to use five. The extra but unnecessary effort that goes into shipping "counts" as part of the national income, and the ships and their equipment are producers' goods. A reduction in the number of ships would release resources which could result in enhanced production of consumers' goods without affecting the rate of growth. In this same sense Yefimov envisages that the more economical nature of synthetic materials will release resources for increased consumption.

This brings me to the reforms of March 1963, to which Smolinski and Wiles rightly devoted much attention. The "political economy" of these reforms is still very unclear, and we must distinguish here between intention and actuality. Let us remember in this connection the agricultural reform of a year earlier (March 1962), which produced a supreme agricultural organ, the All-Union Committee for Agriculture, under N. G. Ignatov, of which little has been heard since. Then, in March 1963, we saw the creation of the VSNKh, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, supposedly the supercoordinating body of industrial planning at the governmental level, presided over by D. F. Ustinov. Smolinski and Wiles again perfectly correctly point out that this body had not been envisaged in November 1962 when the Central Committee plenum decided to divide the party into industrial and agricultural sections. While the purpose of setting up the VSNKh must have been the strengthening of *governmental* coordination, the move was also certain to result in overlapping and duplication of functions between the Supreme Council and the USSR Sovnarkhoz and USSR Gosplan, which are supercoordinators too, not to mention the USSR Gosstroi (Committee on Construction), a multitude of state committees of various species, republican organs, and, of course, the industrial departments of the CPSU Central Committee.

Ustinov's position was thus bound to be a difficult one from the

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start. Indeed, reports of various meetings and decrees published over the past year suggest that he is being fairly successfully bypassed, and that his "Supreme" Council is not playing any sort of supreme role. Whether this is due to Khrushchev, the party Central Committee, or various state organs fighting for their own power-interests, we have as yet no means of knowing. What seems clear, however, is that the present structure is a very ramshackle affair, involving too many areas of what one Soviet journal called "multi-stage irresponsibility." More reforms are bound to come. Meanwhile there is jockeying for position, and, judging from some recent restatements of the formal planning structure, there are strong elements at the center who would like Ustinov's Supreme Council to have the effective power so far only attributed to it.[1]

What can we expect to be the effect of all this confusion on Soviet economic growth? In the very short run, we may see a further reduction of *industrial* growth, mainly because of the disorganization caused by the ambitious chemicals program. In the longer run, however, this same program may and should lead to a renewed upward swing, as more plastics, synthetic fibers and fertilizer become available. I do not believe that Soviet growth in 1962-63 fell to an average of 2.5 percent per annum; but even a drop to 4 percent would represent a considerable slowdown. (The official Soviet version seems to be 5 percent: 6 percent in 1962, probably 4 percent in 1963.) In 1964 and 1965 agriculture should certainly show a sizable increase over the weather-affected performance of 1963, but since industrial growth in these years may be somewhat reduced, there seems no ground for supposing that there will be any major change in the modest rate of increase of the national income.

Perhaps, dismayed by the disappointing results, the Communist leadership will listen more attentively to the advice of would-be reformers. Smolinski and Wiles say that the party will back the *status quo*. Yes, this corresponds to the apparatchik's vested interests and their habits, but they also want results and they must seek to avoid chaos. They want control *and* efficiency. Since the *status quo* is untenable, they will have to accept reforms. Just what kind of reforms, we cannot yet tell, but it need *not* be "total centralization or total decentralization"; there are, in fact, no such drastic either-or choices in any country. The most rational solution might well leave electricity and steel under central planners, while shoe and farm machinery output is left to respond to the stimuli of decentralized market forces. It is not an easy balance to strike, of course, but it is too early to assume that some viable compromise cannot be found between the two extremes.[2]

Finally, a brief comment about the validity of some of Imogene Erro's arguments and the counter-arguments of Marshall Goldman. Mr. Goldman is quite correct in pointing out that the output of a number of consumer durables has been rapidly increasing in recent years, and that in the case of some commodities output has been adversely affected by sales resistance: in other words production plans and consumer preferences have sometimes been inconsistent. Since the prices of some of these commodities have already been reduced almost to the level of production costs, price cuts are obviously no solution. No doubt this is why output of such items as watches and sewing machines has stopped growing or even fallen.

It is also true, as Mr. Goldman says, that inventories of certain types of cloth and clothing have been increasing. However, as Soviet economists and planners have been saying for some time, the increase in inventories has co-existed with queues and unsatisfied demand. No doubt, this is partly due to an inefficient distribution mechanism—items unsalable in one place may be the subject of queues in another—but partly it reflects a rebellion against poor quality. As *Krokodil* has been pointing out at intervals for years, people will not in general buy trousers with one leg longer than the other.

I fully agree with Mr. Goldman that the increasing impact of consumer demand on production must lead to institutional changes in the Soviet economy. Nothing is more absurd than using scarce labor and materials for the production of commodities that will lie unsold in warehouses. Still, the truth is that the production of cloth and clothing, for example, is nowhere near adequate, and it is wrong to imply that the plan targets were too high. Surely, in this respect, cloth and sewing machines represent quite different cases: it may well be that the domestic market for sewing machines is saturated, but the demand for cloth remains unsatisfied even while the consumer rejects poor quality. I doubt very much that anyone has issued instructions to textile factories to reduce production, or that any conscious decision has been taken to reduce plan figures because of the lack of consumer demand. Much more probably, the limiting factors are inadequate supplies of raw materials due to agricultural difficulties, shortage of foreign exchange, and the competing claims of other sectors on

[1] See, *e.g.*, the organizational diagram printed in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Nov. 23, 1963, p. 30.

[2] It is noteworthy that Nemchinov has again been publicly urging the elimination of the system of materials allocation and its replacement by free trade in material inputs. *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, March 14, 1964, p. 5, and *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1964.

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scarce investment resources. In short, while Miss Erro's article would seem to draw a picture more gloomy than the facts warrant, Mr. Goldman may err in the other direction.

A REJOINDER

By Imogene Erro

In criticizing my article, "And What of the Consumer?," Mr. Goldman sometimes loses sight of my central argument. The study was not an attempt simply to measure the improvements over time in the Soviet consumer's situation, nor was it intended to show whether the consumer's cup was half empty or half full. Rather, I was mainly concerned with the promises made to consumers by Soviet officials in recent years and with the success or failure of light industry in fulfilling these promises. My conclusion was—and continues to be—that, in spite of some rather noticeable achievements during the 1950's, Soviet light industry has failed to deliver what the leadership promised (and planned), and what consumers believe they can rightfully expect as the economy develops. The reductions in goals for light industry announced at the CPSU Central Committee plenum last December—a few months after my article was written—lend additional support to this judgment.[1]

If, as Mr. Goldman contends, a study of light industry only is not enough to allow generalizations about Soviet consumer supplies because "the nature of consumption in the USSR has increased in complexity," then let us expand the discussion to include the other components of personal consumption—food, housing, consumer durables, and services.

The record shows quite conclusively that the rate of growth of Soviet personal consumption has declined since 1958. Figures published by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress in 1962 demonstrate that annual increases in Soviet per capita consumption of consumer goods (including food, light industrial production, and consumer durables) have dropped since 1958, even though consumer services have continued to grow at an increasing rate.[2] This trend is also indicated in the commentary by Mr. Becker. While his statistics are not exactly the same as mine, his aggregate index shows a similar decline in the consumption growth rate (see "All Categories" in his table above)—which is the principal point of my argument.

Mr. Becker states that Soviet per capita consumption increased 4 percent a year on the average during the first four years of the present plan period; if one chooses to accept his "outside limit," as I would be inclined to do, this average would drop to 3.5 percent a year. In either case, as Mr. Becker admits, the increase is comparatively small. However, we are concerned here not so much with the average achievement as with the trend in Soviet consumption. The aggregate index, when converted to a per capita basis, shows that increases in consumption, which were respectably high in 1959 and 1960, fell to lower levels in the succeeding years. Furthermore, the year 1963, which is not included in Mr. Becker's indexes, turned out to be the poorest year of all for the Soviet economy.[3] For example, the output of the processed food industry increased only 5 percent in 1963, compared with gains of 10 to 11 percent in other recent years, and light industry reported a production increase of only 2 percent, the lowest increase of any year since World War II. Because of these developments, any improvement in personal consumption in 1963 was probably slight.

Now let us consider separately the various components of Soviet consumption:

(1) Food supply in the USSR was generally adequate in recent years, at least in caloric value, until the end of 1963, when poor harvests produced severe strain and forced Soviet officials to purchase wheat from the West. However, even before these weather-conditioned reverses set in, some leveling-off of gains in the quality of the diet had been noticeable.[4] Thus, even though Khrushchev had promised in 1957 to overtake the US in per capita production of meat and milk within a short time, the forecast proved to be over-optimistic and the slogan had to be abandoned. Instead, by mid-1962, the leadership saw fit to impose sharp increases in the prices of meat and butter.[5] This measure, designed to reduce disposable incomes and at the same time to stimulate further production of the affected products, caused considerable distress among consumers and culminated in public demonstrations and riots in some areas.[6] Furthermore, the recent slaughtering of livestock, necessitated by feed shortages, will have an adverse effect on supplies of livestock products, especially meat, for some time to come. Thus, although some of the current deficiencies may soon be alleviated by better harvests, Soviet consumers can expect little more than modest improvements in food supplies, especially in quality foods, in the foreseeable future.

[1] For example, 1965 goals for fabrics were reduced from 8.3 billion to 7.4 billion square meters, a reduction of 11 percent. Leather footwear goals were reduced from 515 million to 470 million pairs, a reduction of 9 percent. *Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1963.

[2] Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, p. 360.

[3] *Pravda*, Jan. 24, 1964.

[4] *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, op. cit.*, pp. 360, 361.

[5] *Pravda*, June 1, 1962.

[6] For a discussion of popular unrest, see, "When the Kettle Boils Over . . .," by Albert Boiter, *Problems of Communism*, Jan.-Feb. 1964, p. 33.

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(2) In the field of Soviet housing construction, weather is not an important factor, and growth in this sector clearly reflects decisions by the leadership on allocation of resources. Yet, the longstanding housing shortage persists, while prospects for solving this basic consumer need are not encouraging. Living space per capita in Soviet urban areas averages about one-fourth of that in the US; in rural areas the average is even less.[7] A pledge by Soviet officials in 1957 to alleviate the housing shortage within 10 to 12 years was accompanied by a substantial increase in housing construction, including some private-home building, but the effort was not sustained. In 1963, new urban housing construction declined to 77 million square meters from an average annual level of 81 million in 1958-62.[8] Moreover, given the strain on resources currently felt by the whole economy and the new high priorities assigned to the chemical industry and the agricultural sector, any stepup in the pace of housing construction is not likely in the immediate future.

(3) As for consumer durables, growth rates for a few items reported each year are, as Mr. Goldman states, truly "dazzling," but how large a share do these products represent in the total supply of consumer goods? Retail trade statistics show that of all nonfood consumer goods sold in 1962, consumer durables comprised less than 4.5 percent.[9] This includes refrigerators of various sizes, many of which are small; washing machines, mainly agitator types without wringer or spinning devices; sewing machines, of which only a few are motor-driven; radio and television sets, vacuum cleaners, floor polishers, and a few others. The production of washing machines and refrigerators is increasing fairly rapidly, but production of watches, clocks, and cameras has leveled off somewhat, and that of sewing machines has been sharply reduced since 1960, in spite of high 1965 goals for all these commodities. Poor quality—a common characteristic of many Soviet-made durable goods—has depressed the sales of some of the products. For example, many low-quality, last-century models of sewing machines have proven unsalable and are reportedly sitting in warehouses.[10] On the other hand, customers in search of refrigerators currently wait three to five years for the more popular models and nearly as long for washing machines.

It is true that the buildup of inventories in clothing, shoes and other goods does reflect a continuing ability to expand production. As Mr. Goldman argues, this condition may tend to justify cutbacks in the production of selected commodities. However, little consumer satisfaction derives from an accumulation of surplus stocks so poor in quality as to be unsalable and so troublesome to the trade system as to be labeled even by Soviet officials as pure economic waste.[11] Indeed, what is the economic rationale of producing a range of goods that cannot be sold, especially in an economy where scarcities are so prevalent? Given this situation, increases in the marginal propensity to save (or to consume) are perhaps a dubious indicator of economic progress. The real problem is the question of how to cope, in a centrally-directed planned economy, with the complexities of production and marketing so as to offer people a range of goods reflecting their needs and tastes. Quite apart from these technical difficulties, however, the leadership has not seen fit to support its promises to the consumers with the necessary allocation of resources.

Professor Turgeon criticizes my conclusions for presenting an excessively pessimistic picture of both recent gains and short-run prospects for improvement in Soviet consumer goods production. He contends that achievements in 1963 and recently-announced revised plans show that the Soviet leadership has a good deal of confidence in its ability to accelerate the rate of growth in consumer industries in the next two years. His analysis attributes the over-all slowdown in the Soviet economy, and presumably the slow improvement in consumer production, to a reduction of the number of new entrants into the labor force resulting from the drop in birth rates during World War II. Professor Turgeon argues that, even though expenditures for defense and foreign aid may have had some effect, the slowdown in the early 1960's was due primarily to the labor shortage, and that this was, in fact, predictable. However, he believes that better days are immediately ahead because the number of entrants into the labor force will be on the upswing in 1964-65 and planned investment in light industry for that period is accordingly high. Together, he says, these factors will combine to permit the upsurge in consumer goods production which Soviet officials have been planning for all along.

In the absence of more precise data, discussions about Soviet consumer welfare must sometimes fall back on what Soviet statisticians call "Group A" and "Group B" industries, and Professor Turgeon has chosen to build his case on these series. However, he has neglected to point out the serious limitations of the basic data. The truth of the matter is that these aggregate series are fuzzy, difficult to describe, and often impossible to reconcile with other important measures. The Soviets use this classification to divide the total output of industry into two large categories: goods used for further production (Group A), and goods destined for consumption by the popu-

[7] *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, op. cit.*, p. 365.
[8] *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963 godu*, p. 195.
[9] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu*, p. 521.
[10] *Izvestia*, July 23, 1963.
[11] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, July 6, 1963, pp. 16 and 17.

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lation (Group B). However, Group B excludes some important categories of consumption. It does not account for the total food supply, but only for processed foods, and thus fails to include such items as potatoes, fresh fruits, and vegetables sold through state-owned stores and kolkhoz markets, as well as large amounts of food consumed by rural families. In addition, it excludes housing and services which also must be considered part of consumer welfare. In brief, I want to point out here that the reader must be aware of the pitfalls of analysis built on relationships between Group A and Group B industries; that Group B applies to consumer production in a general sense only, and that it should not be equated with "light industry," which in Soviet statistics comprises (with a few minor exceptions) textiles, clothing and footwear only.

Professor Turgeon goes to considerable pains to emphasize that, contrary to popular opinion, the priority assigned to light industry in recent years has actually been lower than it was in the early 1950's. I agree, of course. The data show that the share of total output provided by Group B industries has been declining steadily for many years, from 31 percent in 1950 to below 26 percent in 1963,[12] and that by 1965 it is to be even lower. I see nothing but support for my thesis in these figures. In spite of Khrushchev's many promises to the Soviet people and the consequent rise in consumer expectations, the consumer targets have not been fulfilled, and there are no indications that they will be met in the immediate years ahead.

The slowdown in Soviet economic growth is undoubtedly related in some degree to reduced flow of new entrants into the labor force. However, a more pertinent factor is probably the reduction of working hours during the period 1956-61, when the work was reduced from 48 to 41 hours;[13] this change clearly had a dampening effect on levels of production in some industries.

Actually, industrial employment increased faster in the period 1959-62 (3.8 percent) than it did in the two previous years (3.2 percent), despite the small increases in the total labor force during that time.[14] But in 1963 the industrial labor force grew at an even lower rate (2.5 percent), which tends to put in question Professor Turgeon's prediction that it would expand in the last two years of the plan.

Furthermore, I doubt that the economic slowdown of the early 1960's was as predictable as Professor Turgeon implies. While the decline in the birth rate during World War II, has long been a well-known fact, Professor Turgeon ignores the technological progress that has taken place since then. Labor-saving innovations, in particular, may have compensated, or more than compensated, for the declining number of entrants into the labor force.

Professor Turgeon suggests that there is a strong possibility of a speedup in the production of consumer goods as well as a general upturn in the economy in 1964-65. I fail to see how he can support this position. In fact, the basic data in his Table 1 hardly confirm the speedup which he implies has been anticipated and planned for by Soviet officials. The average annual growth of Group B industries during 1958-63 was 7.1 percent; that planned for 1964-65 is 7.0 percent, indicating no acceleration at all. All of which means that in many branches of light industry the USSR will do well to maintain the rates of growth so far attained in the Seven-Year Plan.

In a further attempt to support his prediction for an upturn, Professor Turgeon suggests that Soviet officials, anticipating a larger work force, have planned greater capital investment in the consumer industries. Actually, the 53 percent increase in light industrial investment planned for the two-year period 1964-65 is no higher than the planned investment for the previous several years, which has been badly underfulfilled. Moreover, the announced investment plan includes only centralized investment, which does not represent the total investment in this industry. Total investment in light industry (including both centralized and noncentralized) in recent years has grown only slightly, as I have explained and shown in my article. There is scarcely any reason to believe that the new plans will be carried out any more successfully.

Finally, the ratios shown in Professor Turgeon's Table 2 tend to be misleading, unless their relative weights are indicated. A breakdown of retail sales of consumer goods through the networks of the state-owned and cooperative stores (and this includes all but the kolkhoz markets) would show that, of the total goods sold in 1962, foodstuffs made up 56 percent; textiles, clothing, and footwear, 30 percent; cultural and sports goods, 9 percent; furniture and small household furnishings, 3 percent; and household appliances (including radio and TV), 2 percent.[15] The high increases in consumer durables, which are often singled out as indicators of better Soviet living standards, fall in the category which claimed the smallest share—only 2 percent—of sales to consumers in 1962.

In summary, I concur with much of the commentary of some of my critics, and I acknowledge certain limitations in my article. However, in my view, the criticisms have in no substantial way invalidated my original thesis, which is that Soviet consumer expectations, stimulated by repeated official promises, have been underfulfilled in the past few years and are not likely to be satisfied in the immediate future.

[12] *Izvestia*, Oct. 14, 1960.

[13] *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963*, p. 76.

[14] Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, *Annual Economic Indicators for the USSR*, p. 49.

[15] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu*, p. 521.

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Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D.C. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the front inside cover.)*

ON COLONIALISM

TO THE EDITORS: In his commentary on the subject of Soviet colonialism (January-February 1964), Mr. Moraes stated that the fine distinctions between British colonialism and Soviet communism count for little with the colonial victim, since his (or her) plight is similar to that of the toad beneath the harrow. I am afraid that Mr. Moraes has missed a fundamental point of difference in trying to draw fine distinctions. For basically there can be no comparison between liberalism and totalitarianism. It is certainly true that some of our finest spirits like Gandhi and Nehru were imprisoned under the British dispensation. And Bertrand Russell was also imprisoned in England. But the point worth stressing is that while these men were physically imprisoned, their minds were free. These prisoners have not only made notable contributions to prison literature, but their works had an impact on the Establishment. Surely one cannot conceive of any prisoner of Uzbekistan who could successfully register a similar protest against the Establishment in Moscow.

Viewed in perspective, the British approach to Indian problems emerges as a sequence of continually shifting perspectives of liberalism. It is this tradition which resulted in the transformation of the British Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations. The philosophical foundations of such a transformation were laid by a body of political thinkers with Burke at their head. Indeed, the priceless legacy of political wisdom which Burke transmitted to posterity in his double capacity as a liberal statesman and political philosopher has inspired and shaped the liberal forces of the Asian Revolution of the mid-20th century. The American philosopher William James wanted a moral equivalent for war. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that the Commonwealth, as an empirical solution to the problem of partnership in different spheres as it has evolved through the decades, is undoubtedly the liberal equivalent for the imperialism of the past era.

A. RANGANATHAN
Kilpauk, Madras, India

KHRUSHCHEV'S POWER

TO THE EDITORS: For the record I wish to point out that Professor Griffith, in his letter published in the May-June issue of this journal, attacks a thesis I never propounded. My article (*Problems of Communism,* Sept-Oct. 1963) does not rest on the proposition that since 1957 Khrushchev has had to engage in battle against an out-and-out "conspiracy" aimed at his overthrow. What I did do was offer evidence showing that conflict has occurred over his powers as leader as well as over various aspects of his policy. The activity of the "anti-party group" and the disputes over resource allocation were offered as prime cases in point. Professor Griffith does not dispose of my thesis with his argument that Khrushchev's retention of the leading position over the years shows how unchallengeable that position is. In fact, he skirts the main question. That question is whether the evidence of conflict in the Soviet party since 1957—as far as I know, no one says there is none—has any appreciable bearing on Khrushchev's leadership, and whether it tells us anything about the scope and extent of his power.

Professor Griffith's letter appears to offer a truly radical counterthesis, namely: Khrushchev's power after June 1957 became so complete that no one in the ruling group would or could offer resistance to his purposes. If true, this would be a remarkable achievement when we recall that Stalin succeeded in gaining equivalent power only by instituting a regime of terror. Even as late as 1934, long after Stalin had routed his opponents and piled up massive powers, Kirov and others joined in an effort to restrain him. (This conclusion, incidentally, has been drawn through careful inferential analy-

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sis by various Western scholars—Kremlinology if you wish—and has since been corroborated by the Moscow press.)

If the history of the USSR tells the outside observer anything, it tells him not to treat Soviet politics as either simple or obvious. Unfortunately and unavoidably, the truth has to be approached by largely deductive and inferential methods. This makes the intensive examination of all available contemporary data the more vital if our historical analogies and general propositions are to hold water and if we are to avoid mistaking the Soviet leadership's monolithic image for its reality.

C. LINDEN
Washington, D.C.

(This correspondence is now concluded.—The Editors)

ERRATUM

In Miss Emily Clark Brown's communication on the subject of labor in the USSR (May-June issue, p. 83), the following passage appeared:

. . . 60,000 people were found to be out of work for one month for the entire country, or an average of 250,000 idle each month.

This should have read:

. . . 60,000 people were found to be out of work for about one month; if the same proportion held for the whole USSR, this would mean about 3 million persons out of work for one month for the entire country, or an average of 250,000 idle each month.

We regret this unfortunate typographical omission.

—The Editors

THE SOVIET MILITARY

TO THE EDITORS: An important oversight has been made in discussions to date of the two editions of the Soviet book on military science, *Voennaia strategiia,* edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, *et al.* This omission is true also of the otherwise comprehensive articles by Messrs. Wolfe and Gallagher, (May-June 1964). Mr. Wolfe *did* mention that the 1963 second edition of the book is 50 pages longer than the first edition. But no one has, to my knowledge, pointed out that *two extremely important paragraphs* are missing in the second edition published in 1963.

In Chapter IV, in the section entitled "The Marxist-Leninist Meaning of the Nature of War in the Modern Era," one finds these two paragraphs, *in the first edition*:

The Yugoslav revisionists also keep pace with the military ideologists of imperialism. In his slanderous book, Socialism and War, *E. Kardelj tries in every way to whitewash the aggressive policy of American imperialism and to conceal the real source of the war threatening the world. Despite the historically proven teachings of Marxism-Leninism, he does not consider war as a continuation of politics by forcible means and ignores the connection between war and the class struggle. . . .*[1]

Yugoslav revisionists assert that modern bourgeois countries have a superclass nature, that they protect the interests of all classes, and that their policy is universal.[2]

What is the significance of the omission? A full answer to this question would require a long Kremlinological analysis. But a few observations as to the timing of the two editions together with the turn of political events in the Soviet Union would seem warranted. . . .

There seems little doubt that the two omitted paragraphs with the epithets "Yugoslav revisionists" bore a certain kinship to the first version of the May Day slogans published in *Pravda* (and other papers) on April 8, 1963. Slogan number 29, addressed to Yugoslavia, omitted the key word "Socialist" in the description of the Yugoslav state. A few days later, on April 11, *Pravda* published a *utocheniie* (clarification) in which it stated that the slogan "should have read . . . Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia . . . etc."

It may be recalled also that it was on May 4 that *Pravda* again published a short item, this time under the heading "Announcement," stating that Frol Kozlov had been unable to attend the May Day celebrations "due to illness."

Boris Nicolayevsky . . . has pointed out that the decision to publish the Yugoslav slogan on April 8 *sans* "Socialist". . . was undoubtedly one of the many maneuvers undertaken by Kozlov (in this case, in Khrushchev's absence from Moscow, Kozlov was in fact acting as First Secretary with the authority to make such an editorial decision) during the period November 1962 through the first week of April 1963. Kozlov appeared, at least since 1960, to have aligned himself with the more conservative . . . elements in the Kremlin, among them undoubtedly numerous military figures. If this is true, and Kozlov was one of the "metal-eaters" referred to pejoratively by Khrushchev in 1963, it is likely that his positions on Communist China, the intelligentsia, agricultural policy, economic management, planning, etc. were consistently conservative and thus, of course, hostile to the kind of socialism practiced in Yugoslavia. The flared-up attack on artists and writers during this "Kozlov Period" (which incidentally was tied in by Malinovski and others with a concern on the part of the military for growing "pacifism" in the arts); the restraint shown toward China

[1] Translated in *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts,* published by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963—an English-language edition of the Russian first edition, p. 170.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

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despite the Chinese-Indian border clashes and despite Khrushchev's somewhat restrained and one-sided jabs at Peking (his December 1962 Supreme Soviet speech, for example); the abruptness with which the campaign for orthodoxy in the arts was stopped and overt attacks on China were resumed—these and other developments point toward Kozlov's involvement in a conservative reaction which failed to unseat Khrushchev and his middle-of-the-road supporters.

In the light of this, we find that the second edition of the Sokolovski book was "submitted to the editor" on April 18, 1963, and sent to the printer in its final form on August 30, 1963. By this time, obviously, the conservative tide had been stemmed, the May Day slogan recast so as to accept Yugoslavia as a fully Socialist state, and whatever stake the military had in Kozlov's ambitions disrupted. Khrushchev's cut in military expenditures, his triumphant posture with respect to the "metal-eaters" and the favorable treatment of Malenkovist "consumerism," perhaps also the test-ban agreement—all of these and other events tend to confirm the concluding statement made at the close of Mr. Wolfe's excellent piece:

. . . it also seems true that the Soviet military as an elite group is still far from being in a position to exercise dominating influence on Soviet policy-making as a whole.

Still the approaching crescendo in the Khrushchev succession struggle should not give rise to complacency on anyone's part so far as the ambitious of a significant part of the Soviet military are concerned.

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